Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports

Sylvain Chassang; Gerard Padró I Miquel

doi:10.1093/restud/rdy075

Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports

The Review of Economic Studies ◽

10.1093/restud/rdy075 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 86 (6) ◽

pp. 2530-2553 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Sylvain Chassang ◽

Gerard Padró I Miquel

Keyword(s):

Incomplete Information ◽

Policy Evaluation ◽

Policy Design ◽

Communication Channels ◽

Successful Intervention ◽

Informative Signals ◽

Target Intervention

Abstract We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor (the potential whistleblower) to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against the monitor in the event of an intervention. In this setting, intervention policies that are responsive to the monitor’s message provide informative signals to the agent, which can be used to target threats efficiently. Principals that are too responsive to information shut down communication channels. Successful intervention policies must therefore garble the information provided by monitors and cannot be fully responsive. We show that policy evaluation on the basis of non-verifiable whistleblower messages is feasible under arbitrary incomplete information provided policy design takes into account that messages are endogenous.

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The contribution of policy design to realist evaluation

Evaluation ◽

10.1177/1356389020902496 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 26 (3) ◽

pp. 296-314

Author(s):

Guillaume Fontaine

Keyword(s):

Policy Evaluation ◽

Policy Design ◽

Policy Instruments ◽

Policy Formulation ◽

Realist Evaluation ◽

Causal Mechanism ◽

Policy Outcome ◽

Case Selection ◽

Empirical Tests

The literature on policy design provides insightful resources to improve policy evaluation. We compare how this literature addresses causation, evaluation, instrumentation, and intervention, based on different methodologies. Then, we explain how the realist approach can contribute to theory-based evaluation with multi-methods. We go through the process leading from the adoption of policy aims to the production of a policy outcome by a causal mechanism linking agenda setting to policy formulation, cross-sectorial coordination, political interplays, and this policy’s outcome. This hypothesis is then tested against a typology of policy instruments classified by the State resources. These instruments are hereby treated as expected empirical observations that provide an empirical basis to assess the theoretical process following a Bayesian logic. We eventually present a five-step protocol aimed at making realist policy evaluation easier, which includes process theorization and operationalization, empirical tests design, case selection and justification, congruence analysis, and deep within-case study.

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Handling Incomplete Information in Policy Evaluation using Attribute Similarity

2020 Second IEEE International Conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Intelligent Systems and Applications (TPS-ISA) ◽

10.1109/tps-isa50397.2020.00021 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Sowmya Ravidas ◽

Indrakshi Ray ◽

Nicola Zannone

Keyword(s):

Incomplete Information ◽

Policy Evaluation

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Abstract #1103: Comprehensive Diabetes Care Through Continuous Communication Channels to Patients with Diabetes

Endocrine Practice ◽

10.1016/s1530-891x(20)44228-4 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 23 ◽

pp. 290

Author(s):

Vamsi Kolukula ◽

Jayashree Gopal ◽

Shantharam Duvuru ◽

Kalpana Dash ◽

Sanjiv Shah ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Diabetes Care ◽

Communication Channels ◽

Patients With Diabetes

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Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design

10.1017/cbo9780511491061 ◽

2002 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Huib Pellikaan ◽

Robert J. van der Veen

Keyword(s):

Policy Design

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Election Poster Persuasion

Social Psychology ◽

10.1027/1864-9335/a000323 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 49 (1) ◽

pp. 3-15 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Malte Schott ◽

Jule Wolf

Keyword(s):

Political Parties ◽

Policy Evaluation ◽

Political Party ◽

Need For Cognition ◽

Evaluation Study ◽

Additional Measure ◽

Political Preferences ◽

Policy Statements ◽

Voting Intentions

Abstract. We examined the effect of presenting unknown policy statements on German parties’ election posters. Study 1 showed that participants inferred the quality of a presented policy from knowledge about the respective political party. Study 2 showed that participants’ own political preferences influenced valence estimates: policy statements presented on campaign posters of liked political parties were rated significantly more positive than those presented on posters of disliked political parties. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 with an additional measure of participants’ need for cognition. Need for cognition scores were unrelated to the valence transfer from political parties to policy evaluation. Study 4 replicated the findings of Studies 2 and 3 with an additional measure of participants’ voting intentions. Voting intentions were a significant predictor for valence transfer. Participants credited both their individually liked and disliked political parties for supporting the two unknown policies. However, the credit attributed to the liked party was significantly higher than to the disliked one. Study 5 replicated the findings of Studies 2, 3, and 4. Additionally, participants evaluated political clubs that were associated with the same policies previously presented on election posters. Here, a second-degree transfer emerged: from party valence to policy evaluation and from policy evaluation to club evaluation. Implications of the presented studies for policy communications and election campaigning are discussed.

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