scholarly journals The group size effect and synchronization of vigilance in the Tibetan wild ass

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinxin Wang ◽  
Le Yang ◽  
Yumeng Zhao ◽  
Cong Yu ◽  
Zhongqiu Li

Abstract Vigilance behavior is considered as an effective strategy for prey species to detect predators. An individual benefits from living in a group by reducing the time spent being vigilant without affecting the probability of detecting a predator. However, the mechanism producing a decrease in vigilance with increasing group size is unclear. Many models of vigilance assume that group members scan independently of one another. Yet in recent studies, the other 2 patterns of vigilance, coordination and synchronization, were reported in some species. In 2 summers (2018 and 2019), we studied the group-size effect on vigilance and foraging of Tibetan wild ass in Chang Tang Nature Reserve of Tibet. We also tested whether individuals scan the environment independently, tend to coordinate their scans, or tend to synchronize their vigilance. The results showed that individuals decreased the time spent on vigilance with increasing group size, while increased the time spent foraging. Group members scanned the environment at the same time more frequently and there was a positive correlation between group members’ behaviors, indicating that Tibetan wild asses tend to synchronize their vigilance.

2010 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. M. Fairbanks ◽  
F. S. Dobson

Vigilance, a vital behaviour in prey species, is affected by many factors, including social group size and possibly the presence of relatives. Columbian ground squirrels ( Urocitellus columbianus (Ord, 1815)) show a group-size effect of reduced individual vigilance in larger groups owing to increased predator detection. Such groups are composed of both kin and nonkin individuals. We observed vigilance (raising head above shoulders while foraging) of yearling males and yearling and older females, and examined kin relationships that are learned in the natal nest (viz., uterine kin). We then tested for possible effects of kinship on vigilance and thus on the group-size effect. Because of the kin-biased behaviours and nepotistic alarm calls shown by ground squirrels in previous studies, we expected either a kin-cooperative influence on vigilance or a nepotistic asymmetrical effect on vigilance,. We found that the presence of kin (whether above ground or not) had little or no effect on vigilance. This lack of kin effect reveals that Columbian ground squirrels do not rely any more on close relatives than on unrelated group members for detecting predators. Thus, the presence of kin does not contribute to the group-size effect on vigilance.


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 684-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Rieucau ◽  
J. Morand-Ferron ◽  
L.-A. Giraldeau

2007 ◽  
Vol 274 (1615) ◽  
pp. 1287-1291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Pays ◽  
Pierre-Cyril Renaud ◽  
Patrice Loisel ◽  
Maud Petit ◽  
Jean-François Gerard ◽  
...  

It is generally assumed that an individual of a prey species can benefit from an increase in the number of its group's members by reducing its own investment in vigilance. But what behaviour should group members adopt in relation to both the risk of being preyed upon and the individual investment in vigilance? Most models assume that individuals scan independently of one another. It is generally argued that it is more profitable for each group member owing to the cost that coordination of individual scans in non-overlapping bouts of vigilance would require. We studied the relationships between both individual and collective vigilance and group size in Defassa waterbuck, Kobus ellipsiprymnus defassa , in a population living under a predation risk. Our results confirmed that the proportion of time an individual spent in vigilance decreased with group size. However, the time during which at least one individual in the group scanned the environment (collective vigilance) increased. Analyses showed that individuals neither coordinated their scanning in an asynchronous way nor scanned independently of one another. On the contrary, scanning and non-scanning bouts were synchronized between group members, producing waves of collective vigilance. We claim that these waves are triggered by allelomimetic effects i.e. they are a phenomenon produced by an individual copying its neighbour's behaviour.


2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuyuki Sawada ◽  
Ryuji Kasahara ◽  
Keitaro Aoyagi ◽  
Masahiro Shoji ◽  
Mika Ueyama

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document