Logical Validity, Necessary Existence and the Nature of Propositions

Analysis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-393
Author(s):  
Ofra Magidor
Keyword(s):  
Logical Validity ◽  
Necessary Existence

Necessary Existence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Necessary Existence ◽  
Concrete Entity ◽  
The Universe

A necessary being is a concrete entity that cannot fail to exist. An example of such a being might be the God of classical theism or the universe of necessitarians. Necessary Existence offers and carefully defends a number of novel arguments for the thesis that there exists at least one necessary being, while inviting the reader to a future investigation of what the neccessary being(s) is (are) like. The arguments include a defense of a classic contingency argument, a series of new modal arguments from possible causes, an argument from abstract objects, and a Gödelian argument from perfections. Furthermore, arguments against the possibility of a necessary being are critically examined. Among these arguments are old and new arguments from conceivability, a subtraction argument, problems with causation, and an argument from parsimony. Necessary Existence also includes a defense of the axioms of S5 modal logic, which is a framework for understanding several arguments for necessary existents.

Being and Reason

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence And Nonexistence ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

scholarly journals Brain electrical traits of logical validity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Salto ◽  
Carmen Requena ◽  
Paula Álvarez-Merino ◽  
Luís F. Antón-Toro ◽  
Fernando Maestú
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Reaction Time ◽  
Medial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Deductive Reasoning ◽  
Significant Activity ◽  
Temporal Window ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Electrical Demand ◽  
Brain Processing ◽  
Temporal Windows

AbstractNeuroscience has studied deductive reasoning over the last 20 years under the assumption that deductive inferences are not only de jure but also de facto distinct from other forms of inference. The objective of this research is to verify if logically valid deductions leave any cerebral electrical trait that is distinct from the trait left by non-valid deductions. 23 subjects with an average age of 20.35 years were registered with MEG and placed into a two conditions paradigm (100 trials for each condition) which each presented the exact same relational complexity (same variables and content) but had distinct logical complexity. Both conditions show the same electromagnetic components (P3, N4) in the early temporal window (250–525 ms) and P6 in the late temporal window (500–775 ms). The significant activity in both valid and invalid conditions is found in sensors from medial prefrontal regions, probably corresponding to the ACC or to the medial prefrontal cortex. The amplitude and intensity of valid deductions is significantly lower in both temporal windows (p = 0.0003). The reaction time was 54.37% slower in the valid condition. Validity leaves a minimal but measurable hypoactive electrical trait in brain processing. The minor electrical demand is attributable to the recursive and automatable character of valid deductions, suggesting a physical indicator of computational deductive properties. It is hypothesized that all valid deductions are recursive and hypoactive.

TESTING FOR WEAK SEPARABILITY USING STOCHASTIC SEMI-NONPARAMETRIC TESTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON US DATA

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1510-1534
Author(s):  
Ryan S. Mattson ◽  
Philippe de Peretti
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Nonparametric Tests ◽  
Extended Version ◽  
Monthly Data ◽  
Monetary Aggregates ◽  
Separability Criterion ◽  
Weak Separability ◽  
Existence Conditions ◽  
Necessary Existence

In this paper, we use the weak separability criterion to check for the existence of six different monetary aggregates reported by the Center of Financial Stability (CFS). We implement an extended version of the semi-nonparametric tests introduced by Barnett and de Peretti on US monthly data from January 1967 to December 2012. The test, first, checks for the necessary existence conditions of an overall utility function and a monetary subutility function, and then tests for the separability of the latter. On different subsamples, our results suggest that only the DM1 aggregate meets the separability criterion. Implemented on macroeconomic data, we have tested a joint assumption about separability and the existence of a representative agent. Thus, the rejection of the null could also be due to the rejection of stringent Gorman's conditions. More advanced tests for weak separability are clearly required to confirm the results found in this paper.

scholarly journals Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Logical Truth ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
And Mathematics

I discuss Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. i begin by comparing Putnam’s 1971 Philosophy of Logic with Quine’s homonymous book. Next, Putnam’s changing views on modality are surveyed, moving from the modal pre-formal to the de-modalized formal characterization of logical validity. Section three suggests a complementary view of Platonism and modalism underlying different stages of a dynamic mathematical practice. The final section argues for the pervasive platonistic conception of the working mathematician.

Richard Mervyn Hare, 1919–2002

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Price
Keyword(s):  
Unfinished Business ◽  
Logical Validity

Richard Hare's ambition was to have united elements from Aristotle, Kant and Mill in a logically cogent way that solved the fundamental problems of ethics (though with unfinished business); and he usually believed himself to have achieved this. For much of his career, his ‘prescriptivism’ formed an important part of the curriculum, certainly in Britain. His disappointment was not to have persuaded others (an occasional ‘we prescriptivists’ was always uncertain of reference), and to have left no disciples; he once told John Lucas that this made his life a failure. Yet he leaves behind generations of pupils grateful for the transmission not of a doctrine but of a discipline; and posterity, while unlikely to ratify the logical validity of his theory, will admire it for its uniting of apparent opposites: freedom and reason, tradition and rationalism, eclecticism and rigour.

6. Language, truth, and care

2019 ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Michael Inwood
Keyword(s):  
Free World ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
The World ◽  
Necessary Existence

‘Language, truth, and care’ examines how interpretations of the world can be formed and communicated. Language emerges from interpretation and consists of a multiplicity of meanings. Words and their meanings are already world-laden. This results in an everyday condition of ‘fallenness’ where meaning is inauthentic and comes from an anonymous ‘they’, not from original thought. The difficulty of communicating truth means that the philosopher’s message sheds light and should be built on, not merely accepted. Dasein’s necessary existence in the world involves it in the world, through ‘care’. Phenomenology dictates that science is only a secondary perception and there is no plausible account of a Dasein-free world.

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