Brill’s Companion to the Philosophy of Biology: Entities, Processes, Implications. Brill’s Companions of Philosophy: Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 4. By Andrea Borghini and Elena Casetta. Leiden (The Netherlands) and Boston (Massachusetts): Brill. $159.00. x + 267 p.; ill.; indexes of names and subjects. ISBN: 978-90-04-38308-1 (hc); 978-90-04-40016-0 (eb). 2019.

Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is the belief that, for example, eyes are for seeing and gills are for breathing. It is the belief that people go to the cinema in order to see films and that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn. The core idea of teleology is thus intuitive enough. Nonetheless, difficult questions arise as we dig deeper into the concept. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic—that is, is teleology inherent in its subjects or is it imposed on them from the outside? Does teleology necessarily involve intentionality—that is, does teleology necessarily involve a subject’s cognizing some end, goal, or purpose? What is the scope of teleology—is the concept of teleology, for example, applicable to elements and animals, or only to rational beings? Finally, is teleology explanatory? When we say that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn, have we explained why they swim upstream? When we say that eyes are for seeing, have we explained why we have eyes? This volume explores the development of the concept of teleology from ancient times to the present. It begins in the golden age of ancient Greece with Plato and Aristotle, winds its way through Islamic, Latin, and Jewish medieval traditions, passes into treatments by leading figures of the scientific revolution, and European Enlightenment, and finishes with current debates in contemporary philosophy of biology. Chapter discussions of key figures, traditions, and contexts are enlivened and contextualized by a series of intermittent reflections on the implications of teleology in medicine, art, poetry and music.

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Géneros naturales y definición de vida

Daímon ◽

10.6018/daimon.374851 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 201-216

Author(s):

Alba Amilburu Martínez ◽

Jaime Soler Parra

Keyword(s):

Natural Kind ◽

Natural Kinds ◽

Philosophy Of Biology ◽

Frame Of Reference ◽

Contemporary Philosophy

En el debate sobre la definición de vida algunos autores consideran que vida ha de entenderse como un género natural (Cleland y Chyba 2002, Diéguez 2013). Sin embargo, cuando se afirma que vida es un género natural se asumen también otras ideas vinculadas con la idea de género natural que conviene explicitar, tal y como han mostrado recientemente Bich y Green (2018) aunque de manera programática, y ese es precisamente el objetivo planteado aquí; mostrar cuáles son esas implicaciones y señalar las dificultades que surgen al adoptar el discurso sobre los géneros naturales para entender y analizar categorías científicas complejas como, por ejemplo, vida. En este trabajo extendemos esta crítica a las distintas formas de entender los géneros naturales y señalamos cuál es la principal causa de las dificultades que derivan de este planteamiento. In the contemporary philosophy of biology, some authors claim that life is better undertood as a natural kind (Cleland and Chyba 2002, Diéguez 2013). This paper questions the metaphysical commitments related to the natural kind approach in relation with the debate of defining life. The goal of this paper is to show how considering life as a natural kind carries out some difficulties and costs. Those difficulties have been partialy shown by Bich and Green (2018) concerning the essentialist view of natural kinds. In this paper we extended this criticism to other ways of understanding natural kinds and we argue that such a difficulties are due to the acceptance of an inadequate frame of reference, based on a naïve idea of naturalness and on a natural/conventional dichotomy that is not properly justified.

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