Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle

1998 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Black
Keyword(s):  
Principal Principle

scholarly journals Measure Theoretic Analysis of Consistency of the Principal Principle

2016 ◽  
Vol 83 (5) ◽  
pp. 972-987 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miklós Rédei ◽  
Zalán Gyenis
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Principal Principle

scholarly journals Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle

2012 ◽  
Vol 121 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
Principal Principle

scholarly journals A NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
True Proposition ◽  
Principal Principle ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
False Proposition ◽  
Objective Chance

AbstractJim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations. Joyce's argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that paper assumed (roughly) that a credence in a proposition is better the closer it is to the objective chance of that proposition. In this paper, I present an epistemic utility argument for Probabilism and the Principal Principle that retains Joyce's assumption rather than the alternative I endorsed in the earlier paper. I argue that this results in a superior argument for these norms.

Deducing the Principal Principle

2019 ◽  
pp. 98-137
Author(s):  
Carl Hoefer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Principal Principle ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Von Mises

This chapter gives two distinct justifications of the Principal Principle (PP) for Humean objective chances (HOCs). The first justification is “consequentialist” in nature: it shows that in practical decision-making, an agent who has to make bets on repeated chancy events of type A, and who knows the chance of A but has no better information (the scenario of PP), will do better setting her credence equal to the chance of A than she can do with any other, significantly different, betting strategy. The second justification shows that an epistemic agent meeting the conditions for application of PP is irrational—logically incoherent, in fact—if she sets her credence to a level substantially different from the chance. This argument is an adaptation of one originally offered by Colin Howson and Peter Urbach (1993) to justify the PP for von Mises–style hypothetical frequentism. It is shown that the argument works better in support of HOC than it did in support of frequentism.

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