scholarly journals Classical probabilities and belief functions in legal cases

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-107
Author(s):  
Ronald Meester

Abstract I critically discuss a recent suggestion in Nance (Belief Functions and Burdens of Proof. Law, Probability and Risk, 18:53–76, 2018) concerning the question which ratios of beliefs are appropriate when in criminal or civil cases one works with belief functions instead of classical probabilities. I do not call into question the use of belief functions themselves in this context, and I agree with in Nance (Belief Functions and Burdens of Proof. Law, Probability and Risk, 18:53–76, 2018) that so-called ‘uncommitted support’, possible in the framework of belief functions, should not be taken into account in a decision-theoretic framework. However, I argue against in Nance (Belief Functions and Burdens of Proof. Law, Probability and Risk, 18:53–76, 2018) in that, at least in criminal law, relative sizes of beliefs should not be used for decision-making at all. I will argue that only the individual, absolute beliefs should be considered. Since belief functions generalize classical probabilities, this position seems at first sight to conflict with the fact that odds are abundant when we use classical probabilities in a legal context. I will take the opportunity, then, to point out that also in the classical setting, odds are not our primary concern either. They are convenient since they appear, together with the likelihood ratio, in the odds form of Bayes’ rule. Apart from that, they do not have any individual significance. I also note that in civil law the conclusions might be different.

1987 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edith Greene ◽  
Edith Greene

This article describes a course that bridged the disciplines of clinical and experimental psychology and the law. The course included discussion of issues in criminal law, such as the psychology of policing, the reliability of confessions, victimization, plea bargaining, jury decision making, and alternative dispute resolution, and in civil law, such as civil commitment, predicting dangerousness, and child custody. Course objectives, requirements, and teaching aids are outlined, and some thoughts on integrating these diverse topics are included.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-113
Author(s):  
Ádám Auer

Összefoglaló. A tanulmány kezdő axiómája a mesterséges intelligencia biztonságos alkalmazása. A biztonságos alkalmazás egyik aspektusa a jogi biztonság, az a jogi környezet, amelyben a felmerülő jogi kérdések rendezésére alkalmazható keretrendszer áll rendelkezésre. A tanulmány a Semmelweis Egyetem projektjében fejlesztett mesterséges intelligencia alkalmazásának olyan polgári jogi problémáit vizsgálja, amelyek a mindennapi hasznosítás során merülhetnek fel. A tanulmány következtetése szerint a vizsgált mesterséges intelligencia szerzői műnek minősül és több védelmi forma is alkalmazható. A jogi szabályozás de lege ferenda kiegészítésre szorul a szerzői mű folyamatos változása okán. Szükséges rögzíteni egy referenciapontot, amely a felelősség kiindulópontjául szolgál. Summary. The starting point of the study is the safe use of artificial intelligence. Legal certainty is one aspect of safe usage, the legal environment in which a framework is available that can be used to resolve legal issues. The paper examines the civil law issues that may arise in the everyday use of the artificial intelligence application developed within the Semmelweis University project. The study will first focus on the legal protection of the Semmelweis AI, including whether this protection is currently international, regional (European Union) or national and which of these is the optimal choice. The study also reflects on the legislative preparatory work of the European Union in this regard. Our hypothesis is that the majority of civil law areas concerning AI can be regulated within a contractual framework. The AI software developed by the project is a forward-looking medical and practical solution. If we want to use a legal analogy, we can imagine its operation as if we had a solution that could analyse all the national court decisions in each legal field and provide an answer to the legal problem at hand, while simultaneously learning and applying the latest court decisions every day. For this AI solution, the diagnostic process must be carefully examined in order to identify the legal problems. I believe that the optimal solution is to classify this AI application as ‘software’ because this allows property rights to be acquired in their entirety and it opens the door to clarifying individual associated usage and copyright by contract. An important civil law question arises in relation to parallel copyright protection, when the individual personal contributions (creative development work) to the software cannot be separated. Therefore, it is important to record the process and to separate the individual contributions protecting by copyright. The AI plays a questionable role in the diagnostic process. If the software itself cannot make a decision, but only provides a framework and platform, then it will not be entitled to co-ownership relating to the diagnostic images (e.g. just as a camera will not own the rights to the pictures taken with it). However, if the algorithm is part of the decision-making (e.g. the selecting of negative diagnoses), it would possibly be co-owner of the right, because it was involved in the development of the classification. All this should be clearly stated in the licence agreement, based on full knowledge of the decision-making process. However, de lege ferenda, the legal regime needs to be supplemented in view of the constant changes of the copyright work and the changing authors. There is a need to establish a specific point in the legislation that serves as a reference point for liability and legal protection. The issues under consideration are of a legal security nature, since without precise legal protection both the creator of artificial intelligence and the persons who may be held liable in the event of a malfunctioning of such systems may be uncertain.


2020 ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
David Cabrelli

This chapter examines the current terrain of criminal law as a technique of labour market regulation. It identifies a range of possible interactions between the criminal law and civil law in the legal enforcement of labour standards. Sometimes fundamental labour rights, such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed or the right not to be discriminated against, are protected exclusively through a ‘private’ enforcement model at the initiative of the individual right-holder. Sometimes there will be exclusive enforcement through the criminal law with no private right of civil action, as under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Finally, there may be mixed enforcement regimes where there is a combination of criminal and civil measures linked to specific statutory rights, as with the enforcement of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-33
Author(s):  
Dag-Erik BERG

AbstractThis paper argues that the Dalit situation of caste-based oppression in India could be characterized by the enduring co-existence of upward social mobility and atrocities. While being a common-sense understanding, the paper suggests that the relation between upward social mobility and enduring atrocity could be referred to as a “structural mechanism” in the Dalit situation. The concept is used to explain the Dalit problem. Moreover, this structural mechanism sheds more light on developments and discursive breaks in the legal context. A central lesson in the post-colonial period is that the problem of “untouchables” could not simply be conceptualized as a problem of civil law and untouchability. Rather, the problem of atrocities created demands and a need to make caste-based atrocities a concern for criminal law. Ambedkar’s significance as a symbol of Dalit assertion could be viewed in connection with the structural mechanism of Dalit achievements and caste-based exclusion.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.E. Marshall ◽  
R.A. Duff

In colloquial speech the terms ‘crime’ and ‘criminal’ have a use which, though connected to the strictly legal notion of criminality, goes well beyond it. It is a way of indicating a serious condemnation of an activity or action. Similarly, when people say of something “There ought to be a law against it,’ they are not necessarily speaking literally, though they might be. Nonetheless, even when they are speaking colloquially and figuratively in using this expression, it is clear that the ‘law’ here is the criminal law and not the civil law. The sense that ‘something ought to be done’ expressed in these usages reflects the idea that there is a kind of wrong which demands a collective response rather than just an individual one. The figurative, colloquial use trades, of course, on the literal one. However, pace Devlin, it requires more than a general feeling of outrage to characterise just what kinds of wrongs are appropriately categorised as crimes. The enduring debates concerning the distinction between crime and tort bear witness to the fact that such a characterisation is far from easy.These academic debates can be situated against the background of wider philosophical discussions about the relationship between the individual and the collective, the private and the public, and the way in which these pairs of concepts map onto one another. We might agree with George Fletcher that “Blackstone had a point in identifying crimes as public wrongs and torts as private wrongs”: the criminal law should deal with those kinds of wrong which are matters of public concern, and which therefore require a collective response from the whole community; wrongs which are, by contrast, properly the concern only of the private or individual victim should be dealt with under the civil law. What is far less clear, however, is how we should characterise that distinction.


Author(s):  
D.V. Tat’yanin

The article deals with the problem of determining the composition of participants in the stage of initiation of criminal proceedings. Imperfect legislation, lack of proper regulatory regulation of participants in the criminal law conflict taking part in the considered stage leads to violations of the rights and legitimate interests of the individual; this affects the process before the investigative check and subsequent preliminary investigation. Based on the analysis of legislation and research papers, the author explains the proposal about inexpediency of a long preliminary investigation and necessary decision-making on excitation of criminal case immediately after the establishment of the fact of committing a crime without further establishing at this stage a suspect in the crime. The author notes the inadmissibility of the use of procedural compulsion in the process of checking the reasons and grounds of a criminal case, as well as on the introduction of such a participant as “suspected”, since the establishment of the commission of a crime entails the criminal case and the emergence of such a participant as “suspect”. The author substantiates the illegality of identifying the suspect and the person who gave himself up. The author offers a list of rights of participants in the criminal case initiation stage, which can be implemented only by the participant's own free will.


Author(s):  
Olga Olegovna Eremenko ◽  
Lyubov Borisovna Aminul ◽  
Elena Vitalievna Chertina

The subject of the research is the process of making managerial decisions for innovative IT projects investing. The paper focuses on the new approach to decision making on investing innovative IT projects using expert survey in a fuzzy reasoning system. As input information, expert estimates of projects have been aggregated into six indicators having a linguistic description of the individual characteristics of the project type "high", "medium", and "low". The task of decision making investing has been formalized and the term-set of the output variable Des has been defined: to invest 50-75% of the project cost; to invest 20-50% of the project cost; to invest 10-20% of the project cost; to send the project for revision; to turn down investing project. The fuzzy product model of making investment management decisions has been developed; it adequately describes the process of investment management. The expediency of using constructed production model on a practical example is shown.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1202-1222
Author(s):  
M.V. Grechko ◽  
L.A. Kobina ◽  
S.A. Goncharenko

Subject. The article focuses on the decision-making mechanism used by economic agents given the existing social constraints. Objectives. We devise applied toolkit to study how socio-economic constraints transform the decision-making mechanism used by economic agents. Methods. The study involves means of the expert survey, the method that streamlines economic knowledge. Results. Social constraints are illustrated to influence the decision-making mechanism used by economic agents, assuming that the individual mind relies on specific mechanisms to make judgments and decisions. Generally, the mechanisms are very useful, however they may generate serious errors during the decision-making process. Given the social constraints, economic agents were found to follow four mental models to make their decisions in case of the full or partial uncertainty, i.e. the representative relevance, accessibility, relations, heuristics (modeling). Conclusions and Relevance. The scientific ideas herein show that the inner architecture of a choice an individual makes determines his or her decisions. The decisions often depend on the contextual environment that gives external signals perceived by the individual while evaluating alternative ways. The findings can possibly be used as a mechanism to manage the consumer choice.


Author(s):  
Detlef Liebs

Abstract Four kinds of Romans in the Frankish kingdoms in the 6th to 8th centuries. Roman law texts from Merowingian Gaul make a difference between cives Romani, Latini and dediticii, all considered as Romans. This difference mattered only to slaves who had been freed. The status of Latin and dediticius was hereditary, whereas the descendants of one who had been freed as civis Romanus were free born Romans, who should be classified as a proper, a fourth kind of beeing Roman; it was the standard kind. The difference was important in civil law, procedural law and criminal law, especially in wergeld, the sum to be payed for expiation when somebody had been killed: Who had killed a Roman, had to pay different sums according to the status of the killed.


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