Giving Succor to Extremism? Judicial Behavior toward Extreme Speech in Constitutional Democracies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Stohler
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Behavior

Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of Congressional Statutes on Judicial Behavior

2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1006-1017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk A. Randazzo ◽  
Richard W. Waterman ◽  
Jeffrey A. Fine
Keyword(s):  
Federal Courts ◽  
Judicial Behavior ◽  
The Impact

The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIK VOETEN
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
National Government ◽  
Judicial Behavior ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Government Behavior ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Court ◽  
International Court ◽  
Bright Side

Can international judges be relied upon to resolve disputes impartially? If not, what are the sources of their biases? Answers to these questions are critically important for the functioning of an emerging international judiciary, yet we know remarkably little about international judicial behavior. An analysis of a new dataset of dissents in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) yields a mixed set of answers. On the bright side, there is no evidence that judges systematically employ cultural or geopolitical biases in their rulings. There is some evidence that career insecurities make judges more likely to favor their national government when it is a party to a dispute. Most strongly, the evidence suggests that international judges are policy seekers. Judges vary in their inclination to defer to member states in the implementation of human rights. Moreover, judges from former socialist countries are more likely to find violations against their own government and against other former socialist governments, suggesting that they are motivated by rectifying a particular set of injustices. I conclude that the overall picture is mostly positive for the possibility of impartial review of government behavior by judges on an international court. Like judges on domestic review courts, ECtHR judges are politically motivated actors in the sense that they have policy preferences on how to best apply abstract human rights in concrete cases, not in the sense that they are using their judicial power to settle geopolitical scores.

Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS M. KECK
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Judicial Behavior ◽  
Policy Conflict ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
The Supreme Court

This paper explores three competing accounts of judicial review by comparing the enacting and invalidating coalitions for each of the fifty-three federal statutes struck down by the Supreme Court during its 1981 through 2005 terms. When a Republican judicial coalition invalidates a Democratic statute, the Court's decision is consistent with a partisan account, and when a conservative judicial coalition invalidates a liberal statute, the decision is explicable on policy grounds. But when an ideologically mixed coalition invalidates a bipartisan statute, the decision may have reflected an institutional divide between judges and legislators rather than a partisan or policy conflict. Finding more cases consistent with this last explanation than either of the others, I suggest that the existing literature has paid insufficient attention to the possibility of institutionally motivated judicial behavior, and more importantly, that any comprehensive account of the Court's decisions will have to attend to the interaction of multiple competing influences on the justices.

SCIENZA POLITICA E SISTEMA GIUDIZIARIO

1971 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 393-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Marradi
Keyword(s):  
Process Approach ◽  
Judicial Behavior ◽  
Input Output ◽  
Judicial Process

IntroduzioneOggetto di questa rassegna sono ie analisi del sistema giudiziario inteso come sotto-insieme del sistema politico, e di sue strutture o segmenti particolari. Del sottosistema e delle sue strutture si investigano le funzioni nel sistema politico, i processi diinput, output, conversion, e le reIazioni con l'ambiente; oppure — in una diversa prospettiva — si analizzano le relazioni fra le caratteristiche di determinati segmenti (singole corti e singoli giudici) e il loro comportamento decisionale.In Italia, queste due prospettive di studio non hanno ancora una denominazione. Useremo quindi, per designarle, quelle ormai affermate negli Stati Uniti: « Judicial Process Approach » per la prima, e « Judicial Behavior Approach » per la seconda. Alcuni preferiscono mettere in secondo piano la distinzione, indicando unitariamente gli studi politologici sul sistema giudiziario con il termine « Judicial Research ». Nella prima parte di questa rassegna, dedicata all'attualestatusaccademico di questi studi in America, alla loro diffusione fuori dai confini americani e al loro sviluppo storico, offriremo anche noi una trattazione unitaria, piú idonea a cogliere gli aspetti generali che è nostra intenzione sottolineare. Passando invece all’analisi dei contributi specifici, le differenze di metodo e linguaggio fra i due « approcci » sono abbastanza sensibili da consigliare una trattazione separata. Dedicheremo quindi la seconda parte della presente rassegna al « Process Approach », e un saggio successivo al « Behavior Approach », le cui caratteristiche richiedono un approfondimento particolare.

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