Counterpart Theory and the Actuality Operator

Mind ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 122 (485) ◽  
pp. 27-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Actuality Operator

scholarly journals Representing Counterparts

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Quantified Modal Logic ◽  
De Re ◽  
Actuality Operator

This paper presents a counterpart theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic based on a fleshed out account of Lewis's notion of a 'possibility'. According to the account a possibility consists of a world and some haecceitistic information about how each possible individual gets represented de re. Following Hazen, a semantics for quantified model logic based on evaluating formulae at possibilities is developed. It is shown that this framework naturally accommodates an actuality operator, addressing recent objections to counterpart theory, and is equivalent to the more familiar Kripke semantics for quantied modal logic with an actuality operator.

scholarly journals Grounding Personal Persistence

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Personal Identity

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
THEODORE SIDER
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Counterpart Theory

AbstractPersonal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity—such as memory and anticipation—are asymmetric and ‘count in favor of personal identity from one side only’. Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed.

scholarly journals Counterpart theories for everyone

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4691-4715
Author(s):  
Achille C. Varzi
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Semantic Theory ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Identity Based

Abstract David Lewis’s counterpart theory (CT) is often seen as involving a radical departure from the standard, Kripke-style semantics for modal logic (ML), suggesting that we are dealing with deeply divergent accounts of our modal talk. However, CT captures but one version of the relevant semantic intuition, and does so on the basis of metaphysical assumptions (all worlds are equally real, individuals are world-bound) that are ostensibly discretionary. Just as ML can be translated into a language that quantifies explicitly over worlds, CT may be formulated as a semantic theory in which world quantification is purely metalinguistic. And just as Kripke-style semantics is formally compatible with the doctrine of world-boundedness, a counterpart-based semantics may in principle allow for cases of trans-world identity. In fact, one may welcome a framework that is general enough to include both Lewis’s counterpart-based account and Kripke’s identity-based account as distinguished special cases. There are several ways of doing so. The purpose of this paper is to outline a fully general option and to illustrate its philosophical significance, showing how the large variety of intermediate relations that lie between Lewisian counterparthood and Kripkean identity yield a corresponding variety of modal theories that would otherwise remain uncharted.

Propositions and counterpart theory

Analysis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Dorr
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory

scholarly journals Epistemicism and modality

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 803-835 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Three Dimensional ◽  
The Other ◽  
Object Language ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
Three Dimensional Model ◽  
Metaphysical Necessity ◽  
Actuality Operator

AbstractWhat kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson's Vagueness (1994) give a definiteness operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that model theory, one of which I will find to be more plausible than the other.

Three-dimensionalism and counterpart theory

Analysis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Langford
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document