Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Wesley C. Salmon

Institutions make new forms of acting possible: Signing executive orders, scoring goals, and officiating weddings are only possible because of the U.S. government, the rules of soccer, and the institution of marriage. Thus, when an individual occupies a particular social role (President, soccer player, and officiator) they acquire new ways of acting on the world. The present studies investigated children’s beliefs about institutional actions, and in particular whether children understand that individuals can only perform institutional actions when their community recognizes them as occupying the appropriate social role. Two studies (Study 1, N = 120 children, 4-11; Study 2, N = 90 children, 4-9) compared institutional actions to standard actions that do not depend on institutional recognition. In both studies, 4- to 5-year-old children believed all actions were possible regardless of whether an individual was recognized as occupying the social role. In contrast, 8- to 9-year-old children robustly distinguished between institutional and standard actions; they understood that institutional actions depend on collective recognition by a community.

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Physics, Structure, and Reality

10.1093/oso/9780192894106.001.0001 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Jill North

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Physical Theory ◽

Scientific Explanation ◽

Classical Mechanics ◽

Careful Attention ◽

Coordinate Systems ◽

Spacetime Structure ◽

The World ◽

Background Assumption ◽

And Mathematics

How do we figure out the nature of the world from a mathematically formulated physical theory? What do we infer about the world when a physical theory can be mathematically formulated in different ways? Physics, Structure, and Reality addresses these questions, questions that get to the heart of the project of interpreting physics—of figuring out what physics is telling us about the world. North argues that there is a certain notion of structure, implicit in physics and mathematics, that we should pay careful attention to, and that doing so sheds light on these questions concerning what physics is telling us about the nature of reality. Along the way, lessons are drawn for related topics such as the use of coordinate systems in physics, the differences among various formulations of classical mechanics, the nature of spacetime structure, the equivalence of physical theories, and the importance of scientific explanation. Although the book does not explicitly defend scientific realism, instead taking this to be a background assumption, the account provides an indirect case for realism toward our best theories of physics.

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Problem kategorii decyzji w kontekście naturalistycznego paradygmatu nauk społecznych

Teoria Polityki ◽

10.4467/25440845tp.21.005.13785 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 5 ◽

pp. 55-69

Author(s):

Piotr Łukomski

Keyword(s):

Social Sciences ◽

Cultural Context ◽

Causal Structure ◽

Cultural Meanings ◽

Control Structures ◽

Theoretical Structure ◽

The World ◽

Human Autonomy ◽

The Mind ◽

Explanatory Structure

Artykuł przedstawia tezę, że decyzja rozumiana jako akt wyboru jest możliwa do wyjaśnienia w ramach teorii kontroli, która przekłada się na rzeczywistą autonomię człowieka. Decyzja w tym ujęciu nie jest typem fenomenu oderwanego od przyczynowej struktury świata ani też rodzajem poręcznej konstrukcji teoretycznej w wyjaśnianiu zachowań, ale funkcjonalnym aspektem umysłu zgodnym (kompatybilnym) z naturalistycznym obrazem świata, obejmującym również humanistykę. W ramach takiej struktury wyjaśniania możemy umieścić decyzje jako element struktur kontroli, które funkcjonują równolegle do struktur przyczynowości i stanowią niezbędny składnik każdego autonomicznego systemu. Co więcej, przy założeniu, że umysł spełnia funkcję semantycznego silnika możemy zarysować kierunek badań, w ramach którego semantyka (język oraz znaczenia i treści kultury) może być interpretowana jako podstawa wyborów (decyzji) dokonywanych w ramach kontekstu kulturowego. The Problem of the Category of Decisions in the Context of the Naturalistic Paradigm of Social Sciences The paper presents the thesis that a decision understood as an act of choice could be explained within the framework of the theory of control, which implicates real human autonomy. A decision in this perspective is not a type of phenomenon detached from the causal structure of the world, nor a kind of handy theoretical structure in explaining behaviour, but a functional aspect of the mind compatible with the naturalistic view of the world, including the humanities. Within such an explanatory structure, we can place decisions as part of the control structures that function alongside causality structures and are a necessary component of any autonomous system. Moreover, if the mind acts as a semantic engine, we can outline the direction of research within which semantics (language, cultural meanings, and content) can be interpreted as the basis for choices (decisions) made within the cultural context.

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