scholarly journals The preterm social brain: altered functional networks for Theory of Mind in very preterm children

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah I Mossad ◽  
Marlee M Vandewouw ◽  
Mary Lou Smith ◽  
Margot J Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Functional Mri ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Angular Gyrus ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Significant Group ◽  
Very Preterm ◽  
The Social ◽  
Preterm Born

Abstract Neurodevelopmental difficulties emerge in very preterm born children (<32-week gestation) in infancy and continue to early adulthood but little is known about their social-cognitive development. This study utilized the complementary methodological advantages of both functional MRI and magnetoencephalography to examine the neural underpinnings of Theory of Mind in very preterm birth. Theory of Mind, one of the core social-cognitive skills, is the ability to attribute mental states to others, and is crucial for predicting others’ behaviours in social interactions. Eighty-three children (40 very preterm born, 24 boys, age = 8.7 ± 0.5 years, and 43 full-term born, 22 boys, age = 8.6 ± 0.5 years) completed the study. In functional MRI, both groups recruited classic Theory of Mind areas, without significant group differences. However, reduced Theory of Mind connectivity in the very preterm born group was found in magnetoencephalography in distinct theta, alpha and beta-band networks anchored in a set of brain regions that comprise the social brain. These networks included regions such as the angular gyrus, the medial pre-frontal cortex, the superior temporal gyrus and the temporal poles. Very preterm born children showed increased connectivity compared to controls in a network anchored in the occipital gyri rather than classical social-processing regions. Very preterm born children made significantly more attribution errors and mis-construed the social scenarios. Findings offer novel insight into the neural networks, supporting social cognition in very preterm born children and highlight the importance of multimodal neuroimaging to interrogate the social brain in clinical populations.

Does context matter? Effects of robot appearance and reliability on social attention differs based on lifelikeness of gaze task

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdulaziz Abubshait ◽  
Patrick P. Weis ◽  
Eva Wiese
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Physical Appearance ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Attention ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Social Signals ◽  
Mind Perception ◽  
The Social ◽  
Behavioral Features

Social signals, such as changes in gaze direction, are essential cues to predict others’ mental states and behaviors (i.e., mentalizing). Studies show that humans can mentalize with non-human agents when they perceive a mind in them (i.e., mind perception). Robots that physically and/or behaviorally resemble humans likely trigger mind perception, which enhances the relevance of social cues and improves social-cognitive performance. The current ex-periments examine whether the effect of physical and behavioral influencers of mind perception on social-cognitive processing is modulated by the lifelikeness of a social interaction. Participants interacted with robots of varying degrees of physical (humanlike vs. robot-like) and behavioral (reliable vs. random) human-likeness while the lifelikeness of a social attention task was manipulated across five experiments. The first four experiments manipulated lifelikeness via the physical realism of the robot images (Study 1 and 2), the biological plausibility of the social signals (Study 3), and the plausibility of the social con-text (Study 4). They showed that humanlike behavior affected social attention whereas appearance affected mind perception ratings. However, when the lifelikeness of the interaction was increased by using videos of a human and a robot sending the social cues in a realistic environment (Study 5), social attention mechanisms were affected both by physical appearance and behavioral features, while mind perception ratings were mainly affected by physical appearance. This indicates that in order to understand the effect of physical and behavioral features on social cognition, paradigms should be used that adequately simulate the lifelikeness of social interactions.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

scholarly journals Entrainment, theory of mind, and prosociality in child musicians

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 205920431775315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatriz Ilari ◽  
Cara Fesjian ◽  
Assal Habibi
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Music Education ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Age At Onset ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Prosocial Skills ◽  
Significant Group ◽  
Sports Programs ◽  
The Mind

In this study, we tracked the development of rhythmic entrainment, prosociality, and theory of mind skills in children attending music and sports programs and in a control group over the course of three years. Forty-five children (mean age at onset = 81 months) drummed in two contextual conditions – alone and social – completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test and prosocial tasks (helping and sharing). All children improved in their ability to entrain to external rhythms over time, with the music group outperforming controls in the entrainment-social condition. Developmental effects were found for theory of mind, but no significant group differences. Although there were no significant group differences for prosociality, following three years of music education, entrainment scores in the alone condition were positively correlated with the number of stickers that children in the music group gave to friends. Results are discussed in light of the nature of collective music learning through ensemble participation and its role in the development of social-cognitive and prosocial skills in childhood.

Coming to Understand the Social and Physical Worlds

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sydney Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Load Force ◽  
New Information ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Underlying Processes ◽  
Adaptation Task

Children’s conceptual development has been described as a process of“theory change.” Specifically, children begin with an idea and then iteratively update that idea by combining existing and new information, making and testing predictions and then revising their idea based on new data again. Similar processes have been postulated to account for adaptive phenomenon in perceptual psychology and motor control. The similarities between the two processes suggest that performance on tasks that measure conceptual and sensory‐motor “theory change”respectively may be related. The goal of the present study is to determine whether children’s development in a complex conceptual domain, theory of mind, is associated with children’s performance in a load force adaptation paradigm. Theory of mind is broadly defined as the ability to understand how mental states, such as beliefs and desires, motivate ourown and other people’s actions. In contrast, load force adaptation is the ability to gradually adjust the amount of force exerted on an object in order to smoothly lift it up, as experience with the weight of the object is gained. To explore the mechanisms underlying these two processes, children between the ages of 3.5 and 4.5 years participate in a load force adaptation task and a battery of theory of mind tasks. We predict that since the underlying processes appear to be theoretically similar, the individual differences in the ability to adapt load force and in theory of mind ability will be positively correlated.   

Developmental Pragmatics

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Rosenthal Rollins
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Young Child ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Communicative Intention ◽  
The Social ◽  
Early Interaction

This chapter traces the development of communicative intention, conversation, and narrative in early interaction from infancy to early childhood. True communicative intention commences once the infant acquires the social cognitive ability to share attention and intention with another. The developing child’s pragmatic understanding is reflective of his/her underlying motivations for cooperation and shared intentionality. As children begin to understand others’ mental states, they can take others’ perspectives and understand what knowledge is shared and with whom, moving from joint perceptual focus to more decontextualized communicative intentions. With adult assistance, the young child is able to engage in increasingly more sophisticated conversational exchanges and co-constructed narratives which influence the child’s autonomous capabilities.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of theory-of-mind are associated with variation in children’s everyday social cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 579-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora E Mukerji ◽  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Charles A Nelson ◽  
Christine I Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
Cognitive Behavior ◽  
School Age ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of “Theory of Mind” in very preterm born children

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (11) ◽  
pp. 5577-5589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah I. Mossad ◽  
Mary Lou Smith ◽  
Elizabeth W. Pang ◽  
Margot J. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Very Preterm ◽  
Preterm Born

Attributing mental states to story characters: A comparison of narratives produced by autistic and mentally retarded individuals

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Tager-Flusberg ◽  
Kate Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Picture Book ◽  
Mentally Retarded ◽  
Normal Subjects ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Standard Test ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Significant Group ◽  
Lexical Cohesion ◽  
Narrative Ability

ABSTRACTThis study investigated narrative abilities and their relation to theory of mind in autistic and mentally retarded subjects, who were matched for their linguistic competence on standardized measures of comprehension and production. We asked 27 autistic, 27 mentally retarded, and 17 normal subjects (whose age range matched the verbal mental age ranges of the developmentally disordered groups) to tell the story from a wordless picture book. Following their spontaneous narratives, a set of probe questions was asked about the story characters' feeling states. The autistic and mentally retarded subjects were also given a standard test of false belief. The main findings were that, when closely matched on language ability, no significant group differences were found on measures of narrative length, use of lexical cohesion devices, and mental state terms. On the probed questions, the autistic and mentally retarded subjects gave fewer appropriate emotion responses than the normal subjects, and the autistic subjects had difficulty explaining the emotional states correctly. For the autistic sample, the narrative measures were significantly correlated with performance on the theory of mind task. The findings are interpreted in terms of the contributions of both linguistic and social–cognitive factors in narrative ability.

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