Credit Default Swaps and Bank Regulatory Capital*
Keyword(s):
Abstract While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier.
2013 ◽
Vol 107
(1)
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pp. 25-45
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2014 ◽
Vol 27
(10)
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pp. 2927-2960
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