To John Holland, Thursday, 19 April 1821

1986 ◽  
pp. 184-184
Author(s):  
John Clare
Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 131-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Trapmann
Keyword(s):  

Zusammenfassung. Vorgestellt wird die revidierte Form des Allgemeinen Interessen-Struktur-Tests (AIST-R) und des Umwelt-Struktur-Tests (UST-R). Das Verfahren basiert auf dem hexagonalen Interessenmodell von John Holland und ermöglicht die Messung von Interessen einer Person und Eigenschaften beruflicher Umwelten auf sechs Dimensionen. Im Vergleich zur Erstauflage des Verfahrens wurde fast die Hälfte der Items verändert, was die Verständlichkeit fördern und zur Berücksichtigung neuerer Berufsfelder führen soll. Der AIST-R/UST-R ist ein ökonomisch durchzuführendes und gut zu interpretierendes Verfahren, dessen Anwendungsbereich vor allem bei Berufs- und Laufbahnentscheidungen sowie in der Forschung gesehen wird. Der AIST-R wurde anhand eines verwandten Verfahrens, eines Persönlichkeitsverfahrens und an Schulnoten validiert. Inwieweit sich die revidierte Form des AIST auch als valide für z. B. berufliche Kriterien erweist, werden erst weitere Studien klären können. Für die Validität des UST-R und der Konsistenz- und Kongruenzannahmen liegen bislang nur Untersuchungen mit der unrevidierten Form vor.


Last Words ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 101-126
Author(s):  
Sebastian Sobecki
Keyword(s):  

In the third chapter I argue that the Libelle (1436–7) was written by Richard Caudray, clerk of the council until 1435, thereafter secretary to John Holland, admiral of England, and dean of St Martin le Grand in London. The Libelle, I maintain, is not an attempt to mask his identity; on the contrary, the intended recipients were council members and, together with the approving authority, John Hungerford, all of them were familiar with the author. The textual ‘I’ of the Libelle is Caudray, and the poem is an example of an instance of indexical and self-referential writing misread as deliberately anonymous.


Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arrow

John Holland's work has combined what appears to be a complicated but technical contribution to giving approximate solutions for a class of difficult problems with a deepening of our understanding of the way we all do induction, of how the experience of the world modifies and improves our behavior and our decisions. Such a comprehension necessarily alters the viewpoint of the behavioral sciences. In this chapter, I want to concentrate on some of the already apparent ways in which he has altered our understanding of the complex dynamic system that constitutes the economic world. Of course, the genetic algorithm can be and has been used as a means of solving hard problems in economic analysis, as in any other field. That is, it is an aid to the analyst, and a powerful one. I want, however, to emphasize the second aspect of Holland's work, the implications of the genetic algorithm as a description of human problem-solving behavior in a complicated world. The economic world is complicated partly because it depends on the physical and biological world which governs the techniques of production. More interestingly, though, the economic world is complicated because the individuals in it are interacting through markets. It is an old observation among economists, going back to Adam Smith's observation of the invisible hand, that economic events are the results of human actions but are not necessarily an achievement of human intentions. In the murk of the economic world, individuals have to act. They have to make choices as to what they will consume, how much they will save, what goods they will produce and how they will produce them, and then what investments they will make. They make these choices with a view to their consequences, personal satisfaction today or in their future or the satisfaction of their heirs, the profits to be made now or in the future by producing goods, and the returns on their investments. These choices have an important time dimension; people and many of the things they buy, make, or sell last, and the outcomes of current decisions depend on events which will occur in the future. The life of the decisionmaker is uncertain, so is his or her health.


Author(s):  
Arthur W. Burks

This is the story of how, in 1957, John Holland, a graduate student in mathematics; Gordon Peterson, a professor of speech; the present writer, a professor of philosophy; and several other Michigan faculty started a graduate program in Computers and Communications—with John our first Ph.D. and, I believe, the world's first doctorate in this now-burgeoning field. This program was to become the Department of Computer and Communication Sciences in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts about ten years later. It had arisen also from a research group at Michigan on logic and computers that I had established in 1949 at the request of the Burroughs Adding Machine Company. When I first met John in 1956, he was a graduate of MIT in electrical engineering, and one of the few people in the world who had worked with the relatively new electronic computers. He had used the Whirlwind I computer at MIT [33], which was a process-control variant of the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) Computer [27]. He had also studied the 1946 Moore School Lectures on the design of electronic computers, edited by George Patterson [58]. He had then gone to IBM and helped program its first electronic computer, the IBM 701, the first commercial version of the IAS Computer. While a graduate student in mathematics at Michigan, John was also doing military work at the Willow Run Research Laboratories to support himself. And 1 had been invited to the Laboratories by a former student of mine, Dr. Jesse Wright, to consult with a small research group of which John was a member. It was this meeting that led to the University's graduate program and then the College's full-fledged department. The Logic of Computers Group, out of which this program arose, in part, then continued with John as co-director, though each of us did his own research. This anomaly of a teacher of philosophy meeting an accomplished electrical engineer in the new and very small field of electronic computers needs some explanation, one to be found in the story of the invention of the programmable electronic computer. For the first three programmable electronic computers (the manually programmed ENIAC and the automatically programmed EDVAC and Institute for Advanced Study Computer) and their successors constituted both the instrumentation and the subject matter of our new Graduate Program in Computers and Communications.


Author(s):  
J. Stephen Lansing

Complex adaptive systems, as conceived by John Holland, are groups of agents engaged in a process of coadaptation, in which adaptive moves by individuals have consequences for the group. Holland and others have shown that under certain circumstances simple models of this process show surprising abilities to self-organize (Holland 1993; Kauffman 1993). Complex adaptive systems have interesting mathematical properties, and the process of "anti-chaos"-—the spontaneous crystallization of ordered patterns in initially disordered networks— has become a new area of interdisciplinary research. But the question of whether these models can illuminate real world processes is still largely open. Not long ago John Maynard Smith described the study of complex adaptive systems as "fact-free science" (1995). This chapter has two purposes. First, in response to Maynard Smith, I will show how the concept of ecological feedback in complex adaptive systems provides a simple and powerful explanation for the structure and persistence of cooperative networks among Balinese rice farmers. Second, I will generalize this explanation to shed light on the emergence of cooperation in a class of social systems where interactions with the natural world create both rewards and punishments. But before turning to these examples, in line with the purposes of this volume I will comment on the ideas and assumptions that underlie the use of models in this analysis. "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man [sic] is a social product." With this epigram Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann neatly encapsulated a fundamental problem in social theory (1967:61). In American anthropology today this paradox is often posed as a conflict between "structure" and "agency," where the former refers to ideational, economic, institutional, or psychological systems that are represented as generating social reality; and the latter to the ability of individual social actors to modify their own social worlds. The same paradox recurs in classical social theory, such as Jürgen Habermas' insistence on the need to somehow reconcile actor-focused and system-level social theories (Habermas 1985, 1987).


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