Interjurisdictional Competition and Policy Preferences of the Public

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deven Carlson ◽  
Byron Carlson ◽  
Elizabeth Bell
Keyword(s):  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Interjurisdictional Competition ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals Why has the COVID-19 pandemic increased support for Universal Basic Income?

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Nettle ◽  
Elliott Johnson ◽  
Matthew Johnson ◽  
Rebecca Saxe
Keyword(s):  
Economic Situation ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
The Public ◽  
Social Transfer ◽  
The Times ◽  
Changing World

AbstractThe onset of the 2020 global COVID-19 pandemic led to a marked increase in positive discussion of Universal Basic Income (UBI) in political and media circles. However, we do not know whether there was a corresponding increase in support for the policy in the public at large, or why. Here, we present three studies carried out during 2020 in UK and US samples. In study 1 (n = 802, April 2020), people expressed much stronger support for a UBI policy for the times of the pandemic and its aftermath than for normal times. This was largely explained by the increased importance they attached, in the pandemic context, to a system that is simple and efficient to administer, and that reduces stress and anxiety in society. In study 2 (n = 400, May 2020), we pitted UBI against a conditional targeted social transfer system. Preferences for UBI were stronger for pandemic times than for normal times. This was partially explained by a number of perceived advantages, such as simplicity of administration and suitability for a changing world. In study 3 (n = 397, September 2020), we found that the headline results of studies 1 and 2 persisted six months after the onset of the pandemic, albeit with attenuated effect sizes. Our results illustrate how a changing social and economic situation can bring about markedly different policy preferences, through changes in citizens’ perceptions of what is currently important.

scholarly journals Fixing a Faulty Thermostat: A Replication and re-Analysis of "The Public as Thermostat” Employing a Fixed-effects Model

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Walter T. Casey
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Fixed Effects Model ◽  
The Public

In a 1995 AJPS article, Christopher Wlezien advanced the notion that the public acts in an Eastonian manner as a thermostat for shaping policy preferences. I assert Wleziens use of a GLS-ARMA approach may be a true mis-specification problem. I propose the use of a fixed-effects model. Using both the older version of MICROCRUNCH and the newer version of RATS, I test Wleziens models and his hypotheses. The results in MICROCRUNCH are somewhat different from the original, whilst the results from RATS suggest that the findings of Wlezien are not nearly as significant as assumed.

The Iranian Parliamentary Elections of 1975

1977 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Mohammadi-Nejad
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
The Public ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Policy Alternatives ◽  
The Government ◽  
Western Democracies

In Western democracies elections are viewed as a means by which the public controls the policies of the government and decides who the policy-makers should be. Democratic theory makes two basic assumptions about elections: one is that the electorate is generally informed to the extent that it can make a meaningful and rational choice among various policy alternatives; the other, that the electorate expresses its policy preferences through recognizable partisan groupings in a two- or multiparty system.

Platforms’ Governance: Analyzing Digital Platforms’ Policy Preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pawel Popiel ◽  
Yoonmo Sang
Keyword(s):  
Business Models ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Regulatory Oversight ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Policy Regimes ◽  
The Public ◽  
Platform Governance ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Market Needs ◽  
Insight Into

Growing political distrust in digital platforms has galvanized policy debates about how to best address issues associated with their market power and ad-run business models—including the proliferation of misinformation, privacy threats, and electoral interference. The range of proposed solutions includes growing calls for public-private policy regimes, such as co-regulation. Such proposals envision a role for digital platforms in addressing platform-related problems, whose contours need to be defined. In this article, we examine how platform companies attempt to influence these debates and define this role, focusing on the biggest U.S. digital platform companies: Amazon, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. We conduct a content analysis of a sample of 2019 public policy blogs, statements, and testimonies by key personnel at these companies to gain insight into (a) the policy issues they engage, (b) the policy preferences they communicate, and (c) what these communications reveal about their regulatory philosophies and visions of platform governance. The findings shed light on the politics underlying the debates over platform governance and provide insight into what co-regulatory approaches might look like in practice. We call these policy paradigms “frictionless regulation”: light and narrow regulatory oversight confined to baseline standard-setting, receptive to the private sector’s ongoing feedback, and prioritizing fast responsiveness to market needs over the slow and deliberative responsiveness to the public that is typical of democratic governance.

Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wallace E. Oates
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Regulatory Competition ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Interjurisdictional Competition ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Competition Theory ◽  
Normative Question ◽  
Central Interest ◽  
Potential Impact

AbstractThis paper reviews first the theoretical literature and then the empirical studies of interjurisdictional competition among governments. Of central interest is the normative question of whether fiscal and regulatory competition promotes a more efficient functioning of the public sector or whether it is the source of distortions in the public and private sectors. This is a contentious issue; both the theoretical and empirical literature, while providing some rich insights into the potential impact of such competition, do not give us an unambiguous answer to the general normative question. The concluding section offers the author's thoughts on all this with a leaning towards the view that such competition is, on balance, efficiency-enhancing.

scholarly journals The Policy Polarization of Party Activists in the United States

2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110044
Author(s):  
Samuel Collitt ◽  
Benjamin Highton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Key Stratum ◽  
Party Activist ◽  
Party Activists

This article investigates how a key stratum of the partisan elite—party activists—have been positioned across time and policy issues. We examine the extent to which activists have polarized symmetrically or asymmetrically and find that only on the issue of abortion has one party’s activists (Republicans) polarized notably more than the other’s. The article also analyzes party activist proximity to the mass public’s policy preferences and finds that Democrats are consistently closer to the public on economic issues, and Republicans are consistently closer on a subset of non-economic issues. Our findings suggest the need for more nuanced theories of party activism and polarization along with providing a useful lens through which to view party electoral competition.

scholarly journals Why has the COVID-19 pandemic increased support for Universal Basic Income?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Nettle ◽  
Elliott Johnson ◽  
Matthew Thomas Johnson ◽  
Rebecca Saxe
Keyword(s):  
Economic Situation ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
The Public ◽  
Social Transfer ◽  
The Times ◽  
Changing World

The onset of the 2020 global COVID-19 pandemic led to a marked increase in positive discussion of Universal Basic Income (UBI) in political and media circles. However, we do not know whether there was a corresponding increase in support for the policy in the public at large, or why. Here, we present three studies carried out during 2020 in UK and US samples. In study 1 (n=802, April 2020), people expressed much stronger support for a UBI policy for the times of the pandemic and its aftermath than for normal times. This was largely explained by the increased importance they attached, in the pandemic context, to a system that is simple and efficient to administer, and that reduces stress and anxiety in society. In study 2 (n=400, May 2020), we pitted UBI against a conditional targeted social transfer system. Preferences for UBI were stronger for pandemic times than for normal times. This was partially explained by a number of perceived advantages, such as simplicity of administration and suitability for a changing world. In study 3 (n= 397, September 2020), we found that the headline results of studies 1 and 2 persisted six months after the onset of the pandemic, albeit with attenuated effect sizes. Our results illustrate how a changing social and economic situation can bring about markedly different policy preferences, through changes in citizens’ perceptions of what is currently important.

scholarly journals Economic Equality and Social Welfare: Policy Preferences in Five Nations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nate Breznau
Keyword(s):  
Social Services ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Church Attendance ◽  
Family Income ◽  
Welfare Policy ◽  
Basic Needs ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Welfare Policies ◽  
The Public

Welfare policies are a common feature of many societies and often strongly favored by the public. This is a primary reason that every advanced capitalist nation remains a welfare state (Brooks & Manza, 2007). Research abounds on welfare policy differences across nations yet scholars pay less attention to why and how the public formulate opinions on welfare policies. The following analysis shows evidence that the public are not merely self-interested in their policy preferences. I propose instead that they have a further goal in mind unrelated to material gains: the reduction of social inequality. I investigate this possibility using survey data from large, representative national samples in Australia, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Finland, and Poland (N=13,294). Structural equation estimates correcting for measurement error show that those with economic egalitarian values are much more supportive of welfare policies consistent with instrumental rationality theory. These egalitarian values are more important than self-interest and national institutions in shaping preferences for government control of social services, price controls for basic needs, and subsidies for basic needs. This holds true after controlling for policy regime, attitudes toward government, family income, education, occupational status, sex, age, and church attendance and holds in all five nations.

Self-interest, partisanship, and the conditional influence of taxation on support for war in the USA

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Kriner ◽  
Breanna Lechase ◽  
Rosella Cappella Zielinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Support ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Level Variation ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Survey Experiments ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Individual

Does the imposition of taxation inevitably erode public support for war? Through a pair of survey experiments we show that whether a war tax decreases public support for military action critically depends on the design of the taxation instrument itself. Broad-based, regressive taxes decrease support for war; progressive taxes targeted on the wealthy do not. We also uncover the mechanisms through which Americans incorporate information about war taxation into their wartime policy preferences. Economic self-interest, alone, cannot explain the individual-level variation in reactions to war taxation. Rather, Americans assess war taxation both through the lens of economic self-interest and by using partisan heuristics. The negative effect of taxation on war support is both conditional on the design of the taxation instrument and variable across segments of the public.

Public opinion and public policy in Turkey

2018 ◽  
pp. 163-180
Author(s):  
Sedef Turper
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Political Attitudes ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Political Interest ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Opinion Surveys

This chapter focuses on political attitudes and policy preferences of Turkish citizens in various salient policy domains. The chapter makes use of several public opinion surveys conducted in Turkey during the period between 1990 and 2015. Firstly, the chapter is concerned with levels of political interest among the Turkish public, and across different subpopulations. The chapter then goes on to consider the public policy issues which have been salient to the Turkish public over the last ten years and the policy preferences of Turkish citizens regarding these salient public policy issues. The current analysis of the policy preferences of the Turkish public points at probable causes of discontent with certain public policies in Turkey as well as the potential areas for policy change where substantial public support can be consolidated.

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