scholarly journals The Sources of Growth in a Technologically Progressive Economy: The United States, 1899–1941

2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (622) ◽  
pp. 2267-2294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerben Bakker ◽  
Nicholas Crafts ◽  
Pieter Woltjer

Abstract We develop new aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) growth estimates for the USA between 1899 and 1941, and sectoral estimates at the most disaggregated level so far, 38 industries. We include hard-to-measure services, and a refined measure of sectoral labour quality growth. The resulting data set supersedes Kendrick (1961), showing TFP growth lower than previously thought, broadly based across industries, and strongly variant intertemporally. The four ‘great inventions’ that Gordon (2016) highlighted were important but less dominant in TFP growth than their predecessors in the British industrial revolution. The findings also make it unlikely the 1930s had the twentieth century's highest TFP growth.

2010 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander J. Field

Between 1890 and 2004 total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the United States has been strongly procyclical, while labor productivity growth has been mildly so. This article argues that these results are not simply a statistical artifact, as Mathew Shapiro and others have argued. Procyclicality resulted principally from demand shocks interacting with capital services which are relatively invariant over the cycle. This account contrasts with explanations emphasizing labor hoarding as well as those offered by the real business cycle (RBC) program, in which TFP shocks (deviations from trend) are themselves the cause of cycles.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-119
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Chernov

The subject of the researchis the dynamics of industrial development in the USA and Europe over the past 15 years.The purpose of the paperwas critical examination of the widely accepted practice of studying the economy in terms of cost indicators. The paper analyzes primarily natural indicators that point to a deep industrial crisis in the United States and European countries who are losing their leadership in such innovative areas as electronics, semiconductor devices, robotics, renewable energy for reasons of a long-term gap in innovation and the chosen economic model. Until the beginning of the XX century, the USA and Europe developed on the principles of a free market economy formulated by Adam Smith that led to the industrial revolution in England while the USA went a century-long way to turn from an agrarian country into an industrial world leader. Other countries followed suit with varying degrees of success. After the global crisis of 1929 and the expansion of state participation in the economy, Marx–Keynes’s model, replaced Adam Smith’s market model. But since the 1970s, growth rates have declined sharply provoking deindustrialization; production facilities have been moving to third world countries; budget deficits and public debt have been increasing along with the accelerating unemployment, inflation and the influx of migrants. Any attempts to reduce social expenditures trigger powerful protests of the population and the loss of votes. The United States and Europe have fallen into a social trap from which so far no one sees a way out. As a result,it is concludedthat in 15 years, assuming the current trends continue, the United States and Europe will turn into ordinary regions of the global economy.The relevance of this study, compared with other publications on this subject, stems from the fact that the true situation in the country’s economy is determined according to the valuation of the country’s industrial output rather than based on the analysis of the GDP per capita.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1366-1383
Author(s):  
Noorazeela Zainol Abidin ◽  
Ishak Yussof ◽  
Zulkefly Abdul Karim

A comparison between countries shows that there is a difference in terms of economic growth achievement across nations. This difference is due to the contribution of capital growth, labor, and total factor productivity (TFP). Although the use of capital and labor plays a vital role in the production, the contribution of TFP growth is also indispensable, as it saves production costs. Nevertheless, in 1995-2000, most countries have experienced a negative growth of TFP in which can affect its contribution to economic growth. Therefore, the focal point of this study is to analyze the impact of TFP growth shock on economic growth in selected ASEAN+3 countries (i.e., Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, China, South Korea, and Japan), using the data set from 1981 to 2014. The study employed the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) method in analyzing the propagation of the shocks through impulse response function and variance decomposition. The main findings revealed that TFP growth shocks have a positive impact on economic growth. Besides, the results also showed that over the next ten years, the proportion of human capital variation would be more dominant in contributing to the economic growth for the selected ASEAN+3 countries. As the surge in TFP growth had a positive impact on economic growth, this finding indicated that each country needs to allocate more expenditure in the Research and Development (R&D) activities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 448-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kellie Forrester

The United States' postwar period has seen an increase in aggregate market hours worked, a decline in home production hours, and an increase in the consumption to output ratio. A multisector growth model that allows for an increase in total factor productivity in the market sector relative to the home sector can account for these phenomena. Households shift hours to the more productive market sector and purchase measured market goods in favor of unmeasured home goods. This channel accounts for a quarter of the increase in the consumption to output ratio observed in the data from 1950 to 2007.


2013 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Zorina Khan

An extensive global market in patents and innovations developed after the middle of the nineteenth century. I employ data from the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, New South Wales, Spain, and Japan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to assess the evolution of transfers in patent-property rights across these countries. The empirical analysis examines the factors that affected patterns in patent assignments and foreign patenting for these countries. It sheds further light on cross-sectional variation in foreign patenting and transfers to corporations, based on a panel data set of patent grants and assignments at issue in the United States during the Second Industrial Revolution. The results indicate that, just as inventive activity responded to incentives, the patterns of market exchange in patent rights varied in accordance with legal, economic, and institutional parameters. The analysis is consistent with the position that developing countries today might benefit from tailoring their patent institutions to individual circumstances rather than adhering to harmonized standards.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (12) ◽  
pp. 2353-2361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiing-Shyang Hseu ◽  
Joseph Buongiorno

Partial and total measures of factor productivity are presented for the pulp and paper industries of the United States and Canada, from 1959 to 1987. Total factor productivity was measured with (1) a Tornqvist–Theil index, (2) a nonparametric index with translating hypothesis, and (3) a nonparametric index with distance functions. Method 1 implied a constant return to scale translog production function. Methods 2 and 3 removed any assumption on the functional form of the production function. Furthermore, method 3 allowed for fully disaggregated outputs. Methods 1 and 3 gave similar results within countries: an increase in total factor productivity of 0.7% per year in the United States and of 0.5% per year in Canada. Method 2 gave rates of growth of total factor productivity that were twice as high, but unreliable because of the assumptions of the method. From 1961 to 1984, when comparable data are available, methods 1 and 3 gave growth rates of total factor productivity that were significantly higher, statistically, in the United States than in Canada. Nevertheless, the differences seem to be too small to be of economic significance.


1998 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen N. Broadberry

A sectoral analysis of comparative labor productivity levels over the period 1870 to 1990 suggests mechanisms of catching-up and forging ahead that are rather different from those found in the conventional literature. Both Germany and the United States caught up with and overtook Britain in terms of aggregate labor productivity largely by shifting resources out of agriculture and improving their relative productivity position in services rather than by improving their position in manufacturing. Although capital played some role, the changes in comparative labor productivity also reflected changes in comparative total factor productivity, related to technology and organization.


1984 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy G. Taylor ◽  
Gary H. Wilkowske

AbstractResults indicate that productivity growth has been a prime factor in Florida's ability to retain a competitive position in the United States domestic fresh winter vegetable market. Total factor productivity indexes and productivity growth rates are estimated for the production of four major vegetable crops in one or more of four production areas in Florida. Florida producers have exhibited substantial productivity growth over the 1969-70 to 1981-82 period.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo S. Eicher ◽  
Oliver Roehn

Abstract While the United States experienced two successive labor productivity surges in 1995 and 2000, Germany’s productivity declined dramatically during the same period. We examine the sources of Germany’s productivity demise using the ifo industry growth accounting database that provides detailed industry-level investment information. While much attention has focused on the reduction in German labor hours, our data show that information and communication technology (ICT) investment in Germany was deeply lacking in the mid-1990s as compared with the United States. The transition to the new economy mitigated the German productivity slowdown, but did not reverse it. After 2000, we find that a recovery in Non-ICT investment was offset by a widespread collapse in German total factor productivity. Over half of the German industries (accounting for almost 50 per cent of German output) experienced negative total factor productivity growth. This second major difference between the United States and German industry performance explains Germany’s secular departure from the technological frontier.


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