Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen

2004 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ladyman
Keyword(s):  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Modal Metaphysics

scholarly journals Realism, empiricism and causal inquiry in International Relations: What is at stake?

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam R C Humphreys
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Causal Mechanisms ◽  
Everyday World

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.

scholarly journals Neo-Pyrrhonism, Empiricism, and Scientific Activity

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. e42184
Author(s):  
Otávio Bueno
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Activity ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
The World ◽  
Philosophical Doctrine

Pyrrhonism involves the inability to defend claims about the unobservable world, or, more generally, about what is really going on beyond the phenomena (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 1994). As a result, the Pyrrhonist is not engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the underlying features of reality. The issue then arises as to whether the Pyrrhonist also has something positive to say about our knowledge of the world, while still keeping Pyrrhonism. In this paper, I develop a positive neo-Pyrrhonist attitude, indicating that we can use this attitude to make sense of important aspects of science and empirical knowledge. To do that, I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, 1989, 2002, 2008). Although constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism. The resulting form of Pyrrhonism suggests that there is something right about the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that suitably formulated it provides an insightful approach to think about empirical knowledge (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2006, for the original inspiration behind neoPyrrhonism).

Scientific Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-253
Author(s):  
Heikki Patomäki
Keyword(s):  
Interwar Period ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
True Story ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status

This chapter addresses scientific realism. After the heyday of empiricism in the interwar period and its immediate aftermath, many critical reactions to empiricism seemed to suggest scientific realism. It was widely agreed that scientific theories make references to things that cannot be directly observed (or at least seen), and thus emerged the issue of the status of non-observables. As scientific realism became increasingly dominant, new philosophical stances such as Bas C. van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism were often defined in opposition to it. Van Fraassen understands scientific realism as a claim that science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. More in line with established forms of scientific realism, Ilkka Niiniluoto talks about verisimilitude, or truth-likeness. This concept is supposed to avoid the consequences of claiming to have access to the truth itself. The chapter then considers how the social sciences seem to pose difficulties for scientific realism.

Why There are No Ready-Made Phenomena: What Philosophers of Science Should Learn From Kant

2008 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michela Massimi
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
The Way

The debate on scientific realism has raged among philosophers of science for decades. The scientific realist's claim that science aims to give us a literally true description of the way things are, has come under severe scrutiny and attack by Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. All science aims at is to save the observable phenomena, according to van Fraassen. Scientific realists have faced since a main sceptical challenge: the burden is on them to prove that the entities postulated by our scientific theories are real and that science is still in the ‘truth’ business.

scholarly journals Observation in Constructive Empiricism: Arbitrary or Incoherent?

1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (61) ◽  
pp. 75-102
Author(s):  
Alberto Cordero
Keyword(s):  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Image

EI empirismo constructivo se halla inapropiadamente motivado por la doctrina empirista general. Sin embargo, sostenemos que es posible encontrar una motivacion para dicho empirismo en la peculiar mezcla entre la teoría de la decisión y algunos hechos específicos acerca de la especie humana anticipados por Van Fraassen en The Scientific Image. Lamentablemente, una filosofia de la ciencia motivada de esa manera es incapaz de evitar su propio hundimiento bajo el peso de otros multiples "hechos" relativos a la especie humana.

scholarly journals Kusch and van Fraassen on Microscopic Experience

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-31
Author(s):  
Alessio Gava
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Microscopic Images ◽  
Microscopic Detection ◽  
Realist Interpretation

Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not “windows on an invisible world”, but rather “image generators”. Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.

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