Electoral Control with Behavioral Voters

2017 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 890-902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Christopher Li
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Control

The Limits of Electoral Control: Evidence from Last-Term Politicians

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 873-898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benny Geys ◽  
Karsten Mause
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Control

Need for a more Democratic Procedure of Amending the Constitution

1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-688
Author(s):  
Seba Eldridge
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Political Discussion ◽  
Legislative Authority ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
Electoral Control ◽  
Democratic Procedure

That final legislative authority in this country is lodged in the letter of a constitution that is amended with the greatest difficulty, and with a supreme court which is entirely independent of electoral control has become a commonplace of political discussion.To quote Professor Goodnow: “Acts of congress and of state legislatures are declared to be unconstitutional ‥‥ because they cannot be made to conform to a conception of the organization and powers of government which we have inherited from the eighteenth century;” and Dr. Blaine F. Moore: “If we may judge from the decisions based on the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment and applying to the States, the court has it in its power to make the similar clause in the fifth amendment cover practically all federal legislation dealing with new problems concerning which there are few or no precedents. If the court does make this entirely possible extension of its power, then the legislation dealing with the more recent and pressing questions is under the control of the popularly inaccessible justices of the supreme court.”Both these quotations are from studies published before the adoption of the sixteenth and seventeenth amendments, but they are only a little less true now than then, as an analysis of the history of those amendments will show.

scholarly journals Local Union Democracy: In Search of Criteria

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Control Structure ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Vast Number ◽  
Local Union ◽  
Union Democracy ◽  
Electoral Control ◽  
Union Control

A vast number of criteria have been proposed as indicators of union democracy. Unfortunately, little agreement exists on the relative importance of those criteria. This article examines the interrelationships between several major components of union democracy: participation, electoral control, leadership responsiveness, and union control structure. Based on the results an integrated approach to union democracy is proposed.

Incumbent performance and electoral control

Public Choice ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 50 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 5-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ferejohn
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Control

Varieties of Electoral Control

2004 ◽  
Vol 45 (02) ◽  
pp. 409-419
Author(s):  
W. Phillips Shively
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Control

Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of Fluid Party Systems

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Zielinski ◽  
Kazimierz M. Slomczynski ◽  
Goldie Shabad
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Perverse Incentives ◽  
Electoral Control ◽  
Control Fluid ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Do So

How do fluid party systems that exist in many new democracies affect democratic accountability? To address this question, the authors analyze a new database of all legislative incumbents and all competitive elections that took place in Poland since 1991. They find that when district-level economic outcomes are bad, voters in that country punish legislators from a governing party and reward legislators from an opposition party. As a result, electoral control in Poland works through political parties just as it does in mature democracies. However, the authors also find that, in contrast to mature democracies, legislators from a governing party tend to switch to an opposition party when the economy in their district deteriorates. When they do so, their chances of reelection are better than those of politicians who remained loyal to governing parties and are no worse than those of incumbents who ran as opposition party loyalists. These empirical results suggest that while elections in new democracies function as a mechanism of political control, fluid party systems undermine the extent to which elections promote democratic accountability.

scholarly journals Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting candidates or voters

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gábor Erdélyi ◽  
Marc Neveling ◽  
Christian Reger ◽  
Jörg Rothe ◽  
Yongjie Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Control Actions ◽  
Electoral Control ◽  
Range Voting

AbstractWe investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copeland$$^{\alpha }$$ α , maximin, k-veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting.

Bureaucratic and Electoral Control in Occupational Interest Associations

Sociology ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lex Donaldson ◽  
Malcolm Warner
Keyword(s):  
Occupational Interest ◽  
Electoral Control
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