Firm Reputation, Innovation and Employee Startups
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Abstract This article studies how a firm’s reputation for rewarding innovative employees affects innovation and startup creation. In any Pareto-efficient equilibrium of the repeated game, low-value innovations are developed in-house, while high-value innovations are developed in startups. When distributions of ideas are ordered by simple cases of first- or second-order stochastic dominance, the firm has a preference for an extreme distribution. The article also characterises the optimal relational contract and workers’ incentives to invest in innovation. The model’s predictions are consistent with a broad set of observed regularities regarding the creation of employee startups.
2017 ◽
Vol 14
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pp. 257-280
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1998 ◽
Vol 37
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pp. 183-193
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2011 ◽
Vol 29
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pp. 260-270
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2020 ◽
Vol 144
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pp. 106396
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2005 ◽
Vol 15
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pp. 649-651
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