You Can Pay Me Now and You Can Pay Me Later: The Dynamic Response of Executive Compensation to Firm Performance

1995 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 577 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Boschen ◽  
Kimberly J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Dynamic Response ◽  
Executive Compensation

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

Executive Compensation-Firm Performance Relationship: A Perspective From India

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Arti Chandani ◽  
Mita Mehta ◽  
Dr.Vishal Baulkaran ◽  
Dr. Harsha Sarvaiya
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation

Troubled Asset Relief Program and earnings informativeness

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-68
Author(s):  
Jose G. Vega ◽  
Jan Smolarski ◽  
Jennifer Yin
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Window Approach ◽  
Relief Program

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine restrictions placed by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on executive compensation during the financial crisis. Since it remains unclear if TARP restored public confidence in financial institutions, the authors also analyze what effect such regulations had on investors’ confidence in the information provided by earning with respect to executive compensation during this critical period. Design/methodology/approach To test the assertions, the authors employ an Earnings Response Coefficient model, which captures the association between firms’ earnings surprise (ES) and perceived earnings informativeness. The authors implement both a long- and short-window test to obtain a better understanding of the effects of TARP on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The authors use the long-window approach to gather evidence about whether and how financial institutions’ ES are absorbed into security prices conditional on both their participation in TARP and their compliance with TARP’s compensation restrictions. The authors attempt to establish a stronger causal link by also using a short-window approach. Findings The authors find that firms paying their CEOs above the TARP threshold show higher earnings informativeness. Financial institutions that paid their CEOs above the TARP threshold achieved better performance during their participation in TARP. The authors also find that a decrease in total compensation while participating in TARP is associated with improved earnings informativeness. Lastly, separating total compensation into its cash and stock-based components, the authors find that firms improve earnings informativeness when they increase (decrease) cash (performance) compensation during TARP. However, overall earnings informativeness decreases during and after TARP relative to the pre-TARP period. Practical implications The research suggests that executive compensation incentives affect earnings informativeness and that tradeoffs are made between direct and indirect costs in retaining executives. The results have implications for policy makers, investors and researchers because the results allow policy makers and regulators to improve on how they design and implement accounting, market and finance regulations and reforms. Investors may potentially use the results when evaluating firm experiencing financial and, in some case, political distress. It also helps firms and offering optimal compensation contracts to create proper incentives for executives and ensure that managerial actions result in successful firm performance. Social implications The study shows how firms react to changing regulations that affect executive compensation and earning informativeness. The results of the study allow regulators to potentially design more effective regulations by targeting certain aspects of firms’ operation such excessive risk-taking behavior and rent extraction opportunities. Originality/value There are very few studies that deal with how firms react to regulation that affect executive compensation. The authors provide evidence regarding what effect TARP and its compensation restrictions had on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The evidence in the study will further regulators’ understanding of whether TARP improved investors’ confidence in financial institutions. The paper also contributes to the understanding in how changes in executive compensation in times of high political scrutiny affect investors’ perceptions of firm performance.

Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case of CEOs Hired after the Imposition of 162(m)

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Balsam ◽  
David H. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Internal Revenue ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Bonus Pay ◽  
Executive Officers

This study analyzes the effect of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) on the compensation package of those chief executive officers (CEOs) hired after the imposition of this code section. Research documents that CEO compensation has increased dramatically since the imposition of section 162(m); yet, this research has not distinguished between the effects on the compensation of CEOs already in place when section 162(m) was imposed from those CEOs hired post-162(m) imposition. We focus our analysis on the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of section 162(m), because when firms hire a new CEO, they have a better opportunity to redesign the executive pay package. Consequently, we posit that section 162(m) will have its greatest effect when the affected companies change CEOs. Our analysis provides evidence that the increase in salary normally associated with the hiring of a new CEO has been mitigated and there has been an increase in the sensitivity of firm performance to bonus pay for CEOs appointed after 1994 in affected firms.

scholarly journals EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM INDIAN FIRMS

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 124
Author(s):  
Mehul Raithatha ◽  
Surenderrao Komera
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation

Investigating the associations between executive compensation and firm performance

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nader Elsayed ◽  
Hany Elbardan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Performance Pay ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Study Results ◽  
And Performance

PurposeWhile there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.Design/methodology/approachUsing data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).FindingsThe authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.Research limitations/implicationsInevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.Practical implicationsThe study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.Originality/valueThis paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

scholarly journals The impact of hedge fund activism on target firm performance, executive compensation and executive wealth

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Carrothers
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Share Price ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the relationship between hedge fund activism and target firm performance, executive compensation, and executive wealth. It introduces a theoretical framework that describes the activism process as a sequence of discrete decisions. The methodology uses regression analysis on a matched sample based on firm size, industry, and market-to-book ratio. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. Schedule 13D Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings are the source for the statistical sample of hedge fund target firms. I supplement that data with target firm financial, operating, and share price information from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database. Activist hedge funds target undervalued or underperforming firms with high profitability and cash flows. They do not avoid firms with powerful CEOs. Leverage, executive compensation, pay for performance and CEO turnover increase at target firms after the arrival of the activist hedge fund. Target firm executives’ wealth is more sensitive to changes in share price after hedge fund activism events suggesting that the executive team experiences changes to their compensation structure that provides incentive to take action to improve returns to shareholders. The top executives reap rewards for increasing firm value but not for increased risk taking.

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