scholarly journals Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-335
Author(s):  
Jan Sprenger
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Degree Of Belief

Models, Idealizations and Objective Chance

2019 ◽  
pp. 311-326
Author(s):  
Jan Sprenger ◽  
Stephan Hartmann
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Statistical Model ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Scientific Modeling ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Degree Of Belief ◽  
Interpretation Of Probability ◽  
Models In Science ◽  
Objective Chance

How does Bayesian inference handle the highly idealized nature of many (statistical) models in science? The standard interpretation of probability as degree of belief in the truth of a model does not seem to apply in such cases since all candidate models are most probably wrong. Similarly, it is not clear how chance-credence coordination works for the probabilities generated by a statistical model. We solve these problems by developing a suppositional account of degree of belief where probabilities in scientific modeling are decoupled from our actual (unconditional) degrees of belief. This explains the normative pull of chance-credence coordination in Bayesian inference, uncovers the essentially counterfactual nature of reasoning with Bayesian models, and squares well with our intuitive judgment that statistical models provide “objective” probabilities.

Unifying Bayesian Inference and Vector Space Models for Improved Decipherment

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Dou ◽  
Ashish Vaswani ◽  
Kevin Knight ◽  
Chris Dyer
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Vector Space ◽  
Vector Space Models

How do academics assess the results of multiple experiments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olmo Van den Akker ◽  
Linda Dominguez Alvarez ◽  
Marjan Bakker ◽  
Jelte M. Wicherts ◽  
Marcel A. L. M. van Assen
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Secondary Analysis ◽  
Individual Participant Data ◽  
Additional Experiment ◽  
Underlying Theory ◽  
Individual Participant ◽  
Vote Counting

We studied how academics assess the results of a set of four experiments that all test a given theory. We found that participants’ belief in the theory increases with the number of significant results, and that direct replications were considered to be more important than conceptual replications. We found no difference between authors and reviewers in their propensity to submit or recommend to publish sets of results, but we did find that authors are generally more likely to desire an additional experiment. In a preregistered secondary analysis of individual participant data, we examined the heuristics academics use to assess the results of four experiments. Only 6 out of 312 (1.9%) participants we analyzed used the normative method of Bayesian inference, whereas the majority of participants used vote counting approaches that tend to undervalue the evidence for the underlying theory if two or more results are statistically significant.

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