Strategic Entry and Strategic Voting in Majoritarian Systems

2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Crisp ◽  
Betul Demirkaya
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Strategic Entry

Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blair Brackin Marquardt ◽  
Brett W. Myers ◽  
Xu Niu
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Insider Ownership

Strategic voting revisited: the case of the 2018 Taipei City mayoral election

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Chung-li Wu ◽  
Alex Min-Wei Lin ◽  
Chingching Chang
Keyword(s):  
Real Time ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
Preliminary Results ◽  
Mayoral Election ◽  
Taipei City ◽  
The Media

Abstract In this study, we examine whether strategic voting – in which a voter seeks to maximize the expected payoff from casting a ballot – occurred among late voters in the 2018 Taipei City mayoral election. This multi-candidate mayoral contest was noteworthy because ballot-counting started before all the votes had been cast, with preliminary results being leaked to the media. Theoretically, having access to real-time updates of voting figures could have influenced the decision of voters who were still in line waiting to cast their ballots. Analysis and reconstruction of aggregate polling data, however, demonstrate that there was very little (if any) strategic voting among these late voters on election day, even if they had information that might have induced them to vote strategically.

Agendas and Strategic Voting

1999 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 622-629
Author(s):  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Lisa R. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Voting

scholarly journals Who Votes More Strategically?

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 470-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW C. EGGERS ◽  
NICK VIVYAN
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Education Level ◽  
New Approach

Strategic voting is an important explanation for aggregate political phenomena, but we know little about how strategic voting varies across types of voters. Are richer voters more strategic than poorer voters? Does strategic behavior vary with age, education, gender, or political leaning? The answers may be important for assessing how well an electoral system represents different preferences in society. We introduce a new approach to measuring and comparing strategic voting across voters that can be broadly applied, given appropriate survey data. In recent British elections, we find that older voters vote more strategically than younger voters and that richer voters vote more strategically than poorer voters, even as strategic behavior varies little across the education level. The differences in strategic voting by age and income are smaller than observed differences in turnout by age and income, but they tend to exacerbate these better-known inequalities in political participation.

Strategic Entry Before Demand Takes Off

2010 ◽  
Vol 56 (8) ◽  
pp. 1259-1271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiaowei Shen ◽  
J. Miguel Villas-Boas
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Entry
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