Forgetting about Thomism: Eleonore Stump’s Aquinas** Eleonore  Stump, Aquinas, Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2003), ix+611 pp., $100.00 (cloth).

2005 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-110
Author(s):  
Derek S. Jeffreys
Keyword(s):  
Eleonore Stump

Atonement

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Negative Emotions ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Mind Reading ◽  
Shared Attention ◽  
History Of Interpretation ◽  
History Of ◽  
Eleonore Stump

The doctrine that Christ has saved human beings from their sins, with all that that salvation entails, is the distinctive doctrine of Christianity. Over the course of many centuries of reflection on the doctrine, highly diverse understandings have been proposed, many of which have also raised strong positive or negative emotions in those who have reflected on them. In this book, in the context of this history of interpretation, Eleonore Stump considers this theological doctrine with philosophical care. The central question of the book is the nature of the atonement. That is, what is it that is accomplished by the passion and death of Christ (or the life, passion, and death, of Christ)? Whatever exactly it is, it is supposed to include a solution to the problem of the post-Fall human condition, with its guilt and shame. This volume canvasses major interpretations of the doctrine of the atonement that attempt to explain this solution, and it argues that all of them have serious shortcomings. In their place, Stump employs an extension of a Thomistic account of love and forgiveness to argue for a relatively novel interpretation of the doctrine, which she calls ‘the Marian interpretation.’ Stump argues that this Marian interpretation makes better sense of the doctrine of the atonement than other interpretations do, including Anselm’s well-known theory. In the process of constructing the Marian interpretation, she also discusses love, union, guilt, shame, forgiveness, retribution, punishment, shared attention, mind-reading, empathy, and various other issues in moral psychology and ethics.

Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas

Theology ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 116 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-205
Author(s):  
Terry J. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Eleonore Stump

Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance

1991 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 159-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Kretzmann
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Classical Foundationalism ◽  
Eleonore Stump

Eleonore Stump argues in her article in this volume that Aquinas’s theory of knowledge is not classical foundationalism, as it has sometimes seemed to be, but, instead, a version of reliabilism. I'm convinced that her thesis is important and well-supported, and it has led me to begin a re-examination of one aspect of Aquinas’s theory of knowledge from the new viewpoint Stump’s work provides. I think the results tend to confirm her account while revealing further details of Aquinas’s reliabilism.My topic is not reliabilism itself. Instead, I am focusing on Aquinas’s account of the reliability of the fundamental operations of the two human cognitive faculties, sense and intellect. Accounts of cognitive reliability have a place in most theories about the justification of belief, of course, and so they are found in more than one sort of epistemology; but reliabilism might be said to need them most.

Toward a Theodicy of the Body: Liturgy and Explanation

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-444
Author(s):  
Jason M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Liturgical Practice ◽  
Embodied Practice ◽  
Eleonore Stump

This essay examines recent attempts to remake the enterprise of theodicy. Both Eleonore Stump and David Burrell analyze the story of Job in an attempt to move theodicy beyond the mode of explanation and into the mode of address. While Mark Scott's theodicy of navigation is a notable advance of this paradigm, such theodicies are still limited to speech and thought. I argue that liturgical practice functions as a sort of “theodicy of the body,” a theodicy of address that includes embodied practice as its predominant medium.

(Affective) union in hell

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (02) ◽  
pp. 261-278
Author(s):  
DAVID WORSLEY
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Union With God ◽  
To Come ◽  
Eleonore Stump

AbstractAccording to Eleonore Stump, God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil (or more properly, suffering) if, by allowing it, either the sufferer's permanent separation from God can be prevented or their deeper union with God can be motivated. But if, in the life to come, it is not possible for a person to be united with God, can God have a morally sufficient reason for allowing their suffering? After rejecting Stump's ingenious answer to this question, I argue that God has a morally sufficient reason to allow an inhabitant of even a maximally bad hell to suffer, namely, to prevent their further separation from God, and from themselves, and to motivate their ‘affective’ union with God.

Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering, by Eleonore Stump.

Mind ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 122 (488) ◽  
pp. 1193-1201 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Vitale
Keyword(s):  
Eleonore Stump

Eternity has no Duration

1994 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherin A. Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Fourth Century ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Classical Concept ◽  
The One ◽  
Eleonore Stump

In 1981 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann published a landmark article aimed at exploring the classical concept of divine eternity.1 Taking Boethius as the primary spokesman for the traditional view, they analyse God's eternity as timeless yet as possessing duration. More recently Brian Leftow has seconded Stump and Kretzmann's interpretation of the medieval position (with qualifications) and attempted to defend the notion of a durational eternity as a useful way of expressing the sort of life God leads.2 However, there are good reasons to reject the idea that divine timelessness should be thought of as having duration. The medievals probably did not accept it, as it contradicts a principle of classical metaphysics even more fundamental than the atemporality of the divine. In any case, it is not possible to express the notion of durational eternity in even a minimally coherent way, and the attempt to salvage the concept by appealing to the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is unsuccessful. The best analogy for God's eternity is still the one proposed by Augustine at the end of the fourth century. God lives in a timeless ‘present’, unextended like our temporal present, but immutable and encompassing all time.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document