Social democracy and the relative price of investment: left governments, indirect taxation and the division of corporate income in affluent democracies
Abstract While indirect taxes can fall on both consumption and investment spending, there has been little discussion on how governments may tax these two types of expenditure differentially. This article shows that the choice between taxing consumption and investment spending has important distributive implications for left governments as the traditional defenders of redistribution. In particular, when left governments increase taxes on investment relative to consumption expenditure, the higher price of investment relative to consumption goods drives up the labor share of corporate income, lowers corporate saving and reduces corporate net lending. Because this labor share strategy of redistribution is likely to antagonize capital, left governments tend to pursue it more intensely when corporatism has declined. I test these arguments using data across 12–14 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from the 1970s to 2010.