scholarly journals Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
George Deane

Abstract Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by ‘subjective valuation’—a deep inference about the precision or ‘predictability’ of the self-evidencing (‘fitness-promoting’) outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of ‘selflessness’; in particular the ‘totally selfless’ states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness. Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Safron

Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) is a synthetic model that attempts to unify theories of consciousness within the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, with particular emphasis on Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT). IWMT further suggests predictive processing in sensory hierarchies may be well-modeled as (folded, sparse, partially disentangled) variational autoencoders, with beliefs discretely-updated via the formation of synchronous complexes—as self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs)—potentially entailing maximal a posteriori (MAP) estimation via turbo coding. In this account, alpha-synchronized SOHMs across posterior cortices may constitute the kinds of maximal complexes described by IIT, as well as samples (or MAP estimates) from multimodal shared latent space, organized according to egocentric reference frames, entailing phenomenal consciousness as mid-level perceptual inference. When these posterior SOHMs couple with frontal complexes, this may enable various forms of conscious access as a kind of mental act(ive inference), affording higher order cognition/control, including the kinds of attentional/intentional processing and reportability described by GNWT. Across this autoencoding heterarchy, intermediate-level beliefs may be organized into spatiotemporal trajectories by the entorhinal/hippocampal system, so affording episodic memory, counterfactual imaginings, and planning.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madis Vasser ◽  
Laurène Vuillaume ◽  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Jaan Aru

AbstractIt is well known that the human brain continuously predicts the sensory consequences of its own body movements, which typically results in sensory attenuation. Yet, the extent and exact mechanisms underlying sensory attenuation are still debated. To explore this issue, we asked participants to decide which of two visual stimuli was of higher contrast in a virtual reality situation where one of the stimuli could appear behind the participants’ invisible moving hand or not. Over two experiments, we measured the effects of such “virtual occlusion” on first-order sensitivity and on metacognitive monitoring. Our findings show that self-generated hand movements reduced the apparent contrast of the stimulus. This result can be explained by the active inference theory. Moreover, sensory attenuation seemed to affect only first-order sensitivity and not (second-order) metacognitive judgments of confidence.


This book explores the value for literary studies of relevance theory, an inferential approach to communication in which the expression and recognition of intentions plays a major role. Drawing on a wide range of examples from lyric poetry and the novel, nine of the ten chapters are written by literary specialists and use relevance theory both as an overall framework and as a resource for detailed analysis. The final chapter, written by the co-founder of relevance theory, reviews the issues addressed by the volume and explores their implications for cognitive theories of how communicative acts are interpreted in context. Originally designed to explain how people understand each other in everyday face-to-face exchanges, relevance theory—described in an early review by a literary scholar as ‘the makings of a radically new theory of communication, the first since Aristotle’s’—sheds light on the whole spectrum of human modes of communication, including literature in the broadest sense. Reading Beyond the Code is unique in using relevance theory as a prime resource for literary study, and is also the first to apply the model to a range of phenomena widely seen as supporting an ‘embodied’ conception of cognition and language where sensorimotor processes play a key role. This broadened perspective serves to enhance the value for literary studies of the central claim of relevance theory: that the ‘code model’ is fundamentally inadequate to account for human communication, and in particular for the modes of communication that are proper to literature.


Author(s):  
Lauren Swiney

Over the last thirty years the comparator hypothesis has emerged as a prominent account of inner speech pathology. This chapter discusses a number of cognitive accounts broadly derived from this approach, highlighting the existence of two importantly distinct notions of inner speech in the literature; one as a prediction in the absence of sensory input, the other as an act with sensory consequences that are themselves predicted. Under earlier frameworks in which inner speech is described in the context of classic models of motor control, I argue that these two notions may be compatible, providing two routes to inner speech pathology. Under more recent accounts grounded in the architecture of Bayesian predictive processing, I argue that “active inference” approaches to action generation pose serious challenges to the plausibility of the latter notion of inner speech, while providing the former notion with rich explanatory possibilities for inner speech pathology.


Author(s):  
James Deery

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox

Active inference is a physics of life process theory of perception, action and learning that is applicable to natural and artificial agents. In this paper, active inference theory is related to different types of practice in social organization. Here, the term social organization is used to clarify that this paper does not encompass organization in biological systems. Rather, the paper addresses active inference in social organization that utilizes industrial engineering, quality management, and artificial intelligence alongside human intelligence. Social organization referred to in this paper can be in private companies, public institutions, other for-profit or not-for-profit organizations, and any combination of them. The relevance of active inference theory is explained in terms of variational free energy, prediction errors, generative models, and Markov blankets. Active inference theory is most relevant to the social organization of work that is highly repetitive. By contrast, there are more challenges involved in applying active inference theory for social organization of less repetitive endeavors such as one-of-a-kind projects. These challenges need to be addressed in order for active inference to provide a unifying framework for different types of social organization employing human and artificial intelligence.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beren Millidge

Initial and preliminary implementations of predictive processing and active inference models are presented. These include the baseline hierarchical predictive coding models of (Friston 2003, 2005), and dynamical predictive coding models using generalised coordinates (Friston 2008, 2010, Buckley 2017). Additionally, we re-implement and experiment with the active inference thermostat presented in (Buckley 2017) and also implement an active inference agent with a hierarchical predictive coding perceptual model on the more challenging cart-pole task from OpanAI gym. We discuss the initial performance, capabilities, and limitations of these models in their preliminary stages and consider how they might be further scaled up to tackle more challenging tasks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Kiepe ◽  
Nils Kraus ◽  
Guido Hesselmann

Self-generated auditory input is perceived less loudly than the same sounds generated externally. The existence of this phenomenon, called Sensory Attenuation (SA), has been studied for decades and is often explained by motor-based forward models. Recent developments in the research of SA, however, challenge these models. We review the current state of knowledge regarding theoretical implications about the significance of Sensory Attenuation and its role in human behavior and functioning. Focusing on behavioral and electrophysiological results in the auditory domain, we provide an overview of the characteristics and limitations of existing SA paradigms and highlight the problem of isolating SA from other predictive mechanisms. Finally, we explore different hypotheses attempting to explain heterogeneous empirical findings, and the impact of the Predictive Coding Framework in this research area.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 1058
Author(s):  
Ron Cole-Turner

William James proposed in 1902 that states of mystical experience, central to his idea of religious experience, can be identified based on their ineffability and their noetic quality. The epistemological category of the noetic quality, modified by W. T. Stace in 1960, plays a central but somewhat confounding role in today’s biomedical research involving psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and LSD. Using scales based on James, it can be shown that psychedelics “reliably occasion” intense subjective states of experience or mystical states. It is debated whether these states are necessary for the wide range of possible mental health therapeutic benefits that appear to follow. This paper reviews what James said about the noetic quality and its relationship to religious experience, epistemology, and states of mystical experience. It explores how the noetic quality is measured in today’s research, addressing a growing list of concerns that psychedelic science can be epistemologically biased, that it is hostile to atheistic or physicalist views, that it injects religion unduly into science, or that it needs to find ways to eliminate the mystical element, if not the entire intense subjective experience altogether.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (11) ◽  
pp. 1521
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox

Active inference theory (AIT) is a corollary of the free-energy principle, which formalizes cognition of living system’s autopoietic organization. AIT comprises specialist terminology and mathematics used in theoretical neurobiology. Yet, active inference is common practice in human organizations, such as private companies, public institutions, and not-for-profits. Active inference encompasses three interrelated types of actions, which are carried out to minimize uncertainty about how organizations will survive. The three types of action are updating work beliefs, shifting work attention, and/or changing how work is performed. Accordingly, an alternative starting point for grasping active inference, rather than trying to understand AIT specialist terminology and mathematics, is to reflect upon lived experience. In other words, grasping active inference through autoethnographic research. In this short communication paper, accessing AIT through autoethnography is explained in terms of active inference in existing organizational practice (implicit active inference), new organizational methodologies that are informed by AIT (deliberative active inference), and combining implicit and deliberative active inference. In addition, these autoethnographic options for grasping AIT are related to generative learning.


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