scholarly journals Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rohan Dutta ◽  
David K Levine ◽  
Salvatore Modica
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
General Model ◽  
Negative Externality ◽  
Pigouvian Tax ◽  
Policy Interventions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Unexpected Consequences

Abstract We study the consequences of policy interventions when social norms are endogenous but costly to change. In our environment a group faces a negative externality that it partially mitigates through incentives in the form of punishments. In this setting policy interventions can have unexpected consequences. The most striking is that when the cost of bargaining is high introducing a Pigouvian tax can increase output - yet in doing so increase welfare. An observer who saw that an increase in a Pigouvian tax raised output might wrongly conclude that this harmed welfare and that a larger tax increase would also raise output. This counter-intuitive impact on output is demonstrated theoretically for a general model and found in case studies for public goods subsidies and cartels.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD CARTWRIGHT ◽  
AMRISH PATEL
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Public Goods

The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Krisch
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Community ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Community Values ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
The Face ◽  
Common Policies ◽  
The Cost

The consensual structure of the international legal order, with its strong emphasis on the sovereign equality of states, has always been somewhat precarious. In different waves over the centuries, it has been attacked for its incongruence with the realities of inequality in international politics, for its tension with ideals of democracy and human rights, and for standing in the way of more effective problem solving in the international community. While surprisingly resilient in the face of such challenges, the consensual structure has seen renewed attacks in recent years. In the 1990s, those attacks were mainly “moral” in character. They were related to the liberal turn in international law, and some of them, under the banner of human rights, aimed at weakening principles of nonintervention and immunity. Others, starting from the idea of an emerging “international community,” questioned the prevailing contractual models of international law and emphasized the rise of norms and processes reflecting community values rather than individual state interests. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the focus has shifted, and attacks are more often framed in terms of effectiveness or global public goods. Classical international law is regarded as increasingly incapable of providing much-needed solutions for the challenges of a globalized world; as countries become ever more interdependent and vulnerable to global challenges, an order that safeguards states’ freedoms at the cost of common policies is often seen as anachronistic. According to this view, what is needed—and what we are likely to see—is a turn to nonconsensual lawmaking mechanisms, especially through powerful international institutions with majoritarian voting rules.

The Origins of Voluntary Compliance: Attitudes toward Taxation in Urban Nigeria

2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bodea ◽  
Adrienne LeBas
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Exchange Mechanism ◽  
Positive Experience ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Tax Enforcement ◽  
Services Delivery ◽  
Voluntary Compliance ◽  
Tax Regimes

Voluntary compliance is an important aspect of strong tax regimes, but there is limited understanding of how social norms favoring compliance emerge. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, where tax enforcement is weak, this article shows that individuals with a positive experience of state services delivery are more likely to express belief in an unconditioned citizen obligation to pay tax. In addition to support for this fiscal exchange mechanism, social context is consequential. Where individuals have access to community-provided goods, which may substitute for effective state services provision, they are less likely to adopt pro-compliance norms. Finally, the article shows that norm adoption increases tax payment. These findings have broad implications for literatures on state formation, taxation and public goods provision.

Applications of an Interactive Balancing Procedure for Gas Turbines and Other Turbomachinery

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy C. Allison ◽  
Harold R. Simmons
Keyword(s):  
Cost Function ◽  
Least Squares ◽  
Gas Turbine ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Gas Turbines ◽  
Interactive Approach ◽  
Interactive Method ◽  
Balance Weight ◽  
The Cost

Least squares balancing methods have been applied for many years to reduce vibration levels of turbomachinery. This approach yields an optimal configuration of balancing weights to reduce a given cost function. However, in many situations, the cost function is not well-defined by the problem, and a more interactive method of determining the effects of balance weight placement is desirable. An interactive balancing procedure is outlined and implemented in an Excel spreadsheet. The usefulness of this interactive approach is highlighted in balancing case studies of a GE LM5000 gas turbine and an industrial fan. In each case study, attention is given to practical aspects of balancing such as sensor placement and balancing limitations.

scholarly journals Editorial introduction: Gender and political financing

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110409
Author(s):  
Rainbow Murray ◽  
Ragnhild Muriaas ◽  
Vibeke Wang
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Women Candidates ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Contesting elections is extremely expensive. The need for money excludes many prospective candidates, resulting in the over-representation of wealth within politics. The cost of contesting elections has been underestimated as a cause of women’s under-representation. Covering seven case studies in six papers, this special issue makes theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding how political financing is gendered. We look at the impact on candidates, arguing that the personal costs of running for office can be prohibitive, and that fundraising is harder for female challengers. We also explore the role of political parties, looking at when and how parties might introduce mitigating measures to support female candidates with the costs of running. We demonstrate how political institutions shape the cost of running for office, illustrate how this is gendered and consider the potential consequences of institutional reform. We also note how societal gender norms can have financial repercussions for women candidates.

scholarly journals Cheater-altruist synergy in immunopathogenic ecological public goods games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Morsky ◽  
Dervis Can Vural
Keyword(s):  
Immune System ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Average Growth ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cheating Behavior ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Population Dynamics Models ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dynamics Models

AbstractMuch research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behavior. Here we argue that under certain conditions cheating behavior can be beneficial to the population. In a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the entire population in the long run, the success of cheaters may aid the population when there is a common enemy that antagonizes both cooperators and cheaters. Here we study models in which an immune system antagonizes a cooperating pathogen. We investigate three population dynamics models, and determine under what conditions the presence of cheaters help defeat the immune system. The mechanism of action is that a polymorphism of cheaters and altruists optimizes the average growth rate. Our results give support for a possible synergy between cooperators and cheaters in ecological public goods games.

Chronicling a Blood-spattered Isle

2021 ◽  
pp. 55-111
Author(s):  
Oren Falk
Keyword(s):  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
General Model ◽  
Brute Force ◽  
The Past ◽  
Textual Source ◽  
Recording Process ◽  
Medieval Europe ◽  
Authorial Intent ◽  
History Of

This chapter implements the general model of violence on case studies from the history of medieval Iceland, especially the Battle of Helgastaðir (1220) and other episodes from the life of Guðmundr Arason, Bishop of Hólar (r.1203–37). It also establishes how structural analysis of sagas—using the concepts of récit, histoire, and uchronia—nuances the picture of history reconstructed from such sources, tracing the transformation of occurrences (what happened) into events (experienced manifestations of meaning). Guðmundar saga A, the main textual source consulted here, demonstrates how uchronia, the ideology of the past, enabled texts to function autonomously of authorial intent: uchronic texts may reveal truths their authors were ignorant of, let alone truths they wished to suppress. By unpacking the ways brute force inflects both the historical social contests recorded in the saga and the narrative tensions of the recording process itself, this chapter highlights the necessity of examining violence in terms of a complex negotiation of power, signification, and risk. In the course of this investigation, various details of medieval Icelandic history are filled in, deepening and qualifying the general portrayal offered in the Introduction. Readers with little background in Icelandic history are familiarized with the contours of this history, while experts find some of its truisms (such as the categorical distinction between farmers and chieftains, or the supposed uniqueness of Iceland in high medieval Europe) re-examined

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