Moore's paradox and Crimmins's case

Analysis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. M. Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Moore's Paradox

scholarly journals Moore'S paradox: one or two?

Analysis ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. N. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Moore's Paradox

scholarly journals Scientific Realism versus Antirealism in Science Education

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park
Keyword(s):  
Science Education ◽  
Science Teachers ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Science Classrooms ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Scientific Antirealism

Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers ask questions to their students to check whether they have grasped the content of a scientific theory. If the students are antirealists, they are also caught in Moore’s paradox when they respond positively to their teachers’ questions, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Finally, neither teachers nor students can understand phenomena in terms of scientific theories, if they are antirealists.

Fallibility’s Payoff

True Enough ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Z. Elgin
Keyword(s):  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Moore's Paradox

Fallibilism with respect to knowledge is vulnerable to either a version of Moore’s paradox or to Kripke’s dogmatism paradox. Fallibilism with respect to understanding is not. The recognition of the perennial possibility of error advances understanding by sensitizing thinkers to exactly where and how they might be wrong. Thus the capacity to make mistakes is an epistemic achievement rather than a failing.

scholarly journals Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox

Symposion ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Michael Campbell ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Companions In Guilt

scholarly journals Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox

Theoria ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-47
Author(s):  
John N. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Moore's Paradox

scholarly journals Moores Paradox, Behaupten, Urteilen

Conceptus ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (91) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph C. Pfisterer
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Mistaken Assumption

SummaryMoore was first to notice that it is absurd to assert sentences of the form “p, but I don’t believe it.” As it looks even more absurd to believe what such a sentence states, explanations of Moore’s paradox have primarily focused on the beliefs thus asserted. Shoemaker, for example, analyzes these beliefs in terms of conflicting higher order beliefs. Kriegel, in return, provides an explanation in terms of logical contradictions. I shall argue that both accounts rest on the mistaken assumption that assertions are merely uttered judgements. What I show instead is that the episodic aspect of judgements renders it impossible even to have such beliefs.

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