The Age of the World. Moses to Darwin. Francis C. HaberDarwin and the General Reader. The Reception of Darwin's Theory of Evolution in the British Periodical Press, 1859-1872. Alvar Ellegard

Isis ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-215
Author(s):  
Walter F. Cannon
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 262
Author(s):  
Febrytha Nur Azizah ◽  
I Putu Anom

Agro-tourism is an alternative tourism activity that relies on plantations and agriculture as its main attraction. Along with the development of tourism, agro-tourism has now become an economic driving commodity for the surrounding community, so that agro-tourism is increasingly taken into account in the world of tourism. The development of an agro-tourism can not be separated from the evolutionary process that occurs through various stages of the beginning of the tourist attraction built until now. This study aims to determine the evolution of developments in Satria Agrowisata. The research method used is descriptive qualitative by conducting data collection techniques through online interview as primary data, and conducting online observations as secondary data. The results show that Satria Agrowisata can adapt well to the various changes that exist and continue to innovate in order to survive in the world of tourism until now. In Darwin's theory of evolution, he put forward two key words in his theory, natural selection and adaptation. Natural selection as a mechanism for evolutionary change, and adaptations that occur in its development over time.   Keyword: Evolution, Agrotourism, Satria Agrowisata, Bali.


Author(s):  
Roald Hoffmann

The theory of theories goes like this: A theory will be accepted by a scientific community if it explains better (or more of) what is known, fits at its fringes with what is known in other parts of our universe, and makes verifiable, preferably risky, predictions. Sometimes it does go like that. So the theory that made my name (and added to the already recognized greatness of the man with whom I collaborated, the synthetic chemist of the 20th century, R. B. Woodward) did make sense of many disparate and puzzling observations in organic chemistry. And “orbital symmetry control,” as our complex of ideas came to be called, made some risky predictions. I remember well the day that Jerry Berson sent us his remarkable experimental results on the stereochemistry of the so- called 1,3-sigmatropic shift . It should proceed in a certain way, he reasoned from our theory—a non-intuitive way. And it did. But much that goes into the acceptance of theories has little to do with rationalization and prediction. Instead, I will claim, what matters is a heady mix of factors in which psychological attitudes figure prominently. A simple equation describing a physical phenomenon (better still, many), the molecule shaped like a Platonic solid with regular geometry, the simple mechanism (A→B, in one step)—these have tremendous aesthetic appeal, a direct beeline into our soul. They are beautifully simple, and simply beautiful. Theories of this type are awesome in the original sense of the word—who would deny this of the theory of evolution, the Dirac equation or general relativity? A little caution might be suggested from pondering the fact that political ads patently cater to our psychobiological predilection for simplicity. Is the world simple? Or do we just want it to be such? In the dreams of some, the beauty and simplicity of equations becomes a criterion for their truth. Simple theories seem to validate that idol of science, Ockham’s Razor. In preaching the poetic conciseness and generality of orbital explanations, I have succumbed to this, too.


Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson

This chapter discusses some themes to which Lewis returned often because they reflect philosophical errors that are still influential in culture—science and scientism, evolution and evolutionism. Under the facade of science, even the science of evolution, philosophical naturalism, materialism, and reductionism serve as the paragons of knowledge and often guide social policy. Thus, “scientism” and “evolutionism” are labels for the combination of naturalism and science in general and evolutionary science in particular. Lewis defines science as seeking natural causes for natural effects, which, when successful, formulates laws of the physical operation of nature. Such an intellectual enterprise is neutral with respect to religious and theological positions and is hardly strong evidence for naturalism and empiricism. Lewis identifies the conflict as occurring, not between science and religion (or theism), but between naturalism and theism as philosophical worldviews. As a case in point, Lewis sees no conflict between the scientific theory of evolution and its increasing confirmation by empirical evidence, but he does see a conflict between evolution as interpreted by philosophical naturalism—with ideas that humanity is not of special worth, that there is no God who is ultimately responsible for the existence of the world, and so on. An item of particular interest is the Lewis–Van Osdall correspondence (recently discovered, never before published) regarding what advice Lewis would offer on Van Osdall’s contemplated book aimed at presenting science to a general audience, especially a Christian audience.


Author(s):  
Nidhal Guessoum

The various positions that Muslim scholars have adopted vis-à-vis Darwin’s theory of evolution since its inception in 1859 are here reviewed with an eye on the theological arguments that are embraced, whether explicitly or implicitly. A large spectrum of views and arguments are thus found, ranging from total rejection to total acceptance, including “human exceptionalism” (evolution is applicable to all organisms and animals but not to humans). The two main theological arguments that are thus extracted from Muslim scholars’ discussions of evolution are: 1) Is God excluded by the evolutionary paradigm or does the term “Creator” acquire a new definition? 2) Does Adam still exist in the human evolution scenario, and how to include his Qur’anic story in the scientific scenario? Additional, but less crucial issues are sometimes raised in Islamic discussions of evolution: a) Does the extinction of innumerable species during the history of life on earth conflict with the traditional view of God’s creation? b) Is theodicy (“the problem of evil”) exacerbated or explained by evolution? c) Are “species” well-defined and important biological entities in the Islamic worldview? d) Can the randomness that seems inherent in the evolutionary process be reconciled with a divine creation plan? These questions are here reviewed through the writings and arguments of Muslim scholars, and general conclusions are drawn about why rejectionists find it impossible to address those issues in a manner that is consistent with their religious principles and methods, and why more progressive, less literalistic scholars are able to fold those issues within a less rigid conception of God and the world.


1909 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Eliot

As students in this summer's School of Theology you have attended a series of lectures on fluctuations in religious interest, on the frequent occurrence of religious declines followed soon by recoveries or regenerations both within and without the churches, on the frequent attempts to bring the prevalent religious doctrines into harmony with new tendencies in the intellectual world, on the constant struggle between conservatism and liberalism in existing churches and between idealism and materialism in society at large, on the effects of popular education and the modern spirit of inquiry on religious doctrines and organizations, on the changed views of thinking people concerning the nature of the world and of man, on the increase of knowledge as affecting religion, and on the new ideas of God. You have also listened to lectures on psychotherapy, a new development of an ancient tendency to mix religion with medicine, and on the theory of evolution, a modern scientific doctrine which within fifty years has profoundly modified the religious conceptions and expectations of many thinking people. You have heard, too, how the new ideas of democracy and social progress have modified and ought to modify not only the actual work done by the churches, but the whole conception of the function of churches.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-10
Author(s):  
Matthew Williams ◽  
João Teixeira

Who are we? Where did we come from? Why are we here? These fundamental questions have been widespread throughout human history, shared across different cultures from distant epochs and geographical locations. The search has been as much a philosophical as an empirical one, capturing the imagination of the philosopher, the theologian, the artist and the scientist alike. Hence, the quest for unveiling our origins is probably as old as humanity itself. From a scientific point of view, which we address in the present article, the question of human origins became deeply intertwined with Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in the late 19th century. This led to the development of scientific fields such as palaeoanthropology, which analyses fossil remains, stone tools and cultural artefacts to piece together our past. Recently, however, the possibility to assess genetic information from thousands of individuals across the world and, more importantly, to obtain DNA from specimens that lived thousands of years in the past (so-called ancient DNA [aDNA] analyses) is rapidly transforming long-held beliefs about our origins. As such, we have never been in a better position to ask what do our genomes have to tell us about where we came from. Ultimately, however, can they tell us who we are?


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