Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, by Neil Levy.

Mind ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 124 (496) ◽  
pp. 1328-1332
Author(s):  
George Sher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Neil Levy

Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 189-206
Author(s):  
Oisín Deery
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Intelligent Agents ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
Free Actions ◽  
Neil Levy ◽  
Shed Light

This concluding chapter summarizes the central claims of the book. Additionally, it argues that the HPC natural-kind view about free actions has the resources to address various empirical threats to free will. For example, Neil Levy has argued that recent findings about how implicit biases affect actions threatens free will and moral responsibility. However, the natural-kind view defuses this threat, including Levy’s version of it. The chapter also shows how the natural-kind view can shed light on emerging questions about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever act freely or be responsible for their actions, and if so in what sense. Finally, the chapter sketches some findings indicating that folk thinking may actually assume something like the natural-kind view.

Conscious Propositional Attitudes and Moral Responsibility

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 585-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Peters
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Conscious Decision ◽  
Neil Levy

By drawing on empirical evidence, Matt King and Peter Carruthers (2012) have recently argued that there are no conscious propositional attitudes, such as decisions, and that this undermines moral responsibility. Neil Levy (2012, forthcoming) responds to King and Carruthers, and claims that their considerations needn’t worry theorists of moral responsibility. I argue that Levy’s response to King and Carruthers’ challenge to moral responsibility is unsatisfactory. After that, I propose what I take to be a preferable way of dealing with their challenge. I offer an account of moral responsibility that ties responsibility to consciously deciding to do X, as opposed to a conscious decision to do X. On this account, even if there are no conscious decisions, moral responsibility won’t be undermined.

scholarly journals Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Feminist Philosophy ◽  
Social Dimensions ◽  
Structural Inequality ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Moral Environment ◽  
Philosophical Debates ◽  
And Control ◽  
Neil Levy

Philosophical theorizing about moral responsibility has recently taken a “social” turn, marking a shift in focus from traditional metaphysical concerns about free will and determinism. Yet despite this social turn, the implications of structural injustice and inequalities of power for theorizing about moral responsibility remain surprisingly neglected in philosophical literature. Recent theories have attended to the interpersonal dynamics at the heart of moral responsibility practices, and the role of the moral environment in scaffolding agential capacities. However, they assume an overly idealized conception of agency and of our moral responsibility practices as reciprocal exchanges between equally empowered and situated agents. The essays in this volume systematically challenge this assumption. Leading theorists of moral responsibility, including Michael McKenna, Marina Oshana, and Manuel Vargas, consider the implications of oppression and structural inequality for their respective theories. Neil Levy urges the need to refocus our analyses of the epistemic and control conditions for moral responsibility from individual to socially extended agents. Leading theorists of relational autonomy, including Catriona Mackenzie, Natalie Stoljar, and Andrea Westlund develop new insights into the topic of moral responsibility. Other contributors bring debates about moral responsibility into dialogue with recent work in feminist philosophy, and topics such as epistemic injustice, implicit bias and blame. Collectively, the essays in this volume reorient philosophical debates about moral responsibility in important new directions.

TELEVISI BESERTA REALITAS NILAI MEDIANYA

DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Social Commitment

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme

Judgments of Moral Responsibility in Tissue Donation Cases

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Primary Factor ◽  
Tissue Donation ◽  
Potential Donor ◽  
Sperm Donor ◽  
Perceived Burden ◽  
Related Individuals ◽  
Unique Ability

If a person requires a tissue donation in order to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in the biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. Such views tend to ignore the role played by a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need and the perceived burden of the donation type in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we argue that such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two main studies and three supplementary studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness, unique ability to help, and donation burden play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that the primary factor driving individuals’ judgments about the moral responsibility of a potential donor to donate tissue to someone in need was the degree to which a donor was in a unique ability to help. We observed no significant role for biological relatedness as such. Biologically related individuals were deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have a relatively unique capacity to help. We also found that people are less inclined to think individuals have a moral responsibility to donate tissue when the donation is more costly to make. We bring these results into dialogue with contemporary disputes concerning the ethics of tissue donation.

Judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Tissue Donation ◽  
Potential Donor ◽  
Sperm Donor ◽  
Biological Relationship ◽  
Related Individuals ◽  
Unique Ability

If a person requires an organ or tissue donation to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. We contend that such views ignore the role that a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need plays in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we think this will not be due to the fact that the donor stands in a close biological relationship to the recipient. Rather, we think such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues and organs with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness and unique ability play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that biologically related individuals are deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have the capacity to help.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document