The Royal Institute of Philosophy ConferencePhilosophy and the EmotionsUniversity of Manchester,11–13 July 2001.The conference aspires to act as a forum for the presentation of key papers by leading figures in the analysis of emotions, and for the commencement of a dialogue on this topic among advanced researchers from different philosophical disciplines, including the philosophy of action, art, meaning, mind and value.Keynote Speakers include: Richard Wollheim, Aaron Ben Zeev, Peter Goldie, Patricia Greenspan, Paul Griffiths, Susan James, Karen Jones, Mike Martin, Al Mele, Hanna Pickard, David Velleman.Please direct all enquiries to Anthony Hatzimoysis, Centre for Philosophy, University of Manchester, M13 9PL, UK.
http://les1.man.ac.uk/philosophy/emotions.htm
Abstract
In this paper I aim to show with the aid of philosophers Edith Stein and Peter Goldie, how empathy and other social feelings are instantiated and developed in real life versus on the Internet. The examples of on-line communication show both how important the embodied aspects of empathy are and how empathy may be possible also in the cases of encountering personal stories rather than personal bodies. Since video meetings, social media, online gaming and other forms of interaction via digital technologies are taking up an increasing part of our time, it is important to understand how such forms of social intercourse are different from in real life (IRL) meetings and why they can accordingly foster not only new communal bonds but also hatred and misunderstanding.
<p>Although studies have shown that a transition from an ‘offender’ to a ‘non-offender’ self-narrative appears to be associated with desistance, the psychological mechanisms involved in this transition phase have not been explored adequately. This may be because desistance research has primarily been conducted from a criminological perspective, thus social factors (e.g., employment or relationships) have been the focus of enquiry. What little psychologically focused forensic literature there is, is held back by the dominance of the cognitive perspective. Because of this, the role that emotions may play in psychological changes that must take place in order for a person to successfully transition to a non-offender is overlooked. Advances in clinical neuroscience research are increasingly highlighting the significance of emotional processes in psychological functioning. In this thesis I introduce a psychological model of self-narrative by Peter Goldie, who incorporates emotions into his description of the psychological processes that constitute self-narratives. Importantly, Goldie also describes a mechanism of transition from a maladaptive (non-agentic) to an adaptive (agentic) self-narrative. Application of Goldie’s conceptualisation may help to understand how a person who commits offences due to a lack of agency could increase their personal agency and desist. However, as I discuss in chapter one, some persons who commit offences act in a goal-directed manner and thus not due to a lack of personal agency. I will extend Goldie’s conceptualisation of this transition mechanism in order to apply it to the self-narratives of offenders. The adaptation I make to the conceptualisation, which I term, the Emotional Closure Model (ECM), crucially, may explain the transition from offender to non-offender self-narratives for those who both lack agency as well as those who lack motivation to desist. Improved understanding of the psychological mechanisms involved in the transition phase to non-offender self-narratives will have far reaching implications for psychological treatment programmes.</p>
Coplan, Amy and Peter Goldie. Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2011, xlvii + 382 pp., $99.00 cloth.