D.X.3 The Relation of the Aristotelian ϕρόνησις {moral discernment} to the modern Moral sense and προαίρεσις {moral judgement} to Free Will

Author(s):  
Gerard Manley Hopkins
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity

The term ‘moral judgement’ can refer to an activity, a state, a state-content, a capacity or a virtue. The activity of moral judgement is that of thinking about whether something has a moral attribute. The thing assessed might be an action, person, institution or state of affairs, and the attribute might either be general (such as rightness or badness) or specific (such as loyalty or injustice). If I engage in this activity and make up my mind, then the result will be the formation of a psychological state: the state of judging that the thing has the attribute. The state should then be distinguished from its content: what is judged by me, rather than my judging it. My psychological state of judging that human trafficking is wrong is a feature of me with a duration and location that depend on me. But the content of that state – the wrongness of human trafficking itself – is not a feature of me. Philosophers also frequently use ‘moral judgement’ to refer to a capacity: our alleged capacity ‘to go beyond the application of rules’ when we deliberate morally. And, going further, it can be used as a term of commendation, referring to a moral virtue (or set of virtues) that we might also call ‘moral discernment’ or ‘moral wisdom’, displayed when we exercise that capacity well. Someone with the virtue of moral judgement, it is often claimed, has an appropriate sensitivity to the way in which the individuality of a person or the particularity of a context can determine how it is right to act, think and feel – a sensitivity that cannot be captured in any general rule. Moral judgement in these various senses raises four main groups of philosophical questions. First, what kind of psychological state is the state of moral judgement? Is it, either wholly or in part, a belief, or is it some kind of noncognitive state? Secondly, what is required in order for a moral judgement-state, or the content of that state, to be justified? What kind of support do moral judgements require? Thirdly, how ought the activity of moral judgement to be conducted? In particular, what role within this activity is properly played by the application of rules? Do we need a capacity that goes beyond rule-application? And, fourthly, what is it to possess the virtue of moral judgement?


Author(s):  
Carl J. Richard

“Thomas Jefferson” demonstrates that Jefferson combined elements of Epicureanism with components of Stoicism and Christianity to form a unique philosophy. Jefferson derived from the Stoics and from Cicero the belief in an innate moral sense. Like these forebears, Jefferson envisioned the moral sense as a mere instinct for good that required training (reason acting on experience) to develop into full-blown virtue, rather than as a collection of Platonic innate ideas. Christianity furnished him with the concepts of a creator, a resurrection, and an afterlife. It also provided a system of ethics based on positive benevolence. He preferred the warmth and benevolence of Christianity to the cold obligations of classical philosophy, which centered on the mere avoidance of injury to oneself and others. Epicureanism provided other essential features of Jefferson’s philosophy, such as a materialist metaphysics and consequent rejection of miracles. Although Jefferson’s Epicureanism did not lead him to reject the doctrine of divine providence commonly held in his day, it contributed greatly to his belief that God worked solely through natural causes to achieve his ends. The Epicurean emphasis on the role played by reason (logic) acting on experience in uncovering truth and its concept of free will also influenced the Virginian.


Author(s):  
Paul Russell

This chapter discusses an important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free will debates, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This chapter disentangles three strands of Strawson’s argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson’s view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson’s view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The chapter concludes with suggestions of how a reactive attitude approach to moral responsibility that builds on the work of Strawson, Wallace, and others might be successfully developed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1055-1076
Author(s):  
Pierre Guenancia

Descartes e a ideia de homem. Imperfeição e perfeição do homem Resumo: O autor nota, por um lado, que Descartes se refere a uma compreensão muito larga, mas também comum e corrente, do homem e, por outro, que o homem não pode ser identificado nem ao corpo, nem à alma, nem mesmo à união do corpo e da alma. Quando falamos da natureza humana, ela evoca o caráter de uma perfeição limitada, cuja particularidade é sua capacidade de ter o livre-arbítrio. A noção do homem enquanto sujeito de (não) perfeição é baseada sobre uma ideia que se define por uma relação à ideia do infinito sob a forma da aspiração a ser mais perfeito. O exercício do livre-arbítrio se articula concretamente a um esforço de atenção e de vigilância que permite evitar um juízo errôneo. A tese exposta se desenvolve, em seguida, em três tópicos. Primeiramente, a razão se apresenta como um instrumento universal do homem, que, por sua vez, aparece como ser polivalente que o utiliza, sendo capaz de se adaptar às situações as mais diversas. Em segundo lugar, a perfeição especificamente humana significará a capacidade de exercer a dúvida e de recorrer às suposições e probabilidades no plano cognitivo. Isso significa, entre outros, que, para a aquisição da perfeição, é preciso reconhecer a sua própria imperfeição. Enfim, em terceiro lugar, a capacidade de usar propriamente o livre-arbítrio conduz à definição de homem como generoso, em que o homem é compreendido no sentido moral mais que no metafísico. Palavras-chave: Homem; Perfeição; Finitude; Atenção ; Livre arbítrio; Generosidade. Descartes et l’idée de l’homme. Imperfection et perfection de l’homme. Résumé: L'auteur note que, d'une part, Descartes se réfère à une compréhension très large, mais aussi commune et courante de l'homme, et de l'autre que l'homme ne peut pas être identifié ni au corps, ni à l'âme, ni même à l'union du corps et de l'âme. Lorsqu’on parle de la nature humaine, elle porte le caractère d'une perfection limitée, dont la particularité est sa capacité d'avoir le libre arbitre. La notion de l'homme en tant que sujet de (non) perfection est basée sur une idée qui se définit par rapport à l'idée de l'infini sous la forme de l'aspiration à être plus parfait. L’exercice du libre arbitre se joint concrètement à un effort d'attention et de vigilance qui permet d’éviter un jugement erroné. La thèse ci-dessus se développe ensuite en trois points. Premièrement, la raison se présente comme un instrument universel de l'homme qui à son tour apparait comme être polyvalent l'utilisant et étant capable de s'adapter aux situations les plus diverses. Deuxièmement, la perfection spécifiquement humaine signifiera la capacité d’exercer le doute et de recourir aux suppositions et probabilités sur le plan cognitif. Cela signifie entre autres que pour l'acquisition de la perfection, il faut reconnaître sa propre imperfection. Enfin, troisièmement, la capacité d'user proprement le libre arbitre conduit à la définition de l'homme comme généreux, où l'homme est compris au sens moral plus que métaphysique. Mots clé: Homme; La Perfection; Finitude; Attention ; Libre arbitre ; La Générosité. Descartes and the idea of man. Imperfection and perfection of man Abstract: The author notes that, on the one hand, Descartes refers to a very broad, but also common and current understanding of man, and on the other that man cannot be identified nor with the body , neither to the soul, nor even to the union of body and soul. When we speak of human nature, it carries the character of a limited perfection, the particularity of which is the ability to have free will. The notion of man as the subject of (non) perfection is based on an idea which is defined in relation to the idea of ​​infinity in the form of the aspiration to be more perfect. The exercise of free will is joined concretely to an effort of attention and vigilance which makes it possible to avoid erroneous judgment. The thesis above then develops in three points. First, reason presents itself as a universal instrument of man who in turn appears to be versatile, using it and being able to adapt to the most diverse situations. Second, specifically human perfection will mean the ability to exercise doubt and use cognitive assumptions and probabilities. Among other things, this means that in order to acquire perfection, you have to recognize your own imperfection. Finally, thirdly, the ability to use free will properly leads to the definition of man as generous, where man is understood more in the moral sense than in the metaphysical sense. Keywords: Man; Perfection; Finitude; Attention ; Free will ; Generosity. Data de registro: 17/11/2020 Data de aceite: 30/12/2020  


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 84-93
Author(s):  
Amir Qorbanpoor Lafmejani

Freud's theory is among the major theories of counseling and psychotherapy. Freud, like other psychotherapists has his own anthropological views. In Freud's theory, man is an instinctive being. A human being is a system of energy, and this energy is the same as the energy of the "id" or "libido. The goal of life is to reduce the tension and gain pleasure. Most human behaviors originate from the unconscious, and humans do not have free will. From this perspective, the person has no tendency to morality within himself, and consequently ethics will be relative. However, From Shi'a point of view, man is the supreme creature of God and is a creature that has two lives. Human beings have free will, so there is a responsibility. Shi'a believes that man is not morally neutral and generally have a common moral sense and are aware of the ethical principles and the ultimate goal of life and Creation is to reach the nearness to God.


Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity

The term ‘moral judgement’ can refer to an activity, a state, a state-content, a capacity or a virtue. The activity of moral judgement is that of thinking about whether something has a moral attribute. The thing assessed might be an action, person, institution or state of affairs, and the attribute might either be general (such as rightness or badness) or specific (such as loyalty or injustice). If I engage in this activity and make up my mind, then the result will be the formation of a psychological state: the state of judging that the thing has the attribute. The state should then be distinguished from its content: what is judged by me, rather than my judging it. My psychological state of judging that human trafficking is wrong is a feature of me with a duration and location that depend on me. But the content of that state – the wrongness of human trafficking itself – is not a feature of me. Philosophers also frequently use ‘moral judgement’ to refer to a capacity: our alleged capacity ‘to go beyond the application of rules’ when we deliberate morally. And, going further, it can be used as a term of commendation, referring to a moral virtue (or set of virtues) that we might also call ‘moral discernment’ or ‘moral wisdom’, displayed when we exercise that capacity well. Someone with the virtue of moral judgement, it is often claimed, has an appropriate sensitivity to the way in which the individuality of a person or the particularity of a context can determine how it is right to act, think and feel – a sensitivity that cannot be captured in any general rule. Moral judgement in these various senses raises four main groups of philosophical questions. First, what kind of psychological state is the state of moral judgement? Is it, either wholly or in part, a belief, or is it some kind of noncognitive state? Secondly, what is required in order for a moral judgement-state, or the content of that state, to be justified? What kind of support do moral judgements require? Thirdly, how ought the activity of moral judgement to be conducted? In particular, what role within this activity is properly played by the application of rules? Do we need a capacity that goes beyond rule-application? And, fourthly, what is it to possess the virtue of moral judgement?


Author(s):  
Dita Šamánková ◽  
Marek Preiss ◽  
Tereza Příhodová
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Logi Gunnarsson
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.


1994 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. A. Sappington
Keyword(s):  

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