Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution

Mind ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 111 (441) ◽  
pp. 47-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Sreenivasan
2020 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Bai ◽  
Grace Ching Chi Ho ◽  
Jin Yan

Author(s):  
Mandi Astola

AbstractStudies in collective intelligence have shown that suboptimal cognitive traits of individuals can lead a group to succeed in a collective cognitive task, in recent literature this is called mandevillian intelligence. Analogically, as Mandeville has suggested, the moral vices of individuals can sometimes also lead to collective good. I suggest that this mandevillian morality can happen in many ways in collaborative activities. Mandevillian morality presents a challenge for normative virtue theories in ethics. The core of the problem is that mandevillian morality implies that individual vice is, in some cases, valuable. However, normative virtue theories generally see vice as disvaluable. A consequence of this is that virtue theories struggle to account for the good that can emerge in a collective. I argue that normative virtue theories can in fact accommodate for mandevillian emergent good. I put forward three distinctive features that allow a virtue theory to do so: a distinction between individual and group virtues, a distinction between motivational and teleological virtues, and an acknowledgement of the normativity of “vicious” roles in groups.


2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-197
Author(s):  
Gerald P. Boersma

AbstractThe broad contours of Augustine's critique of Stoic virtue theory in De civitate dei 19.4 finds a fascinating analogue in Theodor Adorno's theory of immanent critique: Augustine ‘enters’ into Stoic virtue theory and criticises it from its own postulates, illustrating the striking implausibility of Stoic orthodoxy when lived out in concreto and the absurd, but logical, conclusions to which one is necessarily carried by Stoic ethics. Through this deconstruction, Augustine clears a space to propose his own virtue ethic. Augustine maintains that a Stoic virtue ethic fails to deliver on its promised eudaimonistic ends because it lacks a robust eschatological vision. For Augustine, the Christian faith offers a more viable virtue ethic.


1978 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. Innes

A study of the extent to which people are likely to attribute traits to other people rather more than to themselves produced support for the Jones and Nisbett (1972) hypothesis. The level of trait attribution in the present study was, however, higher than that obtained in previous studies. Subjects low in conservatism assigned more traits than did those high in conservatism, but there was no interaction between conservatism and attribution of traits to self versus others. No support was found for the hypothesis that high conservatives make more extreme judgments than low conservatives.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine Windmann ◽  
Patrick Stier ◽  
Lisa Steinbrück

To investigate peoples' trait attribution biases, we asked participants to generate faces of "bad guys" and "good guys" using three methods: free drawings, photo-editing, and feature assembly. In referring to research linking facial width (relative to height, fWHR) with aggressive and dominant personality traits in males, we compared fWHR displayed in the generated portraits between the two character types . We found that participants modelled emotional expressions (in particular, expression of anger and fear/friendliness), but not fWHR per se, to portray character trait. When emotional expressions were statistically controlled for, no difference in fWHR between "bad guys" and "good guys" remained. We conclude that emotion overgeneralization is a strong confound in research on fWHR.


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