scholarly journals Dynamic epistemic logic in update logic

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 1913-1960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillaume Aucher
2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARTELD KOOI ◽  
BRYAN RENNE

We presentArrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing “arrow updates” of Arrow Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing “action models” from the popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought of from Arrow Update Logic’s perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the “relativized” common knowledge familiar from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.


Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Ditmarsch ◽  
W. Van Der Hoek ◽  
B. P. Kooi

This contribution is a gentle introduction to so-called dynamic epistemic logics, that can describe how agents change their knowledge and beliefs. We start with a concise introduction to epistemic logic, through the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge. We then pay ample attention to the logic of public announcements, wherein agents change their knowledge as the result of public announcements. One crucial topic in that setting is that of unsuccessful updates: formulas that become false when announced. The Moore-sentences that were already extensively discussed at the conception of epistemic logic in Hintikka’s ‘Knowledge and Belief ’ (1962) give rise to such unsuccessful updates. After that, we present a few examples of more complex epistemic updates.


2013 ◽  
Vol 651 ◽  
pp. 943-948
Author(s):  
Zhi Ling Hong ◽  
Mei Hong Wu

In multi-agent systems, a number of autonomous pieces of software (the agents) interact in order to execute complex tasks. This paper proposes a logic framework portrays agent’s communication protocols in the multi-agent systems and a dynamic negotiation model based on epistemic default logic was introduced in this framework. In this paper, we use the constrained default rules to investigate the extension of dynamic epistemic logic, and constrained epistemic extension construct an efficient negotiation strategy via constrained epistemic default reasoning, which guarantees the important natures of extension existence and semi-monotonicity. We also specify characteristic of the dynamic updating when agent learn new knowledge in the logical framework. The method for the information sharing signify the usefulness of logical tools carried out in the dynamic process of information acquisition, and the distributed intelligent information processing show the effectiveness of reasoning default logic in the dynamic epistemic logic theory.


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