scholarly journals Appropriate Normative Powers

2020 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 301-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Tadros
Keyword(s):  
Normative Power ◽  
Normative Powers

Abstract A normative power is a power to alter rights and duties directly. This paper explores what it means to alter rights and duties directly. In the light of that, it examines the kind of argument that might support the existence of normative powers. Both simple and complex instrumentalist accounts of such powers are rejected, as is an approach to normative powers that is based on the existence of normative interests. An alternative is sketched, where normative powers arise based on the appropriateness of a person responding to a decision by limiting their freedom.

THE BLUFF: THE POWER OF INSINCERE ACTIONS

Legal Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 168-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Keyword(s):  
Normative Power ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The Right ◽  
Normative Powers

ABSTRACTIn addition to normative powers by which we alter our rights and duties, we can also forfeit rights. Culpable aggression forfeits the aggressor's right against the victim's use of defensive force. So, what happens when an aggressor “fakes it”? If a culpable aggressor is simply bluffing, has he still forfeited his rights? Because there is no threat, leading accounts of self-defense deny that there is forfeiture.This paper argues that individuals alter their rights and duties through insincere acts. Specifically, when one person culpably causes another person to believe that a normative power has been exercised or a right forfeited, that normative power is in fact exercised or the right is forfeited. An insincere promise counts as a promise; insincere consent counts as consent; and insincere abandonment counts as abandonment. And, the insincere threat forfeits the bluffer's rights to the same extent as a real threat would.

The struggle for recognition of normative powers: Normative power Europe and normative power China in context

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilian Kavalski
Keyword(s):  
Normative Power ◽  
Normative Power Europe ◽  
Target States ◽  
Specific Reactions ◽  
Struggle For Recognition ◽  
Normative Powers ◽  
Being And Becoming

Who or what is a normative power? In response to this query the article suggests that normative powers are those actors that are recognized as such by others. This qualifies Ian Manners’s oft-quoted proposition that normative powers are only those actors that have the ability to ‘shape what can be “normal” in international life’. The proposition is that the definitions of the ‘normal’ are not merely undertaken by normative power, but they emerge in the context of its interaction with others. Recognition, in this setting, is indicated by the specific reactions of target states. In this respect, the issue is not merely about being and becoming a normative power, but also about being recognized as one by others. The article details this proposition through a parallel assessment of normative power Europe and normative power China. The intention of such comparison is to elicit the key elements of normative power in global life.

Illocution and Interlocution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
The Difference

This chapter discusses the idea of a “second-personal stance” as developed by Darwall and others, and notes some differences with the notion of “addressing” developed here, particularly with respect to the difference between theoretical and practical reasons. Austin’s distinction between the “illocutionary” and the “perlocutionary” is discussed in connection with Joseph Raz’s idea of the exercise of a normative power. The particular sense of “act” that applies to the perlocutionary status of utterances is illuminated by Jennifer Hornsby’s development of the idea of “reciprocity” as the distinguishing mark of the illocutionary (and hence of acts like telling). The chapter ends with further comparison and contrast between acts of telling and promising.

Outlawing Opposition, Imposing Rule of Law: Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Cambodia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Benjamin LAWRENCE
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Meaning Making ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
Legal Reforms ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Empirical Fact

Abstract Cambodia's Constitution, promulgated in September 1993, was to be the foundation of a transition to liberal, multiparty democracy. Yet, despite the document's seeming commitment to those very principles, constitutional provisions are frequently used to undermine liberal rule of law and to impose restrictions on political processes, freedoms, and rights. Focusing on the events of 2016–2017, including the jailing of opposition politicians, controversial legal reforms, and the dissolution of the country's foremost opposition party, this article demonstrates how authoritarian practices in Cambodia are framed in terms of adherence – even fidelity – to the Constitution. Further, it explores how ideas of ‘stability’ and ‘law and order’ often elide with those of rule of law in discourses and practices that simultaneously exalt and hollow out the normative power of the Constitution. This article posits that a socio-legal approach that pays particular attention to discourse can shed new light on the empirical fact of authoritarian constitutionalism, but also the processes of meaning-making that accompany, facilitate, and legitimize its practice. Far from merely a sham, then, Cambodia's Constitution – like many others – is imbricated in a complex web of contestation and legitimation that extends far beyond the walls of any courtroom.

New "S" powers of the state: theoretical aspect (soft, smart, sharp power)

2021 ◽  
pp. 72-77
Author(s):  
K. Tabarintseva-Romanova
Keyword(s):  
Information Technologies ◽  
Theoretical Aspect ◽  
World Politics ◽  
The State ◽  
Smart Power ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
Hard Power ◽  
New Concepts

In connection with the ongoing geopolitical transformations and the increase in the importance of information technologies in world politics, there is an increase in the terminological apparatus of international and scientifi c discourse. The article analyzes such “new” concepts as: smart power, normative power, sharp power, which are a kind of hybrid of traditional concepts of “soft” and “hard” power.

Russia and EU Countries: Partnership for Modernization

2013 ◽  
pp. 54-61
Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
New Classification ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Eu

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.

Consent in the law By Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007. 406pp. ISBN 978-1-84113-679-0 £45.00 hardback

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-422
Author(s):  
William Lucy
Keyword(s):  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
The Law ◽  
Narrow Area

Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s new book provides an ambitious and thorough account of the role of consent in the law and, also, as a possible basis for law’s authority. Given only a slight familiarity with the previous work of its authors, the volume’s thoroughness and ambition will come as no surprise. The volume does, however, contain some surprises, two of which are particularly worth noting. One surprise, at least to those of us with our noses to the grindstone of a narrow area of legal doctrine, is the near ubiquity of consent in various areas of legal doctrine. The book serves a useful role just by reminding us of this. A second surprise is the complexity of the notion of consent itself, for Beyleveld and Brownsword are intent on determining the normative power of the notion, including the conditions under which that power can be realised, who can realise it and why it should be thought normatively significant. This, too, is a valuable contribution to our thinking about a fundamental feature of the juristic landscape.

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