Does Index Insurance Crowd In or Crowd Out Informal Risk Sharing? Evidence from Rural Ethiopia

2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 672-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazushi Takahashi ◽  
Christopher B. Barrett ◽  
Munenobu Ikegami
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Index Insurance ◽  
Rural Ethiopia ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Informal Risk Sharing

Dynamics of informal risk sharing in collective index insurance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando P. Santos ◽  
Jorge M. Pacheco ◽  
Francisco C. Santos ◽  
Simon A. Levin
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Index Insurance ◽  
Informal Risk Sharing

Informal Risk Sharing, Index Insurance, and Risk Taking in Developing Countries

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak ◽  
Mark R Rosenzweig
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Census Data ◽  
Index Insurance ◽  
Insurance Contracts ◽  
Agricultural Laborers ◽  
Informal Risk Sharing

Preliminary findings are presented from a research project which examined the interactions between informal risk sharing, index insurance and risk-taking. Rainfall insurance contracts were randomly offered to cultivating and landless households in a set of Indian villages where preexisting census data on caste networks allowed the characterization of the nature and extent of informal risk sharing. We study how informal risk sharing mediates the demand for index insurance, whether index insurance or informal indemnification allows farmers to invest in risky technologies, and the general equilibrium effects of offering insurance contracts to cultivators and agricultural laborers.

Can poverty alleviation programs crowd-in private support? Short- and Middle-Run Effects of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Inter-Household Transfers

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
SANDRA GARCÍA ◽  
JORGE CUARTAS
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Conditional Cash Transfer ◽  
Cash Transfer ◽  
Transfer Program ◽  
Public Transfers ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Private Support ◽  
Private Transfers

Abstract Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become an important component of social assistance in developing countries. CCTs, as well as other cash subsidies, have been criticized for allegedly crowding out private transfers. Whether social programs crowd out private transfers is an important question with worrisome implications, as private support represents an important fraction of households’ income and works as a risk sharing mechanism in developing countries. Furthermore, empirical evidence on the effect of public transfers on private transfers is mixed. This paper contributes to the literature by using a unique dataset from the quasi-experimental evaluation of a CCT in Colombia and an empirical strategy that allows us to correct for pre-existing differences between treated and control groups. Our results suggest that the public transfer did not crowd out private transfers, neither in the short-run nor in the middle-run. Instead, it increased the probability of receiving support in cash, in kind, and in non-paid labor from different private sources by approximately 10 percentage points. Moreover, we find that the monetary value of private transfers increased by 32-38% for treated households.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document