Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 565-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. P. Steger
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization

2002 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 208
Author(s):  
Richard N. Cooper ◽  
Claude E. Barfield
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

Doha Development Round

2014 ◽  
pp. 74-83
Author(s):  
Badar Iqbal ◽  
Munir Hasan
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Trade Negotiations ◽  
Global Trade ◽  
New Regionalism ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Future

More than 11 years have passed and Doha Development Round (DDR) has been in the doldrums, having full uncertainties that may result in closure. Trade negotiations are at a standstill, resulting in revivalism of trade protectionism in the name of “new regionalism” or preferential agreements (India-Japan, India-EU). This would lead to dismantling multilateral trading system for which World Trade Organization was created in January 1995. It is vital to protect and preserve the gains of the WTO in a variety of related areas. Therefore, the success of a multilateral trading system is imperative, and this could only be possible when DDR is successful and revivalism takes place. If impasse is continued, the concept and practices of free trade would be transformed into trade protectionism in the name of new regionalism. If it happens, then the future of global trade is uncertain and there would be enormous loss of potential and opportunities of creation of trade, and no country could afford it. Doha is stuck. Where do we go from here? The present chapter analyses the issues relating to the closure vs. success of the DDR. Every effort must be made to keep it alive both in the interest of mankind and the globe. If in 12th round, nothing concrete comes up, then the member countries are thinking and planning to replace it by Global Recovery Round (GRR), which is becoming more significant to deal with. Hence, this chapter attempts to examine the three options, namely closure, revival, and replace.

Environmental Directing Principles versus Free Trade

2020 ◽  
pp. 495-518
Author(s):  
Nicolas de Sadeleer
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Societal Implications ◽  
The Precautionary Principle ◽  
Trade And The Environment ◽  
The World

This chapter focuses on the conflict between the precautionary principle and free trade within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It explains that the said conflict illustrates the role that environmental principles can play in modifying a debate with major legal as well as societal implications. It stresses the odd twists and tangled hierarchies characteristic of post-modern law which may be encountered in disputes involving trade and the environment.

Cross-Cumulation Arrangement as FTA Under GATT Article XXIV

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-185
Author(s):  
Jong Bum Kim
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Value Chain ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Free Trade Area ◽  
Rules Of Origin ◽  
Free Trade Areas ◽  
Intermediate Products ◽  
Trade Area ◽  
The World

ABSTRACT A cross-cumulation arrangement helps manufacturers meet the demands of the global value chain economy by facilitating the sourcing of intermediate products within the territories of participants in the arrangement. It is a de facto free-trade area formed by a network of bilateral free-trade areas underpinning the arrangement. However, a cross-cumulation clause provided in a bilateral free-trade area that underpins a cross-cumulation arrangement is inconsistent with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Articles I and III because the intermediate products from the participants in the arrangement are more favorably treated than products from non-participants in the arrangement. The GATT inconsistencies of a cross-cumulation clause cannot be justified by the GATT Article XXIV exception, because a cross-cumulation clause of a bilateral free-trade area derogates from the free-trade area’s aim by facilitating trade in intermediate products between the free-trade area parties and non-parties to the free-trade area that are participants in the arrangement. In contrast, a cumulation clause provided in a free-trade area contributes to the free-trade area’s aim by facilitating trade in intermediate products between the parties to the free-trade area. To bring a cross-cumulation arrangement such as the Regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Med Preferential Rules of Origin into conformity with World Trade Organization law, the arrangement and its underlying free-trade areas should be recognized as a de jure free-trade area under GATT Article XXIV and notified to the World Trade Organization as such. A large cross-cumulation arrangement as a mega-free-trade area is likely to contribute to the world trading system by harmonizing divergent free-trade area rules of origin and providing an efficient mechanism for the formation of a mega-free-trade area.

scholarly journals The Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions for Further Developments

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keller
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Global Society ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

In today's increasingly interdependent global society, international institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their processes to public view and participation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and democratic participation. Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent than in the arena of dispute settlement. The controversy over the acceptance of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement proceedings. This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.

One World

2003 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Binger
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Aid ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Ethical Aspects ◽  
The World ◽  
Special Duties

AbstractThe following response to the essays by Dietrich, Kesselring and Schefczyk discusses impartiality and foundations of special duties; utilitarianism, foreign aid, NGOs and human rights; and ethical aspects of free trade and the World Trade Organization.

The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization

2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc L. Busch ◽  
Krzysztof J. Pelc
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Decisions ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future Consequences ◽  
Judicial Economy

AbstractInternational institutions often moderate the legal decisions they render. World Trade Organization (WTO) panels do this by exercising judicial economy. This practice, which is evident in 41 percent of all rulings, involves the decision not to rule on some of the litigants' arguments. The constraint is that it can be appealed. We argue that panels exercise judicial economy when the wider membership is ambivalent about the future consequences of a broader ruling. This is proxied by the “mixed” (that is, nonpartisan) third-party submissions, which are informative because they are costly, jeopardizing a more decisive legal victory that would benefit these governments too. We empirically test this hypothesis, and find that mixed third-party submissions increase the odds of judicial economy by upwards of 68 percent. This suggests that panels invoke judicial economy to politically appease the wider WTO membership, and not just to gain the litigants' compliance in the case at hand.

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