scholarly journals One Central Bank to Rule Them All*

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Brusa ◽  
Pavel Savor ◽  
Mungo Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Comparable Result ◽  
Global Markets ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Global Stock Markets ◽  
Global Stock

Abstract While global stock markets enjoy high returns on days surrounding Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, there is no comparable result for other central banks either internationally or, more surprisingly, domestically. Neither announcement surprises nor currency moves drive these findings, which hold even for stocks with a domestic focus. The difference in announcement premia is not explained by economy size, exposure to multinationals, or policy activism. We conclude that the Fed exerts a unique impact on global equities. Consistent with this hypothesis, uncertainty drops across global markets following FOMC announcements but not those of other central banks. Furthermore, the Fed is generally the leader among central banks in setting monetary policy.

scholarly journals Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
General Question ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Fixed Rate ◽  
Proposed Model

Abstract Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so-called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under-’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.

Central Bank Communications

2019 ◽  
pp. 262-286
Author(s):  
J. Scott Davis ◽  
Mark A. Wynne
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Monetary Policy Shocks ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
Quarter Century ◽  
The Past ◽  
Policy Shocks ◽  
Monetary Policy Shock ◽  
Daily Time

Over the past twenty-five years, central bank communications have undergone a major revolution. Central banks that previously shrouded themselves in mystery now embrace social media to get their message out to the widest audience. The volume of information about monetary policy that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) now releases dwarfs what it was releasing a quarter century ago. This chapter focuses on just one channel of FOMC communications, the postmeeting statement. It documents how this has become more detailed over time. Then daily financial-market data are used to estimate a daily time series of US monetary policy shocks. These shocks on Fed statement release days have gotten larger as the statement has gotten longer and more detailed, and the chapter shows that the length and complexity of the statement have a direct effect on the size of the monetary policy shock following a Fed decision.

Crafting Consensus

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Baerg
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Policy Statements ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Central Bankers

In the early 2000s, the US monetary policy committee, as well as other central banks around the world, began using “forward guidance,” or changes in their statement language, to signal policy changes. Underlying this shift toward clearer communication was the idea that more comprehensible monetary policy would lead to better economic performance and lower inflation. The first three chapters of this book argue that, rather than being a lofty goal set by altruistically motivated policy makers, transparency depends on the configuration of committee members’ preferences. Monetary policy committees that have central bankers with opposing preferences are argued to communicate more precisely compared to either a single decision maker or central bankers with more similar preferences. Precise communication is then shown to have positive effects by lowering inflation. Shifting focus and using data from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), chapter 4 presents evidence that committees with opposing preferences use a lower share of uncertainty words in policy statements and make more numerous changes to public announcements. Chapter 5 shows that households in Germany change their inflation expectations when given more precise central bank information. And chapter 6 shows that the level of precision in inflation-related news articles is negatively related to inflation in a sample of countries from Latin America. In conclusion, this book offers a new way of thinking about central bank committees and transparency. It finds that appointing a more policy-diverse central bank committee can encourage intercommittee governance and accountability as well as better economic performance.

scholarly journals The Effect of FOMC Votes on Financial Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (5) ◽  
pp. 921-932
Author(s):  
Carlos Madeira ◽  
João Madeira
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Treasury Securities ◽  
Stock Market Reaction

This paper shows that since votes of members of the Federal Open Market Committee have been included in press statements, stock prices increase after the announcement when votes are unanimous but fall when dissent (which typically is due to preference for higher interest rates) occurs. This pattern started prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The differences in stock market reaction between unanimity and dissent remain, even controlling for the stance of monetary policy and consecutive dissent. Statement semantics also do not seem to explain the documented effect. We find no differences between unanimity and dissent with respect to impact on market risk and Treasury securities.

scholarly journals Testing for Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Felix S. Nyumuah
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Less Developed Countries ◽  
Reaction Function ◽  
Policy Rule ◽  
Asymmetric Preferences ◽  
Policy Reaction Function

The linear specification of the ideal monetary policy reaction function has been questioned in recent times by researchers. They have suggested a nonlinear framework where central banks exhibit asymmetric behaviours. Despite the important policy implications of having asymmetric central bank preferences, studies have been on single-country basis focusing almost entirely on advanced economies. The aim of this study is to check the existence of asymmetric preferences on the part of central banks in the context of a panel of countries and not just a single a country. The study derives and estimates a nonlinear flexible optimal monetary policy rule, which permits zone-like as well as asymmetric behaviours using panel data from a range of countries both developed and less developed. Although the findings indicate the presence of asymmetric preferences on the output gap across less developed countries, generally, the evidence is in favour of a linear policy reaction function and symmetric central bank preferences. These findings mean that monetary policy is characterised by a linear policy rule and symmetric central bank preferences. The results also indicate that interest rate ‘smoothing’ reaction by monetary authorities is more pronounced in less developed countries than in developed ones.

scholarly journals Unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank: A brief recapitulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank

<p>The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a signifciant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.</p>

scholarly journals Comparison of the Approach of the Czech National Bank and the European Central Bank to the Effects of the Global Financial Crisis

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.

scholarly journals CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-100
Author(s):  
T.S. Hudima ◽  
V.A. Ustymenko
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
The Right ◽  
Article 5

The article is devoted to identifying the peculiarities of the central bank digital currency (CBDC), explaining their impact on the monetary policy of the state, and identifying the prospects for the transformation of domestic banking legislation in connection with the implementation of the CBDC. It is noted that the scope of competence of the Central Bank and the legal basis for the issuance of the CBDC will depend on the economic and legal features of the digital currency, the degree of its impact on the monetary policy, the financial stability of the country’s economy and so on. In the process of forming the appropriate legal field and defining the conceptual apparatus in the sphere of emission and circulation of the CBDC, the peculiarities of the use of the latter in economic transactions and the specific functions not inherent in ordinary means of payment should be taken. СBDC initiatives will help: 1) progressively narrow the banking system at the level of the Central Banks (such as the Chicago Plan) by allowing individuals and businesses to deposit directly into the accounts of the Central Banks; 2) increasing confidence of economic entities and individuals in the financial system; 3) strengthening the financial stability of the economy (both domestically and globally). Granting business entities or individuals the right to store digital money directly with the Central Bank can give rise to two main directions of influence on monetary policy: first, to strengthen its transmission mechanism; secondly, lead to banks being disrupted. This may lead to some legal issues regarding (1) the NBU’s area of competence; (2) the constitutional foundations of the legal economic order (Article 5 of the ECU). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that centralization of the production, servicing, and management of the СBDC turnover may violate the principles of competition in business activities, prevent abuse of monopoly position in the market, etc. Keywords: monetary policy, central bank digital currency, financial stability, competence, legal framework, economic operations, issue.

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

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