Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck, and Thomas E. Uebel, Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996 Thomas E. Uebel, Overcoming Logical Positivism from Within: The Emergence of Neurath's Naturalism in the Vienna Circle Protocol Sentence Debate. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1992

1997 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 306-309
Author(s):  
Thomas Mormann
Author(s):  
Andy Hamilton

Mach was an Austrian physicist and philosopher. Though not one of the great philosophers, he was tremendously influential in the development of ‘scientific philosophy’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A vigorous opponent of ‘metaphysics’, he was celebrated as a progenitor of logical positivism. His work is regarded as a limiting case of pure empiricism; he stands between the empiricism of Hume and J.S. Mill, and that of the Vienna Circle. Mach’s positivist conception of science saw its aims as descriptive and predictive; explanation is downgraded. Scientific laws and theories are economical means of describing phenomena. Theories that refer to unobservable entities – including atomic theory – may impede inquiry. They should be eliminated where possible in favour of theories involving ‘direct descriptions’ of phenomena. Mach claimed to be a scientist, not a philosopher, but the ‘Machian philosophy’ was ‘neutral monism’. Close to phenomenalism, it saw the world as functionally related complexes of sensations, and aspired to anti-metaphysical neutrality.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar Beckermann

AbstractFor many years some critically engaged German sociologists have challenged Logical Positivism with the criticism that Positivism’s allegedly neutral conception of science in fact supports conservative or even reactionary political movements. This line of criticism is due, at last in part, to the fact that German scientists became acquainted with the positivistic branch of analytical philosophy after World War II almost exclusively through the works of the liberal-conservative K. R. Popper. Popper, however, is by no means representative of all Positivists. There were influential members of the Vienna Circle who saw a direct connection between the aims of the „scientific world view“ and the endeavour to renew the society on the basis of rational, i.e. socialistic, principles. This connection becomes especially clear in the manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung − Der Wiener Kreis which was published in 1929 by Carnap, Hahn and Neurath.


Author(s):  
John Skorupski

The empiricist approaches to mathematics discussed in this article belong to an era of philosophy which we can begin to see as a whole. It stretches from Kant's Critiques of the 1780s to the twentieth-century analytic movements which ended, broadly speaking, in the 1950s—in and largely as a result of the work of Quine. Seeing this period historically is by no means saying that its ideas are dead; it just helps in understanding the ideas. That applies to the two versions of empiricism that were most prominent in this late modern period: the radical empiricism of Mill and the “logical” empiricism associated with the Vienna Circle positivism of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Mill and the logical positivists shared the empiricist doctrine that no informative proposition is a priori.


Philosophy ◽  
1935 ◽  
Vol 10 (39) ◽  
pp. 313-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. H. Price

The subject of this paper is the relation of Logical Positivism to Theology. By “Logical Positivism” I mean the doctrine originated by Dr. Wittgenstein and expounded more at length by Professors Carnap, Schlick, and other members of the Viennese Circle (Wiener Kreis) in the periodical calledErkenntnis. The clearest account of it in English is that given by Mr. R. B. Braithwaite in the volume calledCambridge University Studies.


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