What is This Thing Called Happiness? by Fred Feldman.

Mind ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 122 (487) ◽  
pp. 820-823
Author(s):  
A. Gregory
Keyword(s):  
Utilitas ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Carlson

This paper criticizes the ‘justice-adjusted’ consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Weber

Many people are moved by the thought that if A is worse off than B, then if we can improve the condition of one or the other but not both that it is better to improve the condition of A. Egalitarians are buoyed by the prevalence of such thoughts. But something other than egalitarianism could be driving these thoughts. In particular, such thoughts could be motivated, instead, by a combination of the belief that desert should determine how people fare and the belief that, for the most part, people are equally deserving. Shelly Kagan has pushed this line of argument, suggesting that desert should replace equality as a normative ideal. He argues that desert theory and egalitarianism often agree, and when they don’t intuition favors desert theory. A number of authors have offered responses to Kagan, including Serena Olsaretti, Fred Feldman, and Richard Arneson. However, I maintain that their responses are inadequate, primarily because they simply fail to capture the compelling intuitions that Kagan appeals to in making his case. There are other responses, however, and I consider three, each of which offers an egalitarian position that is compatible with Kagan’s most compelling intuitions. Thus, I maintain that Kagan has not sufficiently established that desert should replace equality as a normative ideal. There is still room for a genuinely egalitarian position, though Kagan’s reflections helpfully force egalitarians to further develop and refine their thinking.


Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Chapter 10 investigates whether the combined Austere and Hybrid two-tier system, now re-labeled the “Hybrid solution,” provides an effective response to the problem of uncertainty. Criteria of adequacy for a solution to this problem are articulated, and versions of the approach offering a single decision-guide at the lower tier are assessed. Popular guides, such as “Perform the act most likely to be obligatory,” “Maximize expected value,” and “Try to perform the obligatory act,” along with more sophisticated guides proposed by Fred Feldman and John Pollock, are each shown to be inadequate, partly because they demand a richer set of beliefs than many agents possess. The chapter concludes that a Hybrid system offering multiple decision-guides for uncertainty seems far better positioned to solve the problem of uncertainty.


Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS BLACKSON
Keyword(s):  

Fred Feldman conceives of happiness in terms of the aggregation of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure, but he distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and excludes extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure from the aggregation that constitutes happiness. I argue that Feldman has not provided a strong reason for this exclusion


1977 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 429-432
Author(s):  
Peter J. Markie

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Angner

The publishers regret to announce that some corrections in the article by Erik Angner1 were not incorporated in the final published version. The corrections are listed below.Page 459, line 52 – 53 should be Feldman's account hinges on a distinction between two kinds of pleasure.Page 461, line 142 should be George Mason University.


2012 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-273
Author(s):  
Gwen Bradford
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document