Strong Steam, Weak Patents, or the Myth of Watt’s Innovation-Blocking Monopoly, Exploded

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 841-861 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Selgin ◽  
John L. Turner
Author(s):  
Enrico Böhme ◽  
Jonas Severin Frank ◽  
Wolfgang Kerber

AbstractIn this paper, we show that a provision in antitrust law to allow patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the date that is expected under patent litigation can increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would incentivize the challenging of weak patents and maximize consumer welfare. While in principle, later market entry leads to higher profits and lower consumer welfare, this can be more than compensated for if more patents are challenged as a result.


10.2196/24824 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (12) ◽  
pp. e24824
Author(s):  
William J Gordon ◽  
Kenneth D Mandl

The 21st Century Cures Act and the recently published “final rule” define standardized methods for obtaining electronic copies of electronic health record (EHR) data through application programming interfaces. The rule is meant to create an ecosystem of reusable, substitutable apps that can be built once but run at any hospital system “without special effort.” Yet, despite numerous provisions around information blocking in the final rule, there is concern that the business practices that govern EHR vendors and health care organizations in the United States could still stifle innovation. We describe potential app ecosystems that may form. We caution that misaligned incentives may result in anticompetitive behavior and purposefully limited functionality. Closed proprietary ecosystems may result, limiting the value derived from interoperability. The 21st Century Cures Act and final rule are an exciting step in the direction of improved interoperability. However, realizing the vision of a truly interoperable app ecosystem is not predetermined.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 50-60
Author(s):  
M. Dolfin

Abstract The political replacement effect is an interesting socio-political hypothesis introduced by Acemoglu and Robinson and statistically tested. It may determine, under some conditions, the phenomenon of innovation blocking, possibly leading to economic backwardness in a society. In a previous paper, we have introduced a kinetic model with stochastic evolutive game-type interactions, analyzing the relationship between the level of political competition in a society and the degree of economic liberalization. In the present paper we model we model the possibility of having a sort of phase transition occurring in the system when the phenomenon of blocking of the introduction of technological innovation, intended in a broad sense, appears. Crossing a critical point, the rules of interactions change by means of slightly different transition probabilities nevertheless determining very significant differences in the resulting long-term solutions.


1969 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Parker ◽  
Kevin Mooney

A number of fundamental principles (and misconceptions) of patent law and of the system for granting and enforcing patents lie at the heart of the so-called 'evergreening' debate on patent protection for pharmaceutical products. The purpose of this paper is to consider 'evergreening' from a legal perspective and to evaluate the extent to which the patent system operates to safeguard against the claimed abuses. In the authors' view the allegation that pharmaceutical companies have been able to delay substantially the entry of generic competition by 'evergreening' many of their patents simply does not reflect the reality and mischaracterises how the patent system operates in the context of technological innovation. A patent over an improvement does not restrict a generic company from launching a competitor of the originator product and, in the UK at least, the procedure and attitude of the court is conducive to the speedy and cost-effective challenge of 'weak' patents.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

“Reverse” or “exclusion” payments to settle pharmaceutical patent lawsuitsare facilitated because the Hatch-Waxman Act has been interpreted to give180 days of generic exclusivity to the first generic company to file forFDA approval, whether or not that company succeeds in invalidating thepatent or finding a way to avoid infringement. As a result, the patenteecan “buy off” the first generic entrant, paying them to delay their entryinto the market while still offering them the valuable period of genericexclusivity. And if that first generic is entitled to its 180 days, no oneelse can enter until after the exclusivity period has expired or beenforfeited. The result is that the 180-day exclusivity period is not servingits purpose of eliminating weak patents. True, it is encouraging lots ofchallenges to those patents. But it is encouraging the challengers toaccept compensation to drop those challenges, rather than taking them tojudgment and benefiting the rest of the world.We propose a change to the Hatch-Waxman statutory scheme. Our alternativeis straightforward: first-filing generic drug companies should be entitledto 180 days of exclusivity only if they successfully defeat the patentowner, for example, by invalidating the patent or by proving that they didnot infringe that patent. The point of 180-day exclusivity was to encouragechallenges to patents because the invalidation of bad patents benefitssociety as a whole. Society doesn’t benefit from a private deal to drop achallenge. That doesn’t mean settlement is never a good idea; it is acommonplace in our legal system. But it seems bizarre to insulate a companyfrom competition just because it settles the case. Indeed, we expect thatour proposal, if implemented, would facilitate more rational settlements,in which the settlements that result accurately reflect the likelihood ofsuccess in litigation.


Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Barnett

This chapter challenges the conventional assumption that incumbents in technology markets lobby for strong IP rights to erect entry barriers and capture market rents. In the railroad industry in the late nineteenth century, in the software industry in the 1960s and 1970s, and in patent-reform debates since the mid-2000s, large vertically and horizontally (systems-level) integrated firms outside the pharmaceutical industry have generally advocated for weaker patents or resisted the extension of IP protection to new technologies. By contrast, smaller R&D-intensive entities and venture-capital firms have generally expressed the opposite position. A comprehensive study of all amicus briefs filed in Supreme Court patent-related litigation during 2006–2016 confirms this entity-specific divergence in IP-policy preferences. Historical and contemporary evidence supports the hypothesis that in a significant number of industries, weak patents protect incumbents by impeding entry by smaller innovators that lack comparable non-IP complementary capacities by which to capture returns on innovation.


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