The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher: Discussion and Replies. Ernest Sosa

1983 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-171
Author(s):  
Timo Airaksinen
Keyword(s):  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Nicholas Rescher

Myles Brand. Introduction: defining “causes.”The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 1–44. - Ernest Nagel. The logical character of scientific laws. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 77–110. (Reprinted from XL 262(11), pp. 47–78.) - Roderick M. Chisholm. Law statements and counterfactual inference. A reprint of XXI 86. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 111–121. - Nelson Goodman. The problem of counterfactual conditionals. A reprint of XII 139. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 123–149. - Robert Stalnaker. A theory of conditionals. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 151–166. (Reprinted from Studies in logical theory, edited by Nicholas Rescher, American philosophical quarterly monograph series, no. 2, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1968, pp. 98–112; also reprinted in Causation and conditionals, edited by Ernest Sosa, Oxford readings in philosophy, Oxford University Press, London etc. 1975, pp. 165–179.) - Arthur Burks. The logic of causal propositions. A reprint of XVI 277. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 255–276. - J. L. Mackie. Causes and conditions. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 307–344. (Reprinted from American philosophical quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 245–264.) - Donald Davidson. Causal relations. The nature of causation, edited and with an introduction by Myles Brand, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, pp. 353–367. (Reprinted from The journal of philosophy, vol. 64 (1967), pp. 691–703; also reprinted in The logic of grammar, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., Encino and Belmont, Calif., 1975, pp. 246–254.)

1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 470-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Logical Theory ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
University Of Illinois ◽  
Nelson Goodman ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Nicholas Rescher ◽  
Scientific Laws ◽  
Gilbert Harman

The Coherence Theory of Truth. Nicholas Rescher

1974 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-298
Author(s):  
Alex C. Michalos
Keyword(s):  
Coherence Theory ◽  
Nicholas Rescher

Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey C. King
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Physical State ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Paradox Of Analysis ◽  
Relevant Notion

This article examines the main lines of contemporary thinking about analysis in philosophy. It first considers G. E. Moore’s statement of the paradox of analysis. It then reviews a number of accounts of analysis that address the paradox of analysis, including the account offered by Ernest Sosa 1983 and others by Felicia Ackerman (1981, 1986, 1991); the latter gives an account of analysis on which properties are the objects of analysis. It also discusses Jeffrey C. King’s (1998, 2007) accounts of philosophical analysis, before turning to views of analysis that are not aimed at addressing the paradox of analysis, including those associated with David Lewis, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers. In particular, it comments on Lewis’s argument that conceptual analysis is simply a means for picking out the physical state that occupies a certain role, where formulating what that role is constitutes a conceptual analysis of the relevant notion.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Williams
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Vicious Circularity ◽  
Direct Answer

AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. Central to Sosa's anti-skeptical strategy is the claim that there are two kinds of knowledge. His thought is that animal knowledge, which can be understood in purely reliabilist terms, can ground justified trust in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties, thus elevating us (without vicious circularity) to the level of reflective knowledge. I offer a sketch of an alternative approach, linking knowledge and justification with epistemic accountability and responsible belief-management, which casts doubt on the idea that "animal" knowledge is knowledge properly so-called. However, it turns out that this approach is (perhaps surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa's. I suggest that the differences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

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