scholarly journals Asymmetric Information and the Pecking (Dis)Order*

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 961-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Fulghieri ◽  
Diego García ◽  
Dirk Hackbarth
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Classical Problem ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Growth Options ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Growth Firms

Abstract We study the classical problem of raising capital under asymmetric information. Following Myers and Majluf, we consider firms endowed with assets in place and riskier growth opportunities. When asymmetric information is concentrated on assets in place (rather than growth opportunities), equity-like securities are more likely to be optimal. In contrast, when asymmetric information falls on growth options, debt is optimal. Intuitively, this happens because when the asset with greater volatility is less affected by asymmetric information, issuing a security with greater exposure to upside potential (such as equity) can be less dilutive than issuing a security lacking such exposure (such as debt). Our results suggest that equity is more likely to dominate debt for younger firms with larger investment needs, endowed with riskier, more valuable growth opportunities. Thus, our model can explain why high-growth firms may prefer equity over debt, and then switch to debt financing as they mature.

CEO Domination, Growth Opportunities, and their Impact on Audit Fees

2001 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judy S. L. Tsui ◽  
Bikki Jaggi ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul
Keyword(s):  
High Growth ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines the relationship between a firm's internal monitoring mechanism and its impact on the audit fee. The first hypothesis investigates whether firms with independent corporate boards (chief executive officer and chairman being separate individuals) provide a more effective internal monitoring mechanism and are thus associated with lower control risk, resulting in lower audit effort and fees as compared to nonindependent, CEO-dominated boards. The second hypothesis examines whether the effectiveness of the internal monitoring mechanism provided by independent corporate boards is independent of the firms' growth opportunities. High-growth firms are by nature more difficult to monitor due to the existence of discretionary investments and measurement problems associated with future assets. Thus, the negative association between independent corporate boards and audit fees is expected to be affected by a firm's growth. Results using 650 observations from Hong Kong companies provide support for both hypotheses.

scholarly journals Leverage and investment opportunities: the effect on high growth firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (83) ◽  
pp. 302-317
Author(s):  
Rossimar Laura Oliveira ◽  
Eduardo Kazuo Kayo
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Dynamic Panel ◽  
Industry Growth ◽  
Investment Opportunities ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
The Relationship

ABSTRACT The objective of this paper is to investigate if the high growth of a firm results in a reduction in its debt levels. This is expected to happen for firms that experience a positive idiosyncratic shock to their growth opportunities, which would affect their cash flow and profitability. Although the relationship between growth opportunities (e.g., Tobin’s Q) and capital structure has already been widely discussed from a conceptual viewpoint, there are still important empirical gaps, particularly due to the endogeneity of the first variable. This paper seeks to minimize these problems by operationalizing the concept of idiosyncratic technological shocks. This issue is relevant because the negative relationship between growth and leverage may indicate that for the most efficient companies there will be a reduction in bankruptcy cost and a reduction in agency costs for the least efficient companies. This paper contributes to the development of studies in the area by demonstrating the inverse relationship between growth and leverage, with the model and the variable that represents the positive shocks experienced by companies. The dynamic panel method enables an analysis of the variation in debt in relation to the variation in value using the first differences and controlling the lagged debt effect. To apply the model, we used data from Brazilian companies, covering 1995 to 2016. The main results show that the greater the ratio between the firm’s growth opportunities and its industry growth opportunities, the lower its leverage indicators. The complementary results suggest that less leveraged firms have this negative relationship to an even stronger degree.

Does Growth Affect Firms’ Leverage Adjustment Speed? A Study of Indian Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Biswajit Ghose ◽  
Kailash Chandra Kabra
Keyword(s):  
High Growth ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Partial Adjustment ◽  
Partial Adjustment Model ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

The significance of firms’ growth opportunities as one of the determinants of leverage is documented in many prior studies. But, there are not enough studies which examine the impact of growth on leverage adjustment speed. In this backdrop, the present study investigates the relationship between growth and leverage adjustment speed. Second, the study also examines the moderating role of two dimensions of target deviation, that is, nature and level of deviation in the relationship between growth and leverage adjustment speed. Using partial adjustment model on a dataset of 28,532 firm-year observations comprising 2,718 listed Indian firms with 4–12 years data for each firm, the study observes faster leverage adjustment speed for high-growth firms (36%) than low-growth firms (24%). The results also confirm the moderating effect of target deviation in the relationship between growth and adjustment speed. Overall, the study concludes that firms’ growth opportunities cause asymmetries in target adjustment speed by altering the costs and benefits of adjustment, and nature and level of target deviation moderates the relationship between growth and adjustment speed. These findings are expected to have substantial practical implications for financial managers in their capital structure decisions.

Earnings Management, Litigation Risk, and Asymmetric Audit Fee Responses

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
Price Earnings Ratio ◽  
Year 2000 ◽  
Conservative Bias

This study examines the association between audit fees and earnings management, using publicly available fee data. We hypothesize that, due to asymmetric litigation effects, audit fees decrease (increase) with a client's risk of income-decreasing (increasing) earnings management risk. We also hypothesize that the positive relation between income-increasing earnings management risk and audit fees is heightened for clients that are high-growth firms. We test our hypotheses with a sample of 429 public, non-regulated, Big 5 audited companies, using fee data for the year 2000. We find that downward earnings management risk, as estimated by negative (i.e., income-decreasing) discretionary accruals, is associated with lower audit fees. We also document that upward earnings management risk, as estimated by positive discretionary accruals, is associated with higher audit fees and that the interaction of this risk with an industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio has an incrementally significant, positive effect on fees. We interpret our findings as consistent with a conservative bias on the part of auditors. The conservative bias arises from asymmetric litigation risk in which income-increasing discretionary accruals exhibit greater expected litigation costs than income-decreasing discretionary accruals (Simunic and Stein 1996; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Richardson et al. 2002; Heninger 2001).

Explaining the Growth Potential of a Market Leader and Challenger: Evidence from Japan’s Telecommunications Services Industry

2021 ◽  
pp. 227853372198952
Author(s):  
Mostafa Saidur Rahim Khan ◽  
Naheed Rabbani
Keyword(s):  
High Growth ◽  
Growth Potential ◽  
Book Value ◽  
Good Investment ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
Price Earnings Ratio ◽  
Equity Ratio ◽  
Market Leader ◽  
Services Industry ◽  
Telecommunications Services

This study examines the growth potential of the market leader and market challenger in Japan’s telecommunications services industry. We focus on Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) and KDDI, the market leader and challenger (respectively) in terms of sales revenue, total assets, and market share. Following finance literatures, we use higher values of price–earnings ratio (P/E) and market-to-book-value-of-equity ratio (MV/BV) as the indicators of growth potential. High growth firms have the potential to outperform the overall market over a significant period of time providing a good investment opportunity for retail and institutional investors. This study uses financial data of the NTT and KDDI from the period between 2001 and 2016 and applies several regression models to examine the growth potential of the market leader and market challenger in Japan’s telecommunications services industry. Using the P/E and MV/BV as indicators of growth potential, we show that the market challenger’s growth potential is significantly higher than that of the market leader, even after controlling for firm size, liquidity, profitability, leverage, cash flow, and age.

scholarly journals Myth-busting and entrepreneurship policy: the case of high growth firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 414-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Brown ◽  
Suzanne Mawson ◽  
Colin Mason
Keyword(s):  
High Growth ◽  
Entrepreneurship Policy ◽  
Growth Firms
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