Congressional Oversight Revisited: Politics and Procedure in Agency Rulemaking

2020 ◽  
pp. 000-000
Author(s):  
Kenneth Lowande ◽  
Rachel Augustine Potter
Keyword(s):  
Congressional Oversight ◽  
Agency Rulemaking

Oversight

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Minta
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Affordable Housing ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Negative Stereotypes ◽  
Linked Fate ◽  
Congressional Oversight ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Minority Interests ◽  
Black And Latino

This book answers the question of whether black and Latino legislators better represent minority interests in Congress than white legislators, and it is the first book on the subject to focus on congressional oversight rather than roll-call voting. The book demonstrates that minority lawmakers provide qualitatively better representation of black and Latino interests than their white counterparts. They are more likely to intervene in decision making by federal agencies by testifying in support of minority interests at congressional oversight hearings. Minority legislators write more letters urging agency officials to enforce civil rights policies, and spend significant time and effort advocating for solutions to problems that affect all racial and ethnic groups, such as poverty, inadequate health care, fair housing, and community development. This book argues that minority members of Congress act on behalf of broad minority interests—inside and outside their districts—because of a shared bond of experience and a sense of linked fate. It shows how the presence of black and Latino legislators in the committee room increases the chances that minority perspectives and concerns will be addressed in committee deliberations, and also how minority lawmakers are effective at countering negative stereotypes about minorities in policy debates on issues like affirmative action and affordable housing.

scholarly journals Changes in Congressional Oversight

1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 493-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel D. Aberbach
Keyword(s):  
Congressional Oversight

Congressional oversight and electoral accountability

2022 ◽  
pp. 095162982110615
Author(s):  
Austin Bussing ◽  
Michael Pomirchy
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Corrective Action ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Congressional Oversight ◽  
Legislative Oversight

Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.

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