Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-712
Author(s):  
M. Adas
1969 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 282
Author(s):  
I. B. Holley ◽  
Edward M. Coffman ◽  
Harvey A. DeWeerd

2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin R. Bates

This essay offers an analysis of the circulation of World War II and Holocaust analogies in discourses about American military involvement in Kosovo. The essay argues that the World War II/Holocaust analogy provided the public with a new vocabulary for understanding the situation in Kosovo. The essay uses Bill Clinton’s speeches about Kosovo during the first week of American intervention as a representative anecdote for discussing the analogy and its rhetorical force. The essay then probes the circulation of the analogy in other governmental, media, and public opinion outlets. By comparing Kosovo 1999 to Europe 1945, the analogy offers descriptive and prescriptive reasons for American involvement that encourage public approval of military intervention. The essay offers conclusions and implications of this analysis for the understanding of the relationships among rhetoric, public opinion, and international conflict.


Secret Wars ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Austin Carson

This chapter argues that escalation control and a shared desire to limit war can motivate covert intervention up front, collusion by major powers that detect it, and official non-acknowledgment if it is widely exposed. Since World War I, large-scale escalation of war has become unacceptably costly, yet leader control of the escalation process has been simultaneously weakened. While a range of factors influence the escalation potential for war, this chapter focuses on two specific escalation-control problems: constraints created by domestic hawks and misunderstandings among adversaries about the value of limited war. It claims that backstaging military intervention allows rival leaders to insulate themselves and one another from domestic hawkish constraints. In addition, embracing the backstage communicates shared interest in keeping war limited. This basic relationship provides a unifying logic for the initial decision to intervene covertly, a detector's decision to collude after detection, and an intervener's continuing non-acknowledgment of a widely exposed intervention.


2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (38) ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Michał Błachut

The historical point of view is important to fully understand foreign affairs. For Polish-Czech relations the crucial period in this respect is 1918–1945. The matter of the conflict were borderlands, with the most important one – Zaolzie, that is, historical lands of the Duchy of Cieszyn beyond Olza River. Originally, the land belonged to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom, then to the Kingdom of Bohemia and Austrian Habsburg dynasty. After World War I, local communities took control of the land. Czechoslovakian military intervention and a conflict with Bolsheviks caused both parties to agree to the division of Zaolzie through arbitration of powers in 28 July 1920. Until 1938, key parts of Zaolzie belonged to Czechoslovakia. In that year, Poland decided to annex territories lost according to the arbitration. After World War II tension between Poland and Czechoslovakia heightened again. Czechoslovakia made territorial claims on parts of Silesia belonging to Germany. Poland once more tried to reclaim Zaolzie, but military invasion was stopped by Stalin. Negotiations failed, but the escalation of the conflict was stopped. Two years later the relationship between the parties was eventually normalized, the final agreement was signed in 1958 and it is still in place today.


1969 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
David F. Trask ◽  
Edward M. Coffman

1969 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 343
Author(s):  
James E. Hewes ◽  
Edward M. Coffman

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