E pluribus unum? Political fractionalization and deviations from the law of one price in the USA

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Antonini ◽  
David Fielding ◽  
Jacinta Pires

Abstract The magnitude of deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP) across cities depends on a number of characteristics, including language differences, distance, and other correlates of trade costs. We show that in the USA, political differences between cities are an equally important determinant of LOP deviations. LOP deviations are smaller if the cities are both strongly Democrat or both strongly Republican. These effects are of a similar order of magnitude to those of distance, and suggest that political differences represent a substantial barrier to competition.

2010 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 1011-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Chami Batista ◽  
G. B. Silveira Filho
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316802095678
Author(s):  
Melissa M. Lee ◽  
Lauren Prather

International law enforcement is an understudied but indispensable factor for maintaining the international order. We study the effectiveness of elite justifications in building coalitions supporting the enforcement of violations of the law against territorial seizures. Using survey experiments fielded in the USA and Australia, we find that the effectiveness of two common justifications for enforcement—the illegality of a country’s actions, and the consequences of those actions for international order—increase support for enforcement and do so independently of two key public values: ideology and interpersonal norm enforcement. These results imply elites can build a broad coalition of support by using multiple justifications. Our results, however, highlight the tepidness of public support, suggesting limits to elite rhetoric. This study contributes to the scholarship on international law by showing how the public, typically considered a mechanism for generating compliance within states, can impede or facilitate third-party enforcement of the law between states.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-740
Author(s):  
Farhad R. Udwadia ◽  
Judy Illes

Supply-side interventions such as prescription drug monitoring programs, “pill mill” laws, and dispensing limits have done little to quell the burgeoning opioid crisis. An increasingly popular demand-side alternative to these measures – now adopted by 38 jurisdictions in the USA and 7 provinces in Canada — is court-mandated involuntary commitment and treatment. In Massachusetts, for example, Part I, Chapter 123, Section 35 of the state's General Laws allows physicians, spouses, relatives, and police officers to petition a court to involuntarily commit and treat a person whose alcohol or drug abuse poses a likelihood of serious harm. This paper explores the ethical underpinnings of this law as a case study for others. First, we highlight the procedural and substantive standards of Section 35 and evaluate the application of the law in practice, including the frequency with which it has been invoked and outcomes. We then use this background to inform an ethical critique of the law. Specifically, we argue that the infringement of autonomy and privacy associated with involuntary intervention under Section 35 is not currently justified on the grounds of a lack of evidenced benefits and a risk of significant of harm. Further ethical concerns also arise from a lack of standard of care provided under the Section 35 pathway. Based on this analysis, we advance four recommendations for change to mitigate these ethical shortcomings.


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