REVENUE SHARING: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL SYSTEMS: THE CASE AGAINST [with DISCUSSION]

1971 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-326
Author(s):  
LEON H. KEYSERLING ◽  
BERNARD P. HERBER
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Sharing

Customer Revenue Sharing Program in Online Social Media

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fouad H. Mirzaei ◽  
Fredrik Odegaard ◽  
Xinghao Yan
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Online Social Media

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Balseiro ◽  
Max Lin ◽  
Vahab Mirrokni ◽  
Renato Paes Leme ◽  
Song Zuo
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Sharing

Taxes, ITQs, Investments, and Revenue Sharing

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 363-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
RÖGNVALDUR HANNESSON
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Sharing

A THEORETICAL VIEW OF REVENUE SHARING GRANTS

1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-184
Author(s):  
RONALD C. FISHER
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Theoretical View

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

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