The Unity of Consciousness * By TIM BAYNE

Analysis ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 398-400
Author(s):  
T. W. Polger
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Tim Bayne

Tim Bayne on the Unity of Consciousness

Analysis ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. S. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Tim Bayne

Judging for Reasons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
The Relationship

What, if any, is the relation between modal judgment and our capacity to make judgments at all? On a plausible interpretation, Kant connects what he calls the modality of a judgment to its location in a course of reasoning: actual inferential relations between that act of judgment and others. However, there is a puzzling consequence of this interpretation. It is natural to understand Kant as claiming that every judgment has some modality, but if the modality of a judgment is its location in a course of reasoning, then the implication is that every judgment must occur as part of a course of reasoning. Why think this? This chapter proposes an answer that draws on the relationship between judgment, judging for reasons, and the unity of consciousness.

Idealism Without God

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Yetter-Chappell
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Familiar World ◽  
Attributes Of God ◽  
Physical Laws

This chapter develops a novel non-theistic (quasi-)Berkeleyan idealism. The strategy is to peel away the attributes of God that aren’t essential for the role he plays in idealist metaphysics. Neither God’s desires, intentions, beliefs, nor his status as an agent is relevant to the metaphysical work he does in sustaining a robust reality. When we peel away these things, we’re left with a view on which reality is a vast unity of consciousness, weaving together sensory experiences into the familiar world around us. The chapter argues that if reality is fundamentally phenomenal in this way, we can give a unique account of perception that robustly captures direct realist intuitions of reality forming the ‘constituents’ of our experiences. The chapter assesses the unique virtues and challenges such a view faces, paying particular attention to the question of whether idealism entails a profligacy of physical laws.

Unity of Consciousness and Bi-Level Externalism

2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 528-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard W. Kobes
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness

scholarly journals Think Twice, It’s All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self / trans. from English V. A. Sermaksheva

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 124-129
Author(s):  
V. A. Sermaksheva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Stream Of Consciousness ◽  
Single Animal ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
Tim Bayne

According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases – cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity – are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne’s arguments are flawed, and that animalism is capable of handling the case.

scholarly journals Representation, Consciousness, and Time

Metaphysica ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-155
Author(s):  
Sean Allen-Hermanson
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Empirical Argument

Abstract I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in “split second.” Meanwhile, Bourget’s empirical argument is question-begging. My critique also has implications for debates about the essential temporality and unity of consciousness experience, and, phenomenal atomism.

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