Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. Luck Egalitarianism. London: Bloomsbury, 2015. Pp. 280. $94.00 (cloth); $29.95 (paper).

Ethics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 127 (4) ◽  
pp. 939-943
Author(s):  
Kristin Voigt
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism

A Critical Study on Dworkin’s Luck Egalitarianism

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Joo-Hyun KIM ◽  
Hyeon-cheol Kim 
Keyword(s):  
Critical Study ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism

Inheritance and Luck

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Mediating Effects ◽  
Inherited Wealth ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

This chapter reviews and criticizes varieties of the luck egalitarian conception of justice. It begins with the ‘naïve’ distinction between choice and circumstance, on which inequalities are permissible insofar as they depend on the former rather than the latter. The bulk of the chapter discusses more sophisticated versions of luck egalitarianism, which either supplement the naïve view with some countervailing principle (e.g. by appeal to personal prerogatives) or by constraining its scope (e.g. by focusing on the mediating effects of institutions). Later parts of the chapter evaluate other contemporary oppositions to inherited wealth grounded in interpretations of reciprocity and a concern about the role of inheritance in enabling freeriding. The chapter ends with a discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s views, which bear a formal resemblance to the position defended in the following two chapters.

Luck Egalitarianism and Relational Egalitarianism: An Internal Tension in Cohen’s Theory of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-240
Author(s):  
Jiangjin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Egalitarian Ethos

AbstractRelational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen’s theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen’s theory of justice.

Cosmopolitan Luck egalitarianism and the greenhouse effect

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 279-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Gosseries
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Greenhouse Effect ◽  
Human Activities ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Straightforward Manner ◽  
Global Regime ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Evidence provided by the scientific community strongly suggests that limits should be placed on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This means that states, firms, and individuals will have to face potentially serious burdens if they are to implement these limits. Which principles of justice should guide a global regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originating from human activities, and most notably from CO2 emissions? This is both a crucial and difficult question. Admittedly, perhaps this question is too ambitious, given the uncertainties and complexities characterizing the issue of climate change. Yet, rather than listing them all at this stage, let us address the question in a straightforward manner, introducing some of these complexities as the need arises.

Consequentialism, Deontology, Contractualism, and Equality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Quong
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism

This chapter advances two main claims. First, that the distinction between consequentialism and deontology, although widely adopted, is illusory and only serves to obscure some of the genuine disputes underlying central debates in distributive justice. Second, that although luck egalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism are often presented as rival conceptions of justice—in particular, as offering competing accounts of the grounds of distributive justice—this may be a mistake, since this construal makes each view less plausible than it otherwise might be. Instead, the chapter proposes an alternative view where luck egalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism can be understood as complementary answers to different questions. Luck egalitarianism identifies one of the fundamental grounds of justice and injustice, whereas democratic egalitarianism is better conceptualized as offering a contractualist account of what it is for something to be just or unjust.

Social Justice

2021 ◽  
pp. 80-122
Author(s):  
Nils Holtug
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Integration Policies ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
Multicultural Policies

Chapter 4 turns to normative political philosophy and introduces and defends the liberal egalitarian framework that provides the normative basis for assessments of policies that aim to promote social cohesion in diverse liberal democracies. Apart from the basic liberties, this framework includes a concern for equality, where a distinction between equality of opportunity and luck egalitarianism is introduced, and versions of each are developed, and it is pointed out that both these egalitarian theories can be used to support the conclusions about immigration and integration policies that are developed in the book. It is also argued that both theories should be sensitive to inequality of religious and cultural opportunities and that the concern for equality sometimes speaks in favour of multicultural policies.

Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 133-147
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Early Appearance ◽  
The Social ◽  
Egalitarian Theory ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls famously noted that many (dis)advantages reflect the outcomes of the social and the natural lottery. In these remarks, inter alia, some have seen the early appearance in Rawls’s work of what was later developed into a full-blown luck egalitarian theory of justice. Luck egalitarianism says that it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no choice or fault of their own. This principle differs from Rawls’s theory of justice. This had led some political philosophers to criticize Rawls for not thinking through the implications of his luck egalitarian commitments. This chapter (1) presents conflicting interpretations of the role considerations about luck play in Rawls; (2) assesses the exegetical support on offer for these interpretations; and, finally, (3) discusses what role considerations about luck should play in a theory of justice in the light of recent relational egalitarian theories.

Fortune and Fairness in Global Economic Life

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 270-290
Author(s):  
Aaron James
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Current System ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Success Stories ◽  
The Difference

This paper develops John Rawls’s famous objection to the system of natural liberty as against the contemporary system of international trade. Even as “dynamic” policies have proven successful in several recent development success stories, the current system enforces a “static,” laissez-faire system of comparative advantage that threatens to consign poorly-endowed countries to a low-productivity, low-income destiny in agriculture and raw materials. I discuss two very different fairness arguments in favor of allowing and encouraging “dynamic,” pro-development polices: an argument from “structural equity” and an argument from “equity of fortune.” I suggest that the former is of more central importance, and that the difference between the two kinds of fairness argument shows why Rawls’s original objection to the (domestic) system of natural liberty does not imply “luck egalitarianism.”

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