Truth and Ontology, by Trenton Merricks.

Mind ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 120 (478) ◽  
pp. 542-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Rodriguez-Pereyra
Keyword(s):  
Trenton Merricks

Truth and Ontology – Trenton Merricks

2008 ◽  
Vol 58 (232) ◽  
pp. 544-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Trenton Merricks

scholarly journals On the Resurrection of the Body: Discussion with Trenton Merricks

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-454
Author(s):  
Peter Drum
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Recent Discussion ◽  
Trenton Merricks

In a recent discussion, Trenton Merricks concludes that we cannot understand how God might miraculously bring it about that there will be the resurrection of the body. It is contended to the contrary, that it is not utterly mysterious how God might give us our bodies back.

Pluralism and the problem of purity

Analysis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 394-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Builes
Keyword(s):  
Real Problem ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Trenton Merricks ◽  
Important Challenge ◽  
Ways Of Being

Abstract Ontological Pluralism is the thesis that there are different ways of being. In his recent paper, ‘The only way to be’, Trenton Merricks has presented an important challenge to Pluralism in the form of a dilemma. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Merricks’s argument against Pluralism, as stated, is unsound. I will argue that one horn of the dilemma is unproblematic for contemporary versions of Pluralism, defended by Jason Turner and Kris McDaniel, that are formulated in the framework of Ted Sider. However, my second task is to provide a new dilemma against Pluralism, which, when combined with Merricks’s arguments, constitutes a sound argument against all forms of Pluralism. The new dilemma will reveal that the real problem with Ontological Pluralism is its conflict with Ted Sider’s principle of Purity.

Physicalism and the Incarnation

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-199
Author(s):  
Keith Hess ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Physical Object ◽  
The Body ◽  
Trenton Merricks

Trenton Merricks holds to a physicalist view of the Incarnation according to which the Son transformed into a physical object (the body of Jesus) at the Incarnation. R. T. Mullins, in “Physicalist Christology and the Two Sons Worry,” claims that Merricks’s account is Nestorian since it entails that it is metaphysically possible for the human nature of Christ to be a person independently of the Son’s incarnation. While I am not a physicalist, in this essay I defend Merricks’s view against Mullins’s claim. I argue that if the Son is numerically identical to the body of Jesus, then it is not possible for the body of Jesus to exist independently of the Son’s incarnation.

Do We Need Propositions?

Disputatio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (52) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Gordon Barnes
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Trenton Merricks ◽  
Abstract Entities

Abstract Trenton Merricks argues that we need propositions to serve as the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments (Merricks 2015). A modally valid argument is an argument in which, necessarily, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true. According to Mer- ricks, the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments have their truth conditions essentially, and they exist necessarily. Sentences do not satisfy these conditions. Thus, we need propositions. Merricks’ argument adds a new chapter to the longstanding debate over the exis- tence of propositions. However, I argue that Merricks’ argument does not quite succeed. Merricks has overlooked one viable alternative to pos- tulating propositions. However, this alternative employs the relation of being true-at-a-world, which is difficult to analyze. Thus, the soundness of Merricks’ argument ultimately depends on the comparative merits of accepting propositions as abstract entities, versus accepting truth-at-a- world as an unanalyzed relation between sentences and possible worlds.

Do God's Beliefs about the Future Depend on the Future?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 124-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Ryan Byerly
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Simple Solution ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
Trenton Merricks ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
The Future ◽  
Beliefs About The Future

Trenton Merricks, among others, has recently championed in a series of papers what he takes to be a novel and simple solution to an age-old problem concerning the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom. The solution crucially involves the thesis that God’s beliefs about the future actions of human persons asymmetrically depend on the future actions of those persons. I show that Merricks’s defense of this thesis is inadequate and that the prospects for improving his defense of it would require him to enter the fray of articulating and defending a view about the mechanics whereby divine foreknowledge is achieved—something he and other advocates of the strategy he advances had hoped to avoid.

scholarly journals Pairing Problems: Causal and Christological

Perichoresis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Kevin W. Wong
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Trenton Merricks ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Pairing Problem ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Trenton Merricks has objected to dualist conceptions of the Incarnation in a similar way to Jaegwon Kim’s pairing problem. On the original pairing problem, so argues Kim, we lack a pairing relationship between bodies and souls such that body A is causally paired with soul A and not soul B. Merricks, on the other hand, argues that whatever relations dualists propose that do pair bodies and souls together (e.g. causal relations) are relations that God the Son has with all bodies whatsoever via his divine attributes (e.g. God the Son could cause motion in any and all bodies via his omnipotence). So if we count these relations as sufficient for embodiment, then dualism implies that God the Son is embodied in all bodies whatsoever. I shall argue that while the original pairing problem might be easily answerable, the Christological pairing problem is not and that dualists must shift some of their focus from the defense of the soul’s existence to explicating the nature of the mind-body relationship.

scholarly journals Ways of thinking about ways of being

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley Rettler
Keyword(s):  
Trenton Merricks ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Ways Of Being

Abstract Monism about being says that there is one way to be. Pluralism about being says that there are many ways to be. Recently, Trenton Merricks and David Builes have offered arguments against Pluralism. In this paper, I show how Pluralists who appeal to the relative naturalness of quantifiers can respond to these arguments.

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