Are current accounts driven by cost competitiveness or asset prices? A synthetic model and an empirical test

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 1301-1327
Author(s):  
Alexander Guschanski ◽  
Engelbert Stockhammer

Abstract While current account imbalances have widened in recent decades, their causes are still debated. Trade-centred approaches highlight the role of cost competitiveness, in particular unit labour costs, and aggregate demand. In contrast, finance-centred approaches focus on gross financial flows, driven by expectations and the return on assets, that impact demand and the exchange rate. This article, first, builds a simple model of the current account that provides a synthesis between the two approaches. Unit labour costs impact the current account via the real exchange rate and income distribution, while financial inflows drive up asset prices, which leads to nominal appreciation and an increase in domestic demand. Second, we estimate a reduced form of this model for 28 OECD countries from 1972 to 2014, controlling for both trade- and finance-centred channels and a wide range of control variables. Our results indicate that finance-centred channels, via equity and residential property prices, drove current account divergence in the OECD, while unit labour costs were less important. They suggest that the effects of gross financial flows deserve more attention in theoretical and empirical models of the current account.

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Komain Jiranyakul

This paper is motivated by the controversial issue in the literature pertaining to the impact of real exchange rate, housing prices and stock prices on current account fluctuations. Thailand’s quarterly data are used to examine the impacts of shocks to asset prices and real exchange rate on the current imbalances. The paper employs a structural VAR methodology with short-run restrictions. The estimates of structural VAR models are able to identify interactions among asset prices, real exchange rate, and the current account. The estimated results from two different structural models show that the responses of current account to shocks are different. It can be concluded that shocks to real exchange rate affect current account and that shocks to real housing prices can better explain current account fluctuations than shocks to real stock prices. Based upon the results from this study, policymakers should take into account the importance of shocks to real exchange rate and real housing prices that can affect the current account of the country. 


2007 ◽  
Vol 199 ◽  
pp. 34-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell ◽  
Ian Hurst

The US current account imbalance has stayed stubbornly high despite the fall in the dollar that we have seen since the beginning of 2003. The exchange rate has fallen by around 15 per cent on average, mainly between the first quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2005. As we can see from figure 1, the fall has come in three steps, and each time it fell we might have expected an initial worsening of the current account for a year or so as prices change in advance of quantities (the J curve effect of the first year textbook). Hence we might have expected no sustained improvement until at least a year after the last downward step towards the end of 2004. However, as we can see from figure 2, there is no noticeable improvement in the current account during 2006, suggesting that domestic absorption was rising. At the same time inflation in the US was gradually drifting up under pressure from the weakening exchange rate.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-93
Author(s):  
Chirok Han ◽  
Kwanho Shin

Since the currency crisis in 1998, Korea has experienced continuous current account surpluses. Recently, the current account surplus increased more rapidly—amounting to 7.7 percent of GDP in 2015. In this paper, we investigate the underlying reasons for the widening of Korea's current account surpluses. We find that the upward trend in Korea's current account surpluses is largely explained by its demographical changes. Other economic variables are only helpful when explaining short run fluctuations in current account balances. Moreover, we show that Korea's current account surplus is expected to disappear by 2042 as it becomes one of the most aged economies in the world. Demographic changes are so powerful that they explain, quite successfully, the current account balance trends of other economies with highly aged populations such as Japan, Germany, Italy, Finland, and Greece. When we add the real exchange rate as an additional explanatory variable, it is statistically significant with the right sign, but the magnitude explained by it is quite limited. For example, to reduce the current account surplus by 1 percentage point, a 12 percent depreciation is needed. If Korea's current exchange rate is undervalued 4 to 12 percent less than the level consistent with fundamentals, it is impossible to reduce Korea's current account surplus to a reasonable level by adjusting the exchange rate alone. Another way to reduce current account surplus is to expand fiscal policies. We find, however, that the impact of fiscal adjustments in reducing current account surplus is even more limited. According to our estimates, reducing the current account surplus by 1 percentage point requires an increase in budget deficits (as a ratio to GDP) of 5 to 6 percentage points. If we allow endogenous movements of exchange rate and fiscal policy, the impact of exchange rate adjustment increases by 1.6 times but that of fiscal policy decreases that it is no longer statistically significant.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document