Taxation and the Free Exercise of Religion: Papers and Proceedings of the Sixteenth Religious Liberty Conference, Washington, D.C., October 3-5, 1977. Edited by John W. Baker. Washington, D.C.: Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, 1978. 60 pp. $2.50 paper

1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-328
Author(s):  
L. A. Fulbright
Keyword(s):  
Public Affairs ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Free Exercise Of Religion

Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights and Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
VINCENT PHILLIP MUÑOZ
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Free Exercise Of Religion ◽  
Constitutional Tradition

Due in part to the influence of Michael McConnell, free exercise exemptionism is generally thought to be compatible with, if not dictated by, the founders’ church-state political philosophy. This article rejects that position, arguing instead that America's constitutional tradition offers two distinct conceptions of religious liberty: the founders’ natural rights free exercise and modern moral autonomy exemptionism. The article aims to distinguish these two approaches by clarifying how they are grounded upon divergent philosophical understandings of human freedom and by explaining how they advance different views of what religious liberty is, how it is threatened, and, accordingly, how it is best protected. The article also attempts to demonstrate how our modern approach expands the protection for religious liberty in some ways but limits it in others.

Religious Sincerity and the Reasons for Religious Freedom

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 866-877
Author(s):  
David Golemboski
Keyword(s):  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Potential Component ◽  
Sufficient Degree ◽  
Free Exercise Of Religion ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
Fundamental Values ◽  
Number Of Authors

Embedded in U.S. legal frameworks governing the free exercise of religion is a criterion that has received surprisingly little theoretical attention: sincerity. Only those professions of belief that are sincere warrant legal accommodation. Nearly all of the existing literature on sincerity focuses on judicial “tests,” or evidentiary frameworks, for judging sincerity. This paper, in contrast, interrogates the notion of sincerity itself, developing a conception of what properly constitutes a sincere profession of belief. That conception includes three elements: genuineness, nonopportunism, and intelligibility. I then consider a fourth potential component of sincerity, vigilance, which concerns a believer’s consistency in living in accordance with their belief. A number of authors have recently proposed judicial tests requiring some sufficient degree of vigilance, but I argue that a vigilance criterion is incompatible with the fundamental values and objectives that underwrite the commitment to religious liberty in liberal political orders.

scholarly journals Telescoping and Collectivizing Religious Free Exercise Rights

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry L. Chambers
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Free Exercise

If courts are willing to expand religious liberty so that people may be allowed to choose-on the basis of their own religious beliefs-whether certain laws will apply to non-religious entities they create, those courts should take that step very carefully. This Paper explores the issue and pro- ceeds as follows. Part I discusses three recent Supreme Court cases that il- luminate the telescoping and the collectivization of free exercise rights. Part II considers problems that accompany telescoping and collectivizing free exercise rights. Part III suggests how courts should critically evaluate the telescoping and collectivizing of free exercise rights. This Paper con- cludes with a warning about the danger that can accompany insufficient consideration of the telescoping and collectivizing of free exercise rights through entities.

NO TEARS FOR CREON

Legal Theory ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 245-266
Author(s):  
Marc O. DeGirolami
Keyword(s):  
Religious Liberty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Comprehensive Theory ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Equal Respect ◽  
The Government ◽  
Normative Status

This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality (2008). Nussbaum's thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood (as a historical exercise) and justified (as a philosophical one) by recourse to the overarching principle of equal respect—that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.” Nussbaum insists that equal respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are subordinate to it. She examines various free-exercise and establishment issues in light of this principle, concluding that the tradition of religious equality is under threat and calling for renewed vigilance in its defense. This essay criticizes Nussbaum's elevation of the principle of equal respect to supreme normative status. It claims that Nussbaum's single-minded focus on equal respect distorts and misunderstands the conflicts actually at issue in many religious liberty disputes. The essay focuses specifically on the inadequacies of her assessment of two prominent religious liberty cases, one in the free exercise and the other in the established context. This essay concludes that there are reasons for deep skepticism about Nussbaum's approach as a comprehensive theory of the religion clauses.

Secularism and US Religion Jurisprudence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Corbin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Church And State ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
Establishment Clause ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Free Exercise Clause ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Religious surveys are finding greater percentages of Americans who self-identify as secular. At the same time, religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause have become more difficult to obtain. However, religion jurisprudence in the United States has not become more secular for two reasons. First, this greater unwillingness to grant constitutional exemptions reflects a shift in constitutional jurisprudence from “separationism” to “neutrality.” Rather than building a wall between church and state, the Establishment Clause is now interpreted to impose fewer restraints on state-sponsored religion. Second, statutes like the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act and its state counterparts have not only reestablished separationist era levels of protection for religious liberty but increased them. The result is a religion jurisprudence where religion is accommodated more than ever, while the state has more leeway to advance religion. This combination has unfortunate consequences for both secular people and core secular values, such as antidiscrimination.

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