Mutual Optimism and Costly Conflict: The Case of Naval Battles in the Age of Sail

2019 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1181-1196 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Serena

One of the most widely accepted explanations for why wars occur despite its Pareto-suboptimality is mutual optimism: if both sides expect to gain a lot by fighting, war becomes inevitable. The literature on mutual optimism typically assumes mutually optimistic beliefs and shows that, under such an assumption, war may occur despite its Pareto-suboptimality. In a war–peace model, we show that, if players neglect the correlation between other players’ actions and their types—a well-established concept in economics—then players’ expected payoffs from war increase relative to conventional informational sophistication predictions, hence providing a microfoundation of mutual optimism.


2007 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 738-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Fey ◽  
Kristopher W. Ramsay
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 552-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammet Bas ◽  
Robert Schub
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Branislav L. Slantchev ◽  
Ahmer Tarar
Keyword(s):  

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